Peo v. Grant

23CA0810 Peo v Grant 05-22-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0810
Mesa County District Court No. 21CR1611
Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Nicole M. Grant,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 22, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Christopher Gehring, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Nicole M. Grant, appeals the postconviction court’s

order denying her Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal

sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. She contends

that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to support the

court’s order setting the restitution amount. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 While working for a medical facility, Grant impermissibly

accessed multiple individuals’ health records through an online

health information exchange provided by a company called Quality

Health Network (QHN). As a result of an investigation, the State

charged Grant with sixty-four counts of theft of medical records and

one count each of stalking and cybercrime.

¶3 Grant agreed to plead guilty to five counts of theft of medical

records in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and

a stipulated probationary sentence. In its victim impact statement,

QHN requested $33,400.50 in restitution to cover its legal fees and

internal investigative costs that were necessitated by Grant’s

conduct.

¶4 At the providency hearing, Grant pleaded guilty to the five

theft of medical records counts and admitted to a factual basis

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underlying the charges. She requested a hearing on QHN’s

restitution request. The court sentenced Grant to a controlling

term of three years on probation, with thirty days in jail as a

condition of that probation sentence. The court then set the matter

for a restitution hearing.

¶5 At the restitution hearing, QHN’s privacy compliance officer

testified that four audits were conducted to determine how many

patients, medical records, and providers were involved in Grant’s

impermissible access to the health information. After the audits,

QHN concluded that it had to provide notification to eighteen

providers and eleven patients who were affected by Grant’s conduct.

¶6 The compliance officer testified that QHN consulted with legal

counsel to determine what steps the company was legally required

to take in this situation. The prosecutor offered into evidence the

bills from QHN’s legal counsel for work related to Grant’s conduct.

Defense counsel objected, arguing, in part, that the bills were

heavily redacted and should be excluded under the rule of

completeness. The court overruled the objection and admitted the

bills.

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¶7 During cross-examination, the compliance officer agreed that

some of QHN’s legal counsel’s billed services included consultations

with a public relations (PR) firm to help protect QHN’s image (PR

firm consultation fees). But she disagreed that the work

attributable to the PR firm was different from the legal advice QHN

received from counsel. Throughout her testimony, the compliance

officer explained the reasoning behind, and the nature of, the

consultations with the PR firm:

• What I can tell you is that the [PR]
consultation was required as a result of
the egregious work . . . that had gone on.
And the fact that the QHN system is used
by many providers -- [the] public is aware
of it -- and it’s important for the health
and safety of our patients and our
community.

If there’s anything that’s affecting QHN’s
standing in the community, we want to
make sure that we’re protected and that
we reveal this was not a QHN system
issue. It was . . . an impermissible
access. Hence, the purpose of the
consultation with the PR firm, advice
from counsel was needed.

• The consultation was as a result of the
activity that had gone on and the concern
that QHN has relative to the protection of
all the information and making sure the
public knows that we reserve . . . and

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secure their information. We wanted to
make sure -- and we asked our attorney
to speak with this PR firm so that the
language that we submit to the public is
accurate.

• The reason we inquired for help and
requested help with the PR firm is the
more that this investigation revealed the
impermissible and illegal accesses by
[Grant] and the harm that had been
caused, we realized it was our system
that was used for that purpose, and we
wanted to make sure the public would
know that we’re doing everything we can
to protect their information. We weren’t
quite sure the right way to say that, and
which is why we brought in the PR firm.

• QHN is a nonprofit, and our reputation
. . . is a big part of the success of our
operation in terms of protecting patient
information and keeping the public trust,
the trust that their records are correct
and safe, as well as the obligation we
have to our providers and our
organizations that send us the
information.

We wanted to make sure that we explain
everything correctly, that we assure the
public. And sometimes, you know, I can
tell you that, but it may not make sense
to the public, so I needed an expert to
help.

¶8 The compliance officer testified that working with a PR firm

would not have been necessary for a small breach and that the

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consultations here were required because of the scope of Grant’s

impermissible access to QHN’s service. Indeed, the compliance

officer further testified that the size of the breach was going to

require a public notification to the “Office of Civil Rights,” and QHN

had not previously had to make such a notification.1 She also

testified that, if QHN ceased to operate, it would result in harm to

patients.

¶9 The compliance officer acknowledged that QHN’s legal counsel

redacted their bills and that she did not know the content of the

redactions. Specifically, she was unable to say whether the

redacted information involved consultations with the PR firm. But

the compliance officer explained that the redactions were made to

protect attorney-client privilege and maintained that the bills were

fair and accurate because she had records of the conversations

related to the billed services.

