Latus v. State of Colo

24CA1322 Latus v State of Colo 05-08-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1322
El Paso County District Court No. 23CV31850
Honorable Amanda J. Philipps, Judge

Tara Eden Latus,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

State of Colorado Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 8, 2025

Tara Eden Latus, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Bradford C. Jones, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Danny Rheiner, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Plaintiff, Tara Eden Latus, appeals the district court’s

judgment affirming the revocation of her driver’s license by

defendant, the Colorado Department of Revenue, Division of Motor

Vehicles, based on her refusal to submit to chemical testing as

required by Colorado’s express consent statute. We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 One summer evening, Colorado State Patrol Trooper Alvaro

Acuna received a dispatch that a twelve-year-old girl had called 911

to report that her mother — later identified as Latus — “was yelling,

acting weird, and swerving” while driving south on Interstate 25.

The girl described the color and make of the car and its

approximate location.

¶3 Not long after, Trooper Acuna spotted the car and saw it

“travel over the clearly marked and visible white fog line and onto

the right shoulder.” The car then signaled and pulled over on the

right shoulder.

¶4 Upon contacting Latus, Trooper Acuna told Latus that he saw

her weave, and Latus responded, “[Y]eah, because [my daughter]

was yelling.” Trooper Acuna smelled a faint odor of alcohol coming

from Latus’s breath and noticed that she appeared “highly

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confused, irritated, upset, anxious, fidgety, and restless.” He also

saw a child in the back seat who identified herself as Latus’s

daughter.

¶5 The trooper then spoke with the child who reported that she

believed her mother had been drinking and that, as she was

driving, her mother was closing her eyes, not staying in her lane,

and jerking the wheel. The child was emotional and said she did

not feel safe in the car with her mother.

¶6 After placing the child in his patrol vehicle, Trooper Acuna

returned to speak to Latus. Latus first denied any alcohol or drug

use but later admitted that she had taken some of her ex-husband’s

prescription medication the night before. Latus admitted to the

trooper that she had been “weaving all over the road.” When the

trooper asked why, Latus said it was “because her daughter was

talking to her father on the phone.” While speaking with Latus, the

trooper smelled a strong odor of alcohol; saw that her eyes were

watery, bloodshot, and glassy; and noted that Latus was confused,

disoriented, emotional, and incoherent.

¶7 Latus agreed to perform voluntary roadside tests. She

struggled to follow the instructions on several of the tests and didn’t

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perform the tests as a sober person would have. Trooper Acuna

arrested Latus and advised her about the express consent statute.

Because he suspected drug and alcohol use, he asked if she would

consent to a blood test. After Latus refused, the trooper served her

with a summons for weaving, among other charges, and a notice of

revocation.

¶8 Latus requested an administrative hearing to challenge her

revocation. At the hearing, the hearing officer admitted Trooper

Acuna’s reports as well as Latus’s exhibits. Only Latus testified.

After considering the evidence, the hearing officer found that

Trooper Acuna’s “initial contact” was justified and that probable

cause existed to arrest her. The hearing officer rejected Latus’s

claim that she wasn’t intoxicated but rather was suffering from

posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to abuse by her husband

and child. The hearing officer sustained the one-year license

revocation.

¶9 Latus then filed a petition for judicial review, challenging the

hearing officer’s conclusions that Trooper Acuna had reasonable

suspicion to contact her and probable cause to arrest her. She also

argued that the hearing officer failed to consider her evidence.

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¶ 10 In a thorough written order, the district court rejected these

arguments and affirmed the one-year license revocation.

II. Analysis

¶ 11 On appeal, Latus contends that the hearing officer erred by

concluding that Trooper Acuna had either reasonable suspicion to

stop her or probable cause to arrest her and by disregarding

evidence that she maintains showed she was not intoxicated. Latus

also contends that the district court violated her due process rights

by affirming the license revocation before she had filed her reply

brief. We consider each contention in turn.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 12 The express consent statute requires a person to take a breath

or blood test when law enforcement has probable cause to believe

that the person was driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. § 42-

4-1301.1(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024. A driver may refuse to submit to

testing, but “the price of refusal is revocation of the driving

privilege.” People v. Montoya, 2024 CO 20, ¶ 23; see also § 42-2-

126(3)(c)(3)(I), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 13 “In reviewing revocation proceedings, we stand in the same

position as the district court.” Jansma v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue,

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2023 COA 59, ¶ 18. We may reverse the Department’s revocation

decision “if, based on the administrative record, [we] determine[]

that the Department acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner,

exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an

erroneous interpretation of the law, made clearly erroneous factual

findings, or made a determination that is unsupported by

substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at ¶ 15; see also § 42-2-

126(11) (applying section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2024, to review of

driver’s license revocation).

