Peo in Interest of DM

24CA1401 Peo in Interest of DM 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1401
Weld County District Court No. 21JV607
Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of T.M. and D.M., Children,

and Concerning R.M., n/k/a R.K.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 17, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 R.M., now known as R.K., (mother) appeals the judgment

terminating her parent-child legal relationships with T.M. and D.M.

(the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect due to

concerns about mother’s mental health, domestic violence between

mother and her partner, and mother’s partner’s use of illicit

substances.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother, which

required her, among other things, to address her mental health,

learn appropriate parenting skills, and address domestic violence

concerns.

¶4 Shortly after the adoption of her treatment plan, mother filed a

notice of her application under the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to -12213, asserting that she

had anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and

avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality traits.

Mother did not request any accommodations or modifications to her

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treatment plan related to those diagnoses at that time; rather, she

noted that “should [she] require any accommodations or

modifications, [her] counsel will confer with [opposing] counsel” and

then filed a motion with the court.

¶5 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Six months after the original termination hearing date, and

following mother’s second request for a continuance, mother filed a

motion asking the court to modify her treatment plan to require her

to complete a neuropsychological evaluation and to order the

Department to make appropriate referrals for that assessment. The

court denied mother’s motion. After a third and final continuance

of the termination hearing, the court held a three-day evidentiary

hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the

Department’s motion and terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights

¶6 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent didn’t comply

with, or wasn’t successfully rehabilitated by, an appropriate,

court-approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

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parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of

E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is

a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s findings of

evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data underlying the

controversy — for clear error and accept them if they have record

support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶8 When, as is the case here, a child is under six years old at the

time the petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the juvenile

court must consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP)

provisions, which require that such children be placed in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),

19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25.

¶9 The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all matters within the

province of the juvenile court; thus, we won’t disturb findings on

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these issues unless they are clearly erroneous, in that they find no

support in the record. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911,

912 (Colo. App. 2011). But determining the proper legal standard

to apply in a case and applying that standard to the particular facts

of the case are questions of law that we review de novo. M.A.W. v.

People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.

III. Mother’s Arguments

¶ 10 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that

(1) her treatment plan was appropriate; and (2) the Department

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. She largely bases both

contentions on the Department’s alleged failures to accommodate

her disabilities under the ADA.

A. Preservation and Merits

¶ 11 On appeal, the Department asserts that mother’s arguments

regarding the ADA were not preserved because she never informed

the court or the Department what accommodations were necessary

for her disabilities. The Department further argues that mother’s

ADA arguments fail on the merits because her conditions do not

limit her “major life activities” and, therefore, she is not a “qualified

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individual with a disability” under the ADA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A), (2)(A).

¶ 12 We need not reach these issues, however, because, as we

discuss below, even applying the ADA, we perceive no error.

B. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 13 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it

concluded that her treatment plan was appropriate because it

neither (1) addressed necessary accommodations for her disabilities

nor (2) included a neuropsychological evaluation and any

recommended services that may arise from such an evaluation. We

disagree.

1. Relevant Law

¶ 14 An appropriate treatment plan is one “that is reasonably

calculated to render the particular [parent] fit to provide adequate

parenting to the child within a reasonable time and that relates to

the child’s needs.” § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2024. The

appropriateness of a treatment plan is measured by its likelihood of

success in reuniting the family, and it must be assessed in light of

the facts existing at the time of its approval. See People in Interest

of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).

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¶ 15 When a parent is a “qualified individual with a disability,” the

Department’s treatment plan services must also meet the

requirements of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining

“qualified individual with a disability”); § 19-3-208(2)(g), C.R.S.

2024. A parent who is a “qualified individual with a disability” is

responsible for disclosing to the Department and the juvenile court

information about her disabilities so that the Department can

provide appropriate treatment plan services; likewise, such a parent

must identify any modifications she believes are necessary to

accommodate her. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21. “A

parent who waits until the eleventh hour to request a modification

under the ADA may thoroughly undermine her ability to establish

that such modification is reasonable, particularly once the best

interests of the child are taken into account.” S.Z.S., ¶ 16 (citation

omitted).

