Marriage of Moore

24CA0802 Marriage of Moore 05-08-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0802
Summit County District Court No. 20DR30016
Honorable Catherine J. Cheroutes, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Lisa Moore,

Appellant,

and

Dan Moore,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 8, 2025

The Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Cribbet & French, LLC, Mark D. Cribbet, Natalie J. French, Frisco, Colorado,
for Appellee
¶1 This appeal arises from a contempt order and the resulting

entry of punitive sanctions. The contempt charges arose from the

dissolution of the marriage between Daniel Moore (Dan) and Lisa

Moore (Lisa).1 Lisa appeals the district court’s order and punitive

fine. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

I. Background

¶2 Dan and Lisa were married in 1992. They separated in 2020,

after almost twenty-eight years of marriage. The district court

finalized their divorce and entered permanent orders in March

2022. As part of the permanent orders, the court ordered the

parties to sell a Florida condominium, which they had valued at

$1,850,000. The parties also agreed to use binding arbitration to

resolve any dispute related to the sale of the condominium.

¶3 The president of the homeowners association eventually

offered to purchase the condominium for $2,300,000. Lisa refused

to sign a document accepting the offer. When they could not reach

a resolution, Lisa and Dan submitted the dispute to binding

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by the

first names the court and parties used throughout the district court
proceedings. We mean no disrespect by doing so.

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arbitration. The arbitrator’s award, confirmed by a district court

order, required Lisa to sign a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) to

complete the sale of the condominium. Lisa did not sign the PSA,

despite several extensions to the deadline.

¶4 Dan subsequently filed a motion to hold Lisa in contempt for

disobeying the court’s order that she sign the PSA. He initially

requested remedial sanctions in the form of fines or incarceration,

punitive sanctions for the attorney fees and costs he incurred as a

result of Lisa’s contemptuous actions, and the payment of future

costs associated with the condominium if the sale did not go

through.

¶5 The matter proceeded to a hearing in March 2024. Prior to the

hearing, Lisa signed the PSA, and the sale closed. At the start of

the hearing, Dan’s counsel clarified that he was no longer seeking

remedial sanctions because the actions these sanctions sought

(Lisa signing the PSA and closing the sale) had already occurred.

The hearing proceeded only on punitive contempt allegations.

¶6 At the end of the hearing, the district court made oral findings

and orders. The court found that Dan had proved, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that Lisa knew of the court’s order, had the

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ability to comply with the order, and chose not to. The court

confirmed that Dan had withdrawn his request for remedial

sanctions. The court noted, “As a sanction, [Dan] sought

reimbursement for utilities, maintenance costs, homeowners

association dues and special assessments paid solely by [him].”

¶7 Incorporating its oral findings made at the completion of the

contempt proceedings, the court imposed the following punitive

sanctions on Lisa:

1.) [Lisa] shall pay $32,512.72 to [Dan] as
equalization of expenditures (the “Equalization
Amount”) for utilities, maintenance and
homeowners association dues and special
assessments;

2.) This Equalization Amount is based on the
following expenses [Dan] paid out of pocket:

a. $20,795.98 for a Special Assessment in
2022

b. $37,085.23 for a Special Assessment
in 2023

c. Water heater repair[:] $3,250.00

d. Utilities[:] $3,894.92

3.) The total of these expenses is [$]65,025.43;
half is $32,512.72.

4.) [Lisa] is to pay half in the amount of
$32,512.72.

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5.) Additionally, [Lisa] shall pay $50,000.00 to
[Dan] as a fine (the “Fine”) for the punitive
contempt . . . .

¶8 Lisa appeals the order finding her in contempt and the

$50,000 fine payable to Dan imposed by the court as a punitive

sanction.

II. Analysis

¶9 Lisa first argues that we should reverse the district court’s

finding of contempt because it was purportedly not based on a valid

order. Second, she argues that the $50,000 fine was an invalid

punitive sanction because the court ordered it to be paid to Dan

rather than to the court. We disagree with the first proposition but

agree with the second.

A. Contempt Citation

¶ 10 We begin by addressing Lisa’s contention that the order

requiring her to sign the PSA was invalid and therefore could not be

enforced through a contempt citation.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Generally, “[t]he decision whether to find a party in contempt

is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of

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Webb, 284 P.3d 107, 108 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting In re Marriage

of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011)). However, to the

extent that the contempt order is predicated on legal conclusions,

we review those conclusions de novo. Barrett v. Inv. Mgmt.