¶ 14 We may not disturb a hearing officer’s factual findings unless

they are “clearly erroneous [based] on the whole record.” Neppl v.

Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2019 COA 29, ¶ 9 (quoting § 24-4-

106(7)(b)(VII)). While we defer to the hearing officer’s factual

findings and credibility determinations, we review any legal

determinations de novo. Id.

B. Reasonable Suspicion

¶ 15 Latus challenges the hearing officer’s finding that Trooper

Acuna had reasonable suspicion to stop her. More specifically,

Latus says that the trooper “did not observe any weaving violation”

and that no witnesses credibly reported any weaving.

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¶ 16 But Latus never denied weaving when Trooper Acuna stopped

her. Indeed, Latus admitted to the trooper that she was “weaving

all over the road.” And in the revocation hearing, she didn’t refute

that admission. Instead, Latus explained that she was weaving

because her daughter was yelling at her and she was “looking back

at” her daughter. She admitted to the hearing officer “yeah, that

was stupid.” Because Latus admitted to the trooper and the

hearing officer that she was weaving, we conclude that the hearing

officer correctly found that Trooper Acuna had reasonable suspicion

to initiate contact with Latus for a weaving violation. See People v.

Johnston, 2018 COA 167, ¶ 17 (“Suspicion of even a minor traffic

offense can provide the basis for a stop.”).

¶ 17 Even beyond Latus’s weaving admission, the record supports

the hearing officer’s reasonable suspicion finding. Latus’s daughter

called 911 to report that her mother was “swerving,” and soon after

the call, Trooper Acuna “observed the vehicle weave.” These facts

independently support the hearing officer’s finding that Trooper

Acuna had reasonable suspicion to contact Latus. See People v.

Rodriguez, 924 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Colo. App. 1996) (upholding the

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constitutionality of an officer’s stop of a driver that “weaved . . .

once”), aff’d, 945 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1997).

C. Probable Cause

¶ 18 As we understand it, Latus challenges the hearing officer’s

finding that Trooper Acuna had probable cause to arrest her for

driving under the influence because it “disregarded” evidence she

presented that she claims showed she wasn’t intoxicated, including

“evidence of a negative full panel drug screen and negative [urine]

test results.”

¶ 19 An arrest must be supported by probable cause, which is

“information showing a fair probability that the defendant

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” People v.

Dacus, 2024 CO 51, ¶ 26. Whether probable cause exists “rests on

all facts and circumstances known to the police at the time of the

arrest.” People v. Brown, 2022 CO 11, ¶ 18 (quoting People v.

Brown, 217 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Colo. 2009)). Because police officers

“are entitled to draw appropriate inferences from circumstantial

evidence,” probable cause may exist despite proffered “innocent

explanations” for the conduct. People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119,

1122 (Colo. 2011).

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¶ 20 Trooper Acuna reported that when he contacted Latus, she

had a strong odor of alcohol on her breath and her eyes were

“extremely” bloodshot, watery, and glassy. He also noted that Latus

admitted to taking prescription medication the night before, that

she was emotional and at times incoherent, that she struggled to

follow directions, and that she failed to perform the roadside

maneuvers as a sober person. The hearing officer credited these

facts and circumstances in finding that Trooper Acuna had

probable cause to arrest Latus. We agree that these known facts

and circumstances established probable cause to arrest Latus for

driving under the influence and to request that she submit to a

blood test. See Nefzger v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224, 229

(Colo. 1987) (concluding there was probable cause to arrest the

driver when the driver’s breath smelled like alcohol; their eyes were

bloodshot, watery, and glassy; and their performance on roadside

sobriety maneuvers was poor).

