Marriage of Veach

24CA1078 Marriage of Veach 05-22-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1078
Dolores County District Court No. 17DR30001
Honorable William Young Furse, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jeremy Wade Veach,

Appellant,

and

Skye Lunn Veach,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 22, 2025

The Law Office of Jill M. Carlson, LLC, Jill M. Carlson, Hays, Kansas, for
Appellant

Belcastro Law, PPLC, Dan Belcastro, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Jeremy Wade Veach (father) appeals the permanent protection

order (PPO) protecting his two children from him. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Father and the children’s mother, Skye Lynn Veach (mother),

divorced in 2017. In September 2023, mother petitioned for and

obtained a temporary civil protection order (TPO) against father,

with the children listed as the protected parties as victims of

physical assault or threats. The court did not hold a hearing before

granting the TPO. As grounds for the protection order, mother cited

a recent incident in which father allegedly grabbed the oldest child

by the neck and threw him to the ground in frustration while

playing a board game with the children. Mother also cited an

incident in which father allegedly made the children run home in

the dark in front of father’s truck because he was not happy with

the children’s performance at a wrestling meet.

¶3 Following the issuance of the TPO, the district court held a

hearing and entered the PPO against father. The court found by a

preponderance of the evidence that father had committed acts

constituting grounds for entering the PPO and that, unless

restrained, he would continue to commit such acts. The PPO

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prohibited father from having any contact with the children except

for supervised parenting time two times per week for two hours per

session. The PPO also awarded temporary care and control of the

children to mother.

¶4 To further clarify the parenting time arrangement under the

PPO, the district court simultaneously issued a temporary

parenting time order. That order again explained that father was

entitled to supervised parenting time twice per week and stated that

it was not the court’s intent to “indefinitely have [father] subject to

supervised parenting time.” Accordingly, the court set the matter

for a status conference in sixty days to consider possible

modifications to the PPO.

II. Discussion

¶5 Father contends that the district court erred by (1) failing to

hold a statutorily mandated hearing before issuing the TPO;

(2) making certain erroneous evidentiary rulings; and (3) finding

that father had committed acts constituting grounds for entering

the PPO. We perceive no reversible error.

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A. Statutory Framework

¶6 Section 13-14-104.5, C.R.S. 2023, authorizes a court to issue

a temporary or permanent civil protection order to prevent, as

relevant here, assault and threatened bodily harm.

§ 13-14-104.5(1)(a); Martin v. Arapahoe Cnty. Ct., 2016 COA 154, ¶

16.

¶7 Under Colorado’s criminal code, assault includes “knowingly

or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another person.”

§ 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see also § 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024

(defining bodily injury as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment

of physical or mental condition”); People v. Lobato, 530 P.2d 493,

495 (Colo. 1975) (recognizing that bodily injury “need not be of a

crippling or otherwise incapacitating nature”).

¶8 “A motion for a temporary civil protection order shall be set

for hearing at the earliest possible time.” § 13-14-104.5(4); see

Martin, ¶ 18. If “after hearing the evidence” the court is “fully

satisfied therein that sufficient cause exists,” it may issue a TPO

and a citation “to the respondent commanding [them] to appear

before the court . . . to show cause, if any, why said temporary civil

protection order should not be made permanent.” § 13-14-104.5(8).

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¶9 At the PPO hearing, the court “shall examine the record and

the evidence” to decide whether to make the TPO permanent or to

enter a PPO on different terms. § 13-14-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see

also Martin, ¶ 20. To issue a PPO, the court must find by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the person to be restrained

“has committed acts constituting grounds for the issuance of a civil

protection order” and (2) “unless restrained the [person] will

continue to commit the acts or acts designed to intimidate or

retaliate against the protected person.” § 13-14-106(1)(a). The

grounds for issuing a civil protection order are those set forth in

section 13-14-104.5(1)(a). See Martin, ¶ 20.

B. TPO Hearing

¶ 10 As best as we can discern, father contends that the PPO is

flawed because the district court failed to hold a hearing before

granting the TPO. But we conclude that any error was harmless.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Statutory construction and application present questions of

law that we review de novo. Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶ 10.