Consultants, Ltd., 190 P.3d 800, 802 (Colo. App. 2008). Moreover,

we review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence was

sufficient to sustain the contempt judgment. Clark v. People, 232

P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 12 To establish a claim of punitive contempt, the moving party

must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) the

existence of a lawful order of the court; (2) the contemnor’s

knowledge of the order; (3) the contemnor’s ability to comply with

the order; and (4) the contemnor’s willful refusal to comply with the

order.” In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 92 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 13 Lisa’s challenge to the finding of contempt centers on the first

element, the existence of a valid order. But such a challenge

requires Lisa to circumvent the collateral bar rule.2

2 Lisa concedes that she was aware of the order and failed to comply

with it, so we do not address these two elements further.

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¶ 14 Generally, “[u]nder the collateral bar rule, a party must obey a

court order — even an unconstitutional order — unless and until

that order is stayed, set aside, or reversed on appeal.” People in

Interest of K.P., 2022 COA 60, ¶ 2. This mandate serves vital public

policies. Indeed, failure to abide this principle would undercut the

orderly and efficient administration of justice. Id.

¶ 15 There are four narrow exceptions to the collateral bar rule that

may excuse compliance with a court order: (1) the court issuing the

order lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying case or

personal jurisdiction over the parties; (2) there is no adequate and

effective remedy to review the challenged order; (3) compliance with

the order would cause irreparable injury; or (4) the order is

transparently invalid or frivolous. Id. at ¶¶ 30-33.

2. Application

¶ 16 Lisa’s argument focuses on the fourth exception to the

collateral bar rule. Specifically, she argues that the order requiring

her to sign the PSA was transparently invalid or patently frivolous

because if she signed it, she would have violated certain disclosure

requirements under Florida law. Lisa also expressed concerns

about potential conflicts of interest because the buyer was the

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president of the homeowners association and used the association’s

counsel to complete the purchase paperwork. However, the

arbitrator gave both parties time to consult with a Florida attorney

prior to the first deadline to sign the documents, which provided

Lisa with the opportunity to address any legal concerns she had.

Furthermore, in confirming the arbitrator’s award, the district court

found that the buyer was fully aware of any potential defects with

the property and that she was signing an “as-is” PSA. Thus, the

court found, “Those aren’t legal impediments to signing a contract,

particularly an as-is contract, [and] particularly when the buyer is

the president of the Homeowner’s Association.”

¶ 17 There is a “heavy presumption in favor of the validity of every

court order.” K.P., ¶ 33 (quoting In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1403

(11th Cir. 1991)). And only when “there is no colorable,

nonfrivolous argument to support the order . . . should a contemnor

be excused from [her] disobedience of the order.” Id. (quoting

Novak, 932 F.2d at 1403).

¶ 18 Lisa points to no legal authority, and we are aware of none,

supporting the conclusion that the district court’s order adopting

the arbitrator’s award was transparently invalid or patently

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frivolous. And we reject her reliance on case law invalidating a

contempt finding against a defendant for exercising his right to

remain silent despite a court-appointed master’s order that he

testify. See People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo. 1985).

Here Lisa did not validly invoke a constitutional right; she just

pugnaciously refused to comply with an order she had repeatedly

tried to avoid. For these reasons, we reject Lisa’s argument that the

district court’s order was transparently invalid or patently frivolous.

¶ 19 Lisa does not meaningfully argue that the district court lacked

jurisdiction, that she had no remedy to challenge the order, or that

she would suffer irreparable injury if she complied with the order to

sign the PSA. Indeed, Lisa could have pursued an appeal and

moved for a stay of the order if she thought it exposed her to civil

liability. She did neither. The failure to pursue her appellate

remedies did not give her the right to ignore the court’s order with

impunity. Thus, we perceive no error in the district court’s

conclusion that Lisa violated a lawful order.

¶ 20 Finally, we reject Lisa’s argument that the district court erred

by finding that she willfully refused to comply with the court’s

order. Because the PSA purportedly exposed her to civil liability,

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she argues she could not have acted willfully by disobeying the

order. But this is just a recasting of her invalidity argument.

