Peo in Interest of WW

24CA2164 Peo in Interest of WW 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2164
Boulder County District Court No. 23JV30139
Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of W.W. and R.B., Children,

and Concerning A.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 5, 2025

Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County
Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 A.B. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with W.W. and R.B. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human

Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect based on mother’s

substance use. The juvenile court adjudicated the children

dependent or neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan

for mother.

¶3 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. After an evidentiary hearing, held sixteen months after the

filing of the petition, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated mother’s parental rights. The children were four and

five years old at the time of termination.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶4 Mother’s sole contention is that the juvenile court erred in

concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her and reunite the family because the Department

failed to provide family time services. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the department must make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

“Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” to

reunify parents with their children, and services provided in

accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114). As relevant here, “[f]amily time services

for parents with children or youth in out-of-home placement” are

required. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV).

¶6 Family time services must be provided “as determined

necessary and appropriate by individual case plans” and must “be

designed to . . . [p]romote the immediate health, safety, and well-

being” of children in out-of-home placement. § 19-3-208(2)(a), (b);

see also § 19-3-209, C.R.S. 2024 (requiring an individual case

plan). A department can “satisfy its section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV)

family time services obligations by making available and providing

appropriate therapeutic family time services . . . even if those

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services don’t successfully result in face-to-face contact because of

continuing risks to the child’s or youth’s health and safety from

such contact.” People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 40.

¶7 A department may not restrict family time services without the

juvenile court’s oversight, and while the court may not delegate

decisions to restrict family time, it may “utilize the services of

experts, such as therapists, and rely on their recommendations . . .

subject to the continuing supervision and review” of the court.

People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005).

Family time services may be denied if the court finds “that visitation

with the parent would be detrimental to the health and safety of the

child.” People In Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23.

¶8 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination based on those findings. Id.

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B. Additional Background

1. Initial Family Time

¶9 At the shelter hearing, the juvenile court ordered the

Department to provide three hours of supervised family time per

week, and the first visit was scheduled for the following day.

Mother cancelled the visit. The Department then attempted to

provide two virtual visits, but mother cancelled both visits. Mother

first participated in virtual family time with the children one month

after the shelter hearing. Mother then cancelled a visit and the

children refused to join the next visit.

2. First Suspension

¶ 10 Two months after the shelter hearing, based on the

Department’s and guardian ad litem’s recommendation, the juvenile

court suspended family time because the children were fearful of

mother. The court found that the older child had a strong reaction

to contact with mother and said that “he does not want to attend

the virtual visit.” The court recognized “that in-person family time

is very important” but suspended visits to allow the Community

Infant Program (CIP) to work with the family and make

recommendations regarding family time.
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¶ 11 After reviewing the CIP’s assessment approximately two weeks

later, the juvenile court ordered that family time with the older child

be “temporarily paused to assess [the child’s] emotional needs,

provide focused mental health/trauma treatment and to create a

plan for visits where [the child] can feel safe and have increased

ability to access support from all caregivers.” The court then

ordered mother “to work closely with CIP to support [the child] so

that family time can resume as soon as possible.” Regarding the

younger child, the court ordered mother to have one virtual visit,

then in-person visits could commence.

3. Continued Court Oversight

¶ 12 The juvenile court reviewed the status of family time services

regularly and within two months of the suspension, mother began

having in-person visits with both children.

¶ 13 Around this time, the parties agreed to a schedule for

in-person visits. But mother did not attend the first four scheduled

in-person visits. Mother missed visits, in part, because she was

admitted to the emergency room due to an overdose. At the next

hearing, the court ordered mother to meet with the CIP therapist

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working with the family1 and create a narrative so the children

could understand her absence.

4. Second Suspension

¶ 14 After mother met with the CIP therapist to create the narrative,

but before visits resumed, the juvenile court again suspended

family time. The court found that it was “necessary to protect the

children’s mental and emotional health.”

¶ 15 The court ordered that to resume family time, mother had to

(1) attend three consecutive meetings with the caseworker at the

same time and place as her scheduled family time; (2) engage

consistently in recommended individual treatment; and (3) work

with the CIP therapist to create an accurate and developmentally

appropriate narrative for the children to explain her absences.

¶ 16 Within a month, the court reviewed mother’s compliance.

Mother had not attended three consecutive visits with the

caseworker; she had tested positive for alcohol and

methamphetamine; and she had violated the rules of her treatment

1 The CIP contact person was Kendra Kohlhaas. Kohlhaas was the
CIP program manager but also served as a therapist. We refer to
her as the CIP therapist.
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facility, potentially jeopardizing her stay there. The court reaffirmed

the requirements mother had to fulfill to resume family time.

¶ 17 Over the next six months, the court held four more hearings to

review mother’s compliance, but mother did not appear at any of

the hearings. Mother’s last contact with the caseworker was

approximately seven months prior to the termination hearing. And

mother’s last contact with the children was nearly one year before

the termination hearing.

C. Analysis

¶ 18 The juvenile court concluded that the Department provided

reasonable efforts, including supervised family time. As noted, the

Department scheduled a family time orientation and an emergency

visit to occur the day after the shelter hearing, but mother cancelled

the visit. The Department offered five additional virtual visits, but

mother only attended one; the children refused to attend the last

visit, and mother cancelled the rest.

¶ 19 Thereafter, as the juvenile court regularly reviewed the status

of family time, the Department arranged, and mother attended:

• four virtual visits with the younger child;

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• one virtual visit with both children;

• one in-person visit with the younger child;

• one in-person visit with the older child; and

• two in-person visits with both children.

¶ 20 The Department then scheduled four additional in-person

visits for which mother did not appear.