If we identify an error, we review for harmlessness and will reverse

only if the error affected a party’s substantial rights. C.R.C.P. 61;

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People in Interest of R.D., 2012 COA 35, ¶ 25. “An error affects a

substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the

error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529,

535 (Colo. 2010) (citation omitted).

2. Any Error Was Harmless

¶ 12 Father contends, and mother does not dispute, that the

district court failed to hold any sort of a hearing before issuing the

TPO. Father thus suggests that, because the TPO was procedurally

flawed, the PPO is invalid. But even though a TPO hearing was not

held, we conclude that any error is harmless.

¶ 13 We so conclude because “a temporary protection order issued

under section 13-14-104.5 is not the . . . court’s ‘final decision’ on a

plaintiff’s request for a civil protection order.” Martin, ¶ 22. Rather,

the procedure governing TPOs “merely permits a court to make an

initial determination as to whether an imminent danger exists to

the person[s] seeking protection, and to issue a temporary

protection order based on that finding.” Id.; see § 13-14-104.5.

Conversely, section 13-14-106(1)(a) “contemplates that a final

ruling regarding the plaintiff’s entitlement to a civil protection order,

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and the terms of the order, will be made at the permanent order

hearing.” Martin, ¶ 22.

¶ 14 Additionally, while section 13-14-104.5 plainly requires that a

hearing be set prior to granting a TPO, the statute permits the

hearing to be conducted ex parte. § 13-14-104.5(4). Because

father had no right to be present at any TPO hearing, we fail to see,

and he has failed to articulate, how he was prejudiced by the court

not holding a TPO hearing.

¶ 15 Finally, the district court held a PPO hearing during which it

weighed the evidence and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses.

See Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41, ¶ 16 (It is the district court’s

“prerogative to weigh and evaluate the parties’ credibility.”); see also

Martin, ¶ 23 (“The permanent protection order hearing gives the

respondent a prompt opportunity to challenge the court’s initial ex

parte findings and raise any jurisdictional or procedural

deficiencies.”). Because father had the benefit of cross-examining

mother’s witnesses and presenting his own evidence during a

hearing before the PPO was granted, we conclude that any failure to

hold a hearing before granting the TPO was harmless. See Martin, ¶

23 (“[T]he [PPO] hearing and ordinary appellate procedures provide

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adequate alternative remedies for challenging a temporary

restraining order.”).

C. Evidentiary Rulings

¶ 16 Father next contends that the district court abused its

discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings at the PPO hearing.

To the extent that the district court erred, we conclude that any

error was harmless.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 17 We review a trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

2023 COA 107, ¶ 29. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on an

erroneous understanding or application of the law. Id.

2. Mother’s Reputation for Truthfulness

¶ 18 We first consider and reject father’s assertion that the district

court abused its discretion when it prohibited one of father’s

witnesses, who was mother’s uncle, from testifying concerning

mother’s reputation for truthfulness.

¶ 19 In prohibiting the witness from testifying about mother’s

reputation for truthfulness, the district court reasoned that mother

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had not testified in the protection order proceedings and therefore

her character and reputation for truthfulness were not at issue.

¶ 20 CRE 405(a) allows for “testimony as to reputation” in “all cases

in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is

admissible.” However, CRE 404(a) provides that “[e]vidence of a

person’s character or a trait of that person’s character” is generally

not admissible, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, one of

which is “[e]vidence of the character of a witness.” CRE 608 then

provides certain limitations on attacking or supporting the

“credibility of a witness . . . by evidence in the form of opinion or

reputation.” But here, mother did not testify as a witness in the

protection order proceedings, and thus we perceive no error on the

part of the district court when it excluded father’s witness from

testifying as to mother’s reputation for truthfulness.

3. Hearsay

¶ 21 Father next challenges the district court’s ruling permitting

the oldest child’s teacher to testify as to the child’s disclosure of the

neck-grabbing and truck incidents. When mother’s attorney asked

about the child’s description of those incidents, father objected

based on hearsay. But after the teacher testified that the child

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appeared to be very upset at the time that he disclosed the

incidents, the district court overruled father’s objection, holding

that the testimony fell under the excited utterance exception in CRE

803(2).