¶ 10 Defense counsel moved for the discovery of the unredacted

bills to determine whether the redacted services were related to

1 Although not identified by the compliance officer in her testimony,

we presume that the Office of Civil Rights referred to a government
agency that monitors a medical facility’s compliance with privacy
laws.

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legitimate legal advice or to protecting QHN’s public interest. The

court denied that request.

¶ 11 Defense counsel argued that the PR firm consultation fees

were not compensable as restitution and that the prosecution did

not meet its burden of establishing that the legal fees associated

with redacted information should be ordered. The prosecutor

countered that the PR firm consultation fees were not incurred to

generate new business for QHN but instead to address the damage

Grant caused to QHN’s reputation.

¶ 12 In granting the requested restitution, the court concluded that

Grant’s “extensive breach” was the proximate cause of QHN

incurring the PR firm consultation fees. The court found that QHN

needed to preserve its reputation in order to continue to operate

and that consulting with a PR firm made “sense to help protect the

entity from losing business, going out of business, and making it

clear to those they work with and the patients’ records they have,

the patients themselves, that this is a type of thing that would not

happen again, was an aberration.”

¶ 13 The court further found that the minimal redactions of the

legal bills did not impact the veracity or reliability of the documents.

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Specifically, the court noted that “[e]ach of these records plainly

states where there are redactions and can plainly be seen to show

that the fees were associated with this investigation in its entirety.”

¶ 14 Subsequently, Grant filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion, in which

she raised challenges to the restitution order that were similar to

those raised at the hearing. The postconviction court denied the

motion. Grant appeals that order.

II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶ 15 “A defendant convicted of a felony offense must pay restitution

for any pecuniary loss [she] proximately caused [her] victim.”

Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 13 (citing § 18-1.3-602(3)(a),

C.R.S. 2024); see also § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2024. In the

restitution context, proximate cause is defined as a cause which in

natural and probable sequence produced the claimed injury and

without which the claimed injury would not have been sustained.

People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13. However, restitution does not

include, among other things, loss of future earnings. § 18-1.3-

602(3)(a).

¶ 16 Crim. P. 35(a) permits a “court [to] correct a sentence that was

not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction at

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any time.” A sentence that was not authorized by law, or an illegal

sentence, is one that is inconsistent with the sentencing scheme

established by the legislature. People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76,

¶ 11.

¶ 17 Crim. P. 35(a) also permits a court to correct a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner within 126 days from, as pertinent

here, the imposition of the sentence. Crim. P. 35(a), (b). “A

sentence may be imposed in an illegal manner ‘when the [district]

court ignores essential procedural rights or statutory considerations

in forming the sentence.’” People v. Bowerman, 258 P.3d 314, 316

(Colo. App. 2010) (quoting 15 Robert J. Dieter & Nancy J.

Lichtenstein, Colorado Practice Series, Criminal Practice and

Procedure, § 21.10 n.10 (2d ed. 2004)). A postconviction challenge

to a restitution amount has been treated as an illegal manner claim.

Id. at 317.

¶ 18 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. People v. Bice,

2023 COA 98, ¶ 12. And, “[w]hen the legality of a sentence turns

on an issue of statutory interpretation, we review that issue de novo

as well.” Id.

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¶ 19 Furthermore, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a restitution award de novo. Martinez, ¶ 19.

Finally, we review a court’s factual findings for clear error and its

legal conclusions de novo. Id. at ¶ 24.

III. Analysis

¶ 20 Despite framing her argument as a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the court’s restitution order, the

substance of Grant’s assertions is that the type of damages sought

— i.e., the PR firm consultation fees — cannot be ordered as

restitution. See id. at ¶ 20 (“[W]e consider [a] challenge’s

substance, not its form.”). On this issue, she baldly claims that

“protecting QHN’s ‘image’ and ensuring that the ‘public doesn’t have

distrust’ . . . is neither a proper basis for nor a proper form of

restitution, not only because it’s the equivalent of recompensing

QHN for ‘loss of future earnings’ but also because it’s

‘prophylactic.’” But Grant does not develop this argument any

further — by, for example, analyzing the applicable authority and

applying to the facts of this case — and we therefore decline to

consider it. See People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551, 555 (Colo. App.

2003).

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¶ 21 Grant also appears to argue that, even if PR firm consultation

fees can be awarded as restitution, the court’s finding that the fees

here should be ordered was improperly based on speculation and

unreliable evidence. We are not persuaded.

¶ 22 The compliance officer testified extensively as to the need for

the PR firm’s services, specifically explaining that Grant’s conduct

undermined the trust providers and patients placed in QHN to

secure the health information. She also testified as to the reliability

and accuracy of the legal counsel’s bills. And, although redacted,

the bills themselves provide enough information to demonstrate

that the fees were related to work performed related to Grant’s

impermissible access to QHN’s service.

IV. Disposition

¶ 23 Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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