1. Concerns About the Children’s Health and Safety

¶ 21 First, mother argues that the juvenile court erroneously

withheld family time based on “largely speculative concerns about

the possible impact of family time.”

¶ 22 The court found that the children’s health and safety required

suspension of family time. For example, the court first suspended

family time because it found that the older child was afraid and

“pitching a pretty big fit” in response to family time. When the

court suspended family time for the second time, it found that

mother’s lack of consistency in treatment and sobriety was “clearly

evident with the children,” as demonstrated by “a five-year-old who

is self-harming.” The record supports the court’s findings:

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• The CIP therapist testified that the older child was

diagnosed with trauma-related disorder (because of his

trauma history with mother) and post-traumatic stress

disorder. And he exhibited a stress response at the

suggestion of contact with mother. The level, duration,

and difficulty of mitigating this response suggested that

he experienced an “intolerable to toxic” level of stress.

• The CIP therapist next testified that the older child said

that he was afraid to visit mother and in response to even

the idea of contact, he would engage in “significant self-

harm behaviors,” a response the therapist opined was

“extremely atypical.”

• The CIP therapist also testified that there were

“significant concerns” about the younger child’s contact

with mother, even though his behaviors “weren’t as

explicit” as the older child. The younger child’s behaviors

after family time indicated “signs of stress or that his

little system was overwhelmed.” His energy was “ramped

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up,” he had a hard time sleeping, he was agitated, and he

acted out at school.

• The CIP therapist confirmed that it was unusual to

require a parent to be sober for visits to occur, but it was

necessary for the children’s well-being. Even if mother

was not intoxicated during a visit, she presented

differently during periods of substance use. After long

periods of sobriety, mother looked well rested, she did not

fidget or shake, she could hold a conversation, and she

could maintain eye contact. But if mother appeared to

the children like she was using, it “could be

psychologically damaging” and would be a

“retraumatizing experience” for them.

• At times, mother acknowledged to the CIP therapist that

she was not in a good place and that the children should

not see her unless she was healthy and sober.

¶ 23 Mother contends that the older child’s behavioral issues were

not caused by contact with her because his behaviors continued

after family time ended. But the juvenile court found, with record

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support, that when mother stopped attending family time, the

children’s behaviors and emotions stabilized. In particular, the CIP

therapist testified that the older child stopped self-harming and the

younger child was able to “establish a routine around sleeping and

taking care and calming his body and being able to be at school.”

¶ 24 Given this evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court

suspended family time based on legitimate concerns for the

children’s health and safety.

2. Preconditions on Family Time

¶ 25 Mother next contends that the preconditions the juvenile court

imposed were more burdensome than necessary to protect the

children’s health and safety.

¶ 26 The record shows that the court regularly held hearings to find

a balance between the children’s safety and the burdens placed on

mother, finding at one point that “I’ve peeled away as many of the

requirements as I feel like I can and safely let these children have

time with their mom.” The court recognized that some of the

requirements placed on mother were not typical but were necessary

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given the “unique” nature of the case, including a young child

engaging in self-harm.

¶ 27 In trying to find a balance, the court relied on expert

recommendations to determine whether certain preconditions were

necessary. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1071 (the court may “utilize the

services of experts, such as therapists, and rely on their

recommendations concerning a variety of issues, including

visitation plans”). For example, the CIP therapist recommended

that, given the older child’s negative reactions, mother needed to

demonstrate sobriety before re-engaging in family time, participate

in substance abuse treatment, and later create an accurate and

developmentally appropriate narrative for the children.

¶ 28 The CIP therapist also recommended that mother meet with

the caseworker three consecutive times prior to visits resuming.

The caseworker testified that the purpose of this requirement was

for mother to demonstrate that she could maintain a consistent

schedule for the children, which is why these visits were to occur at

the same time and place as the eventual family time visits. When

asked about this requirement, the CIP therapist testified that it is

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difficult for a child if a parent does not show up, “[b]ut actually,

what’s even harder or more challenging for a young child is when

there’s not consistency or predictability in a parent showing up for

visits.” And the lack of consistency was “psychologically damaging”

and “retraumatizing for these children in particular.”

¶ 29 To the extent that mother argues preconditions on family time

“were difficult if not impossible given the barriers” she was facing,

including that she was unhoused, lacked consistent means of

communication or transportation, and “otherwise lacked

meaningful support systems,” the court found that the Department

offered many services to assist mother. Namely, the court found,

with record support, that “[t]he family has been offered a number of

services and supports, including but not limited to: assessments;

individual and group mental health and substance abuse

treatment; withdrawal management; in-patient treatment; sober

living support; supervised family time; parent coaching; the

Community Infant Program; substance use monitoring; assistance

with housing and financial supports; early intervention evaluations;

transportation assistance; and ongoing caseworker support

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including coordination with the providers working with the family.”

As discussed above, the Department offered family time services

and assistance from the CIP therapist. Additionally, the

Department, among other things, (1) made referrals for mental

health services; (2) coordinated substance use services, including

detox, in-patient treatment, monitoring, and sober living; (3) offered

transportation services such as Lyft/Uber, gas cards, and bus

passes; and (4) attempted to work with mother on a housing

voucher.

¶ 30 The record illustrates that the preconditions imposed by the

juvenile court were not overly burdensome and were necessary to

protect the children’s health and safety.

D. Conclusion

¶ 31 To be sure, a reasonable efforts finding ordinarily requires the

department to facilitate in-person family time between a parent and

the children. But considering the entire record, we cannot say that

the juvenile court erred by restricting family time in this unusual

case. Because the record supports the conclusion that the

Department made reasonable efforts to provide family time services,

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we will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings and legal

conclusions.

III. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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