¶ 22 Hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to certain

enumerated exceptions. CRE 802. One of those is the excited

utterance exception, which excludes “[a] statement relating to a

startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the

stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” from the

general prohibition on the admission of hearsay. CRE 803(2).

¶ 23 Under CRE 803(2), the statement to be admitted must meet

the following requirements:

(1) the event was sufficiently startling to render
normal reflective thought processes of the
observer inoperative; (2) the statement was a
spontaneous reaction to the event; and
(3) direct or circumstantial evidence exists to
allow the jury to infer that the declarant had
the opportunity to observe the startling event.

People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 42 (citation omitted). In

considering the second requirement, the court must also weigh

the lapse of time between the startling event or
condition and the . . . statement; whether the
statement was a response to an inquiry;

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whether the statement is accompanied by
outward signs of excitement or emotional
distress; and the declarant’s choice of words to
describe the startling event or condition.

Id. at ¶ 45 (quoting Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 882 (Colo.

2005)), overruled on other grounds by Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO

71, ¶ 30. Moreover, “‘[t]he most important of the many factors’

related to whether the observer reacted spontaneously or engaged

in reflective thought ‘is the temporal element.’” Id. at ¶ 47 (quoting

2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 272 (Robert P.

Mosteller ed., 8th ed.)).

¶ 24 Here, we share father’s concern that the teacher’s testimony

regarding the oldest child’s description of the incidents did not

qualify as an excited utterance. Specifically, the teacher testified

that the child did not state when the incidents had occurred,

meaning that the court was unable to assess whether the child’s

statements were indeed a spontaneous reaction to very recent

events. See id. at ¶¶ 42, 47. Likewise, the teacher did not testify

that the child was upset because of the incidents but instead

recounted that the child “was upset because he had to end a

friendship because he was told to do so by his father.” Thus, it

10
appears that the child’s statements were not a spontaneous

reaction to the incidents but were instead made while he was upset

about a different matter. See id. at ¶ 42.

¶ 25 However, even if the district court erred in admitting the

teacher’s testimony as to the child’s statements, we conclude that

any error was harmless because the teacher’s testimony was merely

cumulative of other admitted evidence, so the error does not

warrant reversal. See In re Marriage of Adamson, 626 P.2d 739,

741 (Colo. App. 1981).

¶ 26 Here, an intake caseworker for child protective services and

the children’s therapist were both qualified as expert witnesses and

testified at the hearing. Without objection from father, the

caseworker testified as to the oldest child’s description of the

neck-grabbing and truck incidents. And without any hearsay

objection from father, the caseworker’s intake report, the therapist’s

trauma assessments, and a police report were admitted as

exhibits.1 Those documents in turn summarized the children’s

1 The record reflects that father initially objected to the admission of

the police report, but he then withdrew his objection. It further
shows that father’s objection to the trauma assessments based on
reliability was overruled, and he does not challenge that ruling here.

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descriptions of the incidents forming the basis of the PPO. Thus,

because substantial, cumulative evidence concerning the incidents

was admitted, we decline to reverse the PPO even if the district

court erred by allowing the teacher to testify as to hearsay

statements. See id.

¶ 27 Finally, we reject father’s contention that the district court

abused its discretion by excluding certain hearsay testimony that

one of his witnesses had offered to discredit the child’s report

regarding the truck incident. As mother correctly points out, the

district court in fact admitted the statements that father has

claimed were improperly excluded.

D. Evidentiary Support for the PPO

¶ 28 Father also contends that the district court improperly placed

the burden on him to refute the allegations in mother’s petition,

and that there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the

issuance of the PPO. We are not persuaded.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 29 We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. In re

Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 55. A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous if there is no support for it in the record. In re

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Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 39. It is for the trial court to

determine credibility of the witnesses and the weight, probative

force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom. In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422,

424 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The trial court can believe all, part, or none

of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution

of conflicting evidence is binding on review.”).

