Peo v. Black

22CA0011 Peo v Black 05-29-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0011
Weld County District Court No. 18CR864
Honorable Vincente G. Vigil, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeremy Black,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 29, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lane Towery, Assistant Attorney General
Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jeffrey A. Wermer, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jeremy Black, appeals his convictions for various

sex crimes against his stepdaughter. He contends, among other

things, that the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to

a deliberating juror who expressed partiality in favor of child sexual

assault victims and wasn’t rehabilitated. Because we agree that the

court erred by denying the challenge for cause, we must reverse the

judgment and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

¶2 When the victim was roughly fourteen, she alleged that Black

had been sexually abusing her since she was six or seven years old.

The outcry resulted in criminal charges against Black for multiple

counts of sexual assault on a child. Black denied any inappropriate

touching.

¶3 Before voir dire, the prospective jurors completed written

questionnaires. The questionnaire advised that Black “is accused of

repeatedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter” and he has

“pleaded not guilty to all charges.” In his questionnaire, Juror R

responded that he had a substantial doubt about his ability to

“fairly and impartially listen to allegations where a child is alleged

to have been a victim.” He specifically responded that he “would be

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partial to the child,” that “sexually assaulting a child is disgusting

and the child wouldn’t make something like that up,” and he

checked the box affirming that he had a “serious doubt” about his

“ability to be fair.”

¶4 Based on these responses, the court allowed the parties to

question Juror R before the general voir dire. During this

questioning, Juror R expressed general agreement with certain

principles of criminal law — like the presumption of innocence and

the prosecution’s burden of proof. He also expressed that his “first

instinct” is to believe children. When pressed on this point, Juror R

acknowledged that children could lie and explained that the age of

the child would make a difference because as you “get older you

then learn kind of how to lie.”

¶5 Despite that, Juror R later disclosed that his sister had been

touched inappropriately when she was fourteen — the victim’s age

when she disclosed Black’s sexual abuse — and that his sister

“would never lie about something like that, and that’s kind of my

example in this case with just what I’ve grown up with.” When

asked if hearing from a child who was “similar in age” to his sister

when she was touched would make him “sympathetic in a way that

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may be unfair” to Black, Juror R replied, “I think so” — because he

believed his sister. He went on to elaborate that “just with like the

similarities, I think that’s where it’s at, personally. I think I would

just kind of make — kind of just remember my sister.”

¶6 At this point, the court took up the questioning:

Court: I just want to make sure that I clarify
because I wasn’t 100 percent clear about that
last question. Are you saying that if you heard
from someone around the same age as your
sister was, like --

...

Court: -- 13, 14, 15 --

...

Juror R: Yeah, because that’s what . . . [my
sister’s] age was, so -- and like I said, I
believed her right away, so I think that’s where
I stand with that.

...

Court: So if you heard somebody make this
type of claim when they’re around that same
age, would you automatically assume that they
were telling the truth if you didn’t have that
same sister relationship or do you feel like you
would be able to judge the evidence and judge
her credibility and decide for yourself whether
or not she was telling the truth, or would that
just be something you assumed?

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Juror R: I think it would be my first instinct,
like I was saying, and I would like to think that
I would be able to look at the evidence and
make a decision guided on that case and
everything that’s been provided here.

Court: But your first instinct would be to . . .

Juror R: To believe them, yes.

¶7 Defense counsel then moved to strike Juror R for cause,

arguing that his sister’s experience “would affect his ability to

render an impartial verdict.” The prosecutor acknowledged some

problems with the responses to the court’s questions but suggested

Juror R was confused and should be questioned further.

¶8 The court agreed that “some of [Juror R’s] answers were not

terribly clear.” The court deferred ruling on defense counsel’s

causal challenge until after general voir dire so that it could

consider any additional information Juror R may provide.

¶9 During general voir dire, however, neither the prosecutor nor

the court revisited Juror R’s responses or questioned Juror R

further about his instinct to believe a child witness or the impact of

his sister’s experience on his ability to be a fair and impartial juror.

Instead, Juror R responded to a few general questions posed to the

venire panel, including whether he had any family members in law

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enforcement, whether he would evaluate video or photographic

evidence differently than testimony, and whether he could talk

about uncomfortable things in a public setting.

¶ 10 The court denied defense counsel’s challenge for cause

“[b]ased on the additional statements made by [Juror R].” The court

added that “in context of his additional answers” it had no

“significant concern about his ability to be fair.”

¶ 11 The defense exhausted its peremptory challenges on other

prospective jurors, and Juror R served on the jury.

II. Challenge for Cause

¶ 12 Black contends that the trial court erred by denying his

challenge for cause to Juror R.

¶ 13 Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair

trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Colo.

Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25; see also People v. Blassingame, 2021 COA

11, ¶ 10. To protect this right, a court must disqualify biased

prospective jurors. See Blassingame, ¶ 11; see also § 16-10-

103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2024; Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X).