¶ 21 Nor do we agree with Latus that either Scherr v. Colorado

Department of Revenue, 49 P.3d 1217 (Colo. App. 2002), or Schocke

v. State, Department of Revenue, 719 P.2d 361 (Colo. App. 1986),

require a different result. That’s because the Department revoked

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Latus’s license for refusing chemical testing. In contrast, the

drivers in Schocke and Scherr both consented to breath testing

within the required two-hour window but then challenged the test

results at their revocation hearings. Scherr, 49 P.3d at 1219;

Schocke, 719 P.2d at 362; see § 42-4-1301.1(2)(a)(III) (“[T]he person

must cooperate with the request such that the sample of blood or

breath can be obtained within two hours of the person’s driving.”).

Neither Schocke nor Scherr addressed whether probable cause

existed to arrest a driver when the driver refused to consent to

chemical testing. And neither case supports Latus’s claims that

Trooper Acuna lacked probable cause to arrest her or that the

hearing officer was required to credit results from testing completed

days after her arrest. See § 42-4-1301.1(2)(a)(III).

¶ 22 Pressing on, Latus says that reversal is required because the

hearing officer “disregarded” evidence she presented that she

maintains proved she wasn’t intoxicated. The “objective evidence”

included (1) the results of a urine screen test taken days after the

stop; (2) criminal court records related to her ex-husband and

daughter; (3) a one-page printout identifying a therapist; (4) a one-

page printout about PTSD; and (5) a series of unauthenticated,

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purported results from other drug and alcohol tests taken after her

arrest.1

¶ 23 The hearing officer, however, admitted and considered Latus’s

evidence. And it heard her testify that she had PTSD and was

suffering a PTSD episode when Trooper Acuna contacted her. She

testified that PTSD explained her erratic behavior and emotional

state. She also testified that she was “legally blind” and wore a

scleral contact lens that explained the glassy eyes. She testified

that she had been crying to explain the watery eyes.2 As to the

smell of alcohol on her breath, she claimed she used some sort of

watermelon spray that must have caused the smell. And she

pointed out that she had submitted test results from urine tests she

1 As the hearing officer noted, Latus presented no evidence that she

had been diagnosed with PTSD. Nor did Latus present any expert
testimony about the effects of PTSD.
2 Latus now faults the hearing officer for failing to consider “medical

literature” on her “rare, congenital ocular condition and scleral
lens.” But Latus didn’t include any “medical literature” in her
hearing exhibits, nor did she testify to a rare ocular condition or
how it might impact her failure to perform the nystagmus eye test
as a sober person. That Latus presented additional information to
the district court doesn’t matter. Our review is limited to the
evidence presented at the revocation hearing. See § 42-2-126(9)(b),
C.R.S. 2024.

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took days after she drove that she claimed showed she had no

alcohol or drugs in her system days earlier.3

¶ 24 Because the hearing officer admitted and considered Latus’s

evidence, what Latus really takes issue with is that the hearing

officer didn’t credit it. But it was for the hearing officer to consider

and weigh the evidence. See Haney v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015

COA 125, ¶ 13. We cannot make credibility findings or substitute

our judgment for that of the hearing officer. Id. Because the

hearing officer’s probable cause finding is based on the proper legal

standard and supported by substantial record evidence, we are

bound by it. See id. at ¶¶ 17, 28.

D. Reply Brief

¶ 25 Finally, Latus argues that the district court violated her due

process rights by affirming the hearing officer’s revocation before

receiving her reply brief.

¶ 26 Even assuming that Latus was entitled to file a reply before

the court issued its ruling, we “may disregard any error or defect

not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.” C.A.R. 35(c). An

3 No expert testified about ETG urine testing, and, though admitted,

the test results were unauthenticated.

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error affects a substantial right when “it can be said with fair

assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome.” Bly

v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (quoting Banek v. Thomas,

733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986)). Latus doesn’t identify anything

in her reply brief that would have substantially influenced the

outcome had the court first reviewed it before issuing its order.

Thus, any error was harmless.4

III. Disposition

¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

4 Latus generally asserts that the district court was biased based on

something that occurred in a separate custody case that the district
court judge also handled. But she doesn’t say how the custody
case biased the judge or impacted the review of the hearing officer’s
decision. Without any developed argument or explanation, we are
unable to address the issue further. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp.
Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007).

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