¶ 21 Litigants do not have the ability to ignore a court’s order

without consequence simply because they think the order is wrong.

[I]t is fundamental to our legal system that “all
orders and judgments of courts must be
complied with promptly. If a person to whom a
judge directs an order believes that order is
incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent
a stay, [s]he must comply promptly with the
order pending appeal. Persons who make
private determinations of the law and refuse to
obey an order generally risk criminal contempt
even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect.”

¶ 22 People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815, 820 (Colo. 1982) (quoting

Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975)). This is the cardinal

principle that Lisa disregarded: she had no authority to ignore the

court’s valid order, and her attempt to justify her conduct on the

assertion that the order was wrong is without merit. The district

court did not abuse its discretion by finding that she willfully

violated the order and was therefore in contempt. See Webb, 284

P.3d at 109 (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a

contempt finding).

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B. Punitive Sanction

¶ 23 The district court imposed a punitive fine of $50,000 as a

sanction against Lisa, which the court ordered to be paid to Dan

out of the proceeds from the sale of the Florida condominium. Lisa

argues that the district court abused its discretion by entering a

punitive fine payable directly to Dan.3 We agree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 24 When ordering a contempt sanction, the court must be clear

whether the sanction is remedial or punitive. See In re Marriage of

Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694, 698 (Colo. App. 1988). Remedial sanctions

are “imposed to force compliance with a lawful order or to compel

performance of an act within the person’s power or present ability

to perform.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). Punitive sanctions are imposed as

punishment “for conduct that is found to be offensive to the

3 Neither party appeals the district court’s imposition of

homeowners association dues, special assessments, and utilities
and maintenance costs in the punitive contempt order. While this
“Equalization Amount” reads more like a remedial sanction than a
punitive sanction, we also note that the parties agreed that Lisa
would pay half of those assessments and the court treated this
issue as one of reimbursement rather than as a sanction. In any
event, no one questions this portion of the order on appeal, so we
do not address it further.

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authority and dignity of the court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4). A fine may

be used to preserve the dignity of the court as a punitive sanction

but that kind of fine is “payable to the court, not to the parties.” In

re Estate of Hossack, 2013 COA 64, ¶¶ 34-35 (citation omitted).

2. Analysis

¶ 25 On appeal, Lisa argues that the district court erred by

imposing a punitive sanction of $50,000 to be paid to Dan. Dan

does not dispute that the fine is not supported by Colorado case

law. We agree.

¶ 26 At the district court hearing, Dan’s counsel sought only

punitive sanctions because once the closing had occurred, there

was no basis on which to seek remedial sanctions. He also reserved

the ability to request attorney fees for the contempt citation under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 27 Remedial sanctions are designed to resolve disputes between

parties, while punitive sanctions are designed to vindicate the

dignity and authority of the court. Eichhorn v. Kelley, 56 P.3d 124,

127 (Colo. App. 2002). Punitive contempt “does not primarily

benefit the interests of a party; instead, it punishes the offending

party for conduct offensive to the court.” Id. Thus, the matter is

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primarily between the court and the contemnor, not between the

litigants. Id.

¶ 28 Here, the court found that by violating the court order, Lisa

had offended the authority and dignity of the court and held her in

punitive contempt. Clearly, the court had the authority to impose a

punitive fine under these circumstances. But punitive fines must

be paid to the court, not to a party. Zebedee, 778 P.2d at 699 (“[A]

fine is permissible for vindication of the dignity of the court, but

must be made payable to the court, not to any of the parties.”); see

also Hossack, ¶ 35 (“[I]f a fine is imposed for the sole purpose of

vindicating the court’s dignity, then it must be paid to the court.”).

¶ 29 The district court misapplied the law when it ordered Lisa to

pay the fine imposed as a punitive sanction to Dan; therefore, that

fine cannot stand. See Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 29.

Thus, we vacate the $50,000 punitive fine made payable to Dan.

On remand, the court may consider whether to assess a punitive

fine against Lisa made payable to the court, and if so, for what

amount.

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III. Disposition

¶ 30 We vacate the punitive sanctions portion of the district court’s

contempt order against Lisa but affirm that order in all other

regards. We remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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