2. The Record Supports the Court’s Findings

¶ 30 Based on the incidents between father and the children, the

district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that father

committed acts constituting grounds for a protection order, and

that unless restrained, he would continue to commit such acts.

The court was persuaded by the fact that the children had given

similar statements about the incidents to multiple adults. And the

court otherwise found that father’s former girlfriend, who testified in

support of father, was not “all that compelling of a witness.”

¶ 31 From the outset, we reject father’s contention that the district

court applied the wrong legal standard when making its findings in

support of the PPO by placing the burden of proof on him instead of

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mother. While the court concluded that the allegations against

father were largely “unrefuted,” the court emphasized in response to

a question from father’s counsel that it had found by “a

preponderance of the evidence” that the PPO was warranted. Thus,

we are satisfied that the court did not simply accept the allegations

in the petition at face value, but instead, the court was persuaded

by the evidence introduced by mother.

¶ 32 For similar reasons, we reject father’s contention that the

district court applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise made

inconsistent findings when it explained that, although it was

issuing the PPO, it was “not finding that [father] is an unfit parent.”

The district court unambiguously indicated that it had found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the requirements for issuing a

PPO under section 13-14-106 had been met, and father has not

cited any legal authority suggesting that a finding of parental

unfitness was required before issuing a PPO.

¶ 33 Moreover, we disagree with father’s assertion that the district

court was confused about whether it was applying the protection

order statute or the standards governing the children’s best

interests under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act. See

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§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024. In terms of the court’s statement

that it also had jurisdiction to restrict or modify parenting time in

the children’s best interests, we construe that statement to be part

of an inquiry as to the circumstances under which the court may

modify the PPO in the children’s best interests in the future. We

otherwise express no opinion on that inquiry.

¶ 34 Finally, contrary to father’s assertions, we conclude that there

was sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the PPO. Even

without considering the testimony of the oldest child’s teacher, both

the caseworker and the therapist confirmed the children’s

descriptions of the neck-grabbing and truck incidents. The

caseworker specifically described how the oldest child reported that

father became upset while playing a board game with the children

and “grabbed [the oldest child] by the back of his neck and threw

him on the ground.” The caseworker confirmed that the oldest

child was traumatized by the incident.

¶ 35 Likewise, the therapist’s trauma assessments explained that

both children considered the truck incident to be a recent traumatic

event and described the incident as a punishment implemented by

father for the children’s poor performance during wrestling practice.

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The trauma assessments described how, during that incident,

father stopped the truck multiple miles away from home and made

the children run all the way home in front of the truck, with father

driving the truck very close behind the children if they slowed

down. Accordingly, the therapist testified that the children felt

unsafe around father, and both the caseworker and the therapist

recommended that, going forward, father should only interact with

the children in a supervised environment. And while father

contends that the testimony of both the caseworker and therapist

was largely based on hearsay statements of the children, father

failed to object to that testimony on that basis. See Am. Fam. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo. 2009) (“In order to

properly preserve an objection to evidence admitted at trial, a timely

and specific objection must appear in the trial court record.”).

¶ 36 Likewise, while father directs us to other evidence that he

contends weighs against the issuance of the PPO, including

mother’s course of conduct during past parenting disputes and the

testimony of his former girlfriend, we may not reweigh the evidence

in father’s favor given that the district court’s findings enjoy record

support. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (“[Even

16
where] there is evidence in the record that could have supported a

different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of

the district court.”). And in terms of father’s assertion that there

was no evidence that he would continue to engage in future acts

supporting a PPO, we disagree given that the PPO was based on

multiple incidents and the evidence indicated that the children

continued to feel unsafe around father.

¶ 37 In sum, given the evidence presented, we conclude that the

record supports the district court’s finding that father had

committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a civil

protection order and unless restrained, would continue to commit

such acts. See § 13-14-106(1)(a). Specifically, given both the

neck-grabbing and truck incidents, we conclude that sufficient

evidence was presented to support a finding that the PPO was

necessary to prevent assaults on, and threatened bodily harm

against, the children. See § 13-14-104.5(1)(a); § 18-3-204(1)(a).

III. Disposition

¶ 38 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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