¶ 14 A prospective juror’s expressed preconceived beliefs as to some

aspect of the case don’t necessarily require dismissal for cause. See

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Marko v. People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 21. Indeed, a trial court shouldn’t

remove a prospective juror for cause if, after further examination

and rehabilitative questioning, the court is satisfied that the juror

will follow the law and be impartial. People v. Gulyas, 2022 COA

34, ¶ 19. But when a prospective juror’s statements compel the

inference that they cannot decide the issues fairly, and no

rehabilitation occurs, the challenge for cause must be granted. Id.

¶ 15 We review the trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause for

an abuse of discretion. Blassingame, ¶ 9. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling “is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law.” Id. If the

court fails to excuse a biased juror who then serves on the jury, the

error is structural and requires reversal. Clark v. People, 2024 CO

55, ¶¶ 30, 35.

¶ 16 On this record, we conclude that the trial court erred by not

dismissing Juror R. Starting with his questionnaire, Juror R

expressed serious and substantial doubt about his ability to be a

fair and impartial juror. In individual questioning, he explained

that he was partial toward children and shared that his first

instinct is to believe them. Even more concerning, he also related

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his sister’s experience of being inappropriately touched when she

was around the same age the victim was when the victim disclosed

the abuse, said that he believed his sister, and agreed that her

experience would make him sympathetic in a way that may be

unfair to Black. Indeed, Juror R’s final statement to the trial court

before general voir dire was that, given his sister’s experience, his

first instinct would be to believe a child’s sexual abuse claim made

when the child was around the same age his sister was when she

was inappropriately touched.

¶ 17 And the general voir dire did nothing to alleviate concerns

about Juror R’s partiality. Neither the prosecutor nor the court

questioned Juror R further about his previous statements. Nothing

touched on whether Juror R could set aside his instincts and his

sister’s experience. Nor did Juror R ever assure the court during

general voir dire that he could set them aside (or even try to set

them aside) and serve as a fair and impartial juror. Without these

assurances, the court should have dismissed Juror R. Compare

Gulyas, ¶ 24 (concluding that the court erred by denying a causal

challenge where the juror “never gave any assurances that he could

set aside his clearly expressed bias in favor of child witnesses and

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follow the court’s instructions”), with People v. Fleischacker, 2013

COA 2, ¶ 27 (noting that a prospective juror’s commitment to try to

set aside their biases along with an expressed belief that they can

be fair is sufficient to deny a causal challenge).

¶ 18 To be sure, we agree with the People that Juror R made some

“inconsistent and equivocal” statements. He agreed that children

could lie yet consistently repeated that his “first instinct” is to

believe children, particularly children around the same age his

sister was when she was inappropriately touched. And he generally

equivocated and hedged about whether he could follow basic

criminal law principles, including the court’s credibility instruction.

But he never equivocated on the fact that he believed his sister was

touched inappropriately, that she would not lie about that, and that

he believed her experience would make him an unfair juror. We

thus disagree with the People that Juror R’s equivocal statements

either did not require rehabilitation, see Blassingame, ¶ 21

(concluding that the juror’s uncertain and equivocal responses

required “some rehabilitation” before the juror “could be deemed fit

to serve on the jury”), or were sufficiently rehabilitating themselves

to assure the court that he could serve as a fair and impartial juror,

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see People v. Maestas, 2014 COA 139M, ¶ 19 (concluding that the

trial court reversibly erred by denying a challenge for cause to a

deliberating juror who said she might hold the defendant’s silence

against him and was “never rehabilitated”); see also People v.

Zurenko, 833 P.2d 794, 797 (Colo. App. 1991) (noting that an

appellate court “may not assume” that a juror would render an

impartial verdict where “no attempt was made” to determine if she

could apply the law after she indicated a preconceived bias).

¶ 19 Finally, we agree with the People that the trial court has

discretion to evaluate a juror’s demeanor and credibility when

assessing bias. But that’s not what happened here. The court

didn’t say anything about Juror R’s demeanor or credibility. It

denied the challenge for cause based on the “additional statements

made by [Juror R]” in general voir dire. As explained, however,

nothing in general voir dire touched on Juror R’s stated bias or on

his ability to set aside his bias. See Gulyas, ¶ 25 (rejecting the

People’s claim that the trial court denied a challenge for cause

based on demeanor and credibility where it was based on the

court’s “misrecollection” of the juror’s comments).

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¶ 20 Because Juror R expressed partiality in favor of child sexual

assault victims and was not rehabilitated, the trial court abused its

discretion by denying the challenge for cause. And because Juror R

served on the jury, reversal is required. See Clark, ¶¶ 30, 35.

III. Remaining Evidentiary Contentions

¶ 21 Because they might not arise on retrial or, if they do, might

arise in a different manner or under different circumstances, we

decline to address Black’s two remaining contentions that the trial

court erred by allowing both hearsay testimony and generalized

expert testimony that he claims improperly bolstered the victim’s

credibility. See People v. Becker, 2014 COA 36, ¶ 29 (declining to

review fact-specific contentions that may “result in an advisory

opinion, which risks improperly depriving the parties of their

prerogative to litigate the case as they choose”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new

trial.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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