2. Analysis

¶ 16 The juvenile court found that mother’s treatment plan was

reasonable and appropriate, but that she had reasonably or

successfully complied with it. The court noted that mother’s ADA

notice did not include any modifications she believed were

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necessary to accommodate her. Nevertheless, the court concluded

the Department did make reasonable accommodations for mother

throughout the case.

¶ 17 The court found, with record support, that the caseworker

(1) utilized trauma-informed practices; (2) set up weekly phone calls

with mother when she requested them; (3) brought in a nurse to

help mother understand the children’s medical needs and what

happened at appointments; (4) allowed mother to take breaks from,

and bring support people into, meetings; (5) rescheduled and moved

the location of meetings and family time at mother’s request;

(6) provided mother with reminders for appointments; (7) routinely

reviewed with mother what she needed to be working on; and

(8) printed out or wrote down necessary information for her,

including detailed instructions involving her treatment plan.

¶ 18 True, the treatment plan did not specifically detail mother’s

diagnoses and how her conditions would be addressed in the

treatment plan. However, it does not appear from the record that

she ever requested any modifications or accommodations specific to

the diagnoses she identified in her notice, in addition to the

accommodations the Department provided to her. See S.K., ¶ 21.

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Notably, on appeal, mother describes no additional modifications or

accommodations, other than a neuropsychological evaluation, that

could have helped her comply with the treatment plan.

¶ 19 Mother appears to assert that, based on her expert’s opinion,

she may have a cognitive or intellectual disability. Mother’s expert

opined that a neuropsychological exam could reveal whether mother

had a cognitive or intellectual disability. But the court had

previously found — and reaffirmed at the termination hearing after

considering the Department’s and mother’s experts’ testimony and

reports — that a neuropsychological evaluation was not warranted.

¶ 20 The Department referred mother for a psychological evaluation

at the beginning of the case. The provider who conducted the

evaluation opined that mother lived with depression and anxiety

and recommended that she continue to engage in individual

therapy but concluded that she was in the average range of

intelligence.

¶ 21 Later, mother retained her own expert, who believed that

mother needed a neuropsychological evaluation to determine

whether there was “any interference with her comprehending

instructions.” In response, the Department made a referral for a

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second psychological evaluation that included adaptive functioning

testing. The second evaluator concluded that, “[d]ue to a

lower-than-expected score profile from her cognitive abilities test,

intellectual disability and learning disorder were considered but

ruled out,” and “[t]herefore, further psychological testing to confirm

these rule-outs is not indicated.” Given these results, the

Department declined to seek a neuropsychological evaluation for

mother.

¶ 22 At the termination hearing, mother’s first evaluator, a licensed

psychologist who had a doctoral degree in clinical psychology,

testified that, based on his evaluation of mother, he did not have

any concerns about her ability to understand and comply with her

treatment plan.

¶ 23 In sum, although mother argues a neuropsychological

evaluation could have determined whether she had a cognitive or

intellectual disability, the Department introduced expert opinions

that she did not require additional testing to determine whether she

might have other disabilities. The juvenile court’s ruling reflects

that it weighed the conflicting evidence, and having done so,

determined the evaluations the Department provided to mother

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were sufficient. We see no reason to disturb the court’s ruling. See

S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 912.

C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 24 Mother also contends that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her because it did not provide

(1) necessary ADA accommodations; (2) services when she lost

Medicaid coverage; or (3) services necessary for her to complete her

treatment plan. We discern no error.

1. Relevant Law

¶ 25 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the child.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h). The reasonable efforts

standard is satisfied if the department provides services in

accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114). Section

19-3-208 requires a department to provide screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

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¶ 26 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915, by “considering the totality of the circumstances and

accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is

ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011), and the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment in determining whether the department has

made reasonable efforts, see People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA

210, ¶ 12.

¶ 27 The ADA does not provide a defense to the termination of

parental rights. People in Interest of T.B., 12 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo.

App. 2000). Nonetheless, a department of human services has an

affirmative duty under the ADA to make reasonable

accommodations for a parent with a qualifying disability when

providing rehabilitative services. S.K., ¶¶ 25, 34. Therefore, when

determining whether the department made reasonable efforts, the

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juvenile court must consider whether the department made

reasonable accommodations for the parent’s disability. Id. at ¶ 34;

see also § 19-3-208(2)(g) (requiring rehabilitative services to comply

with the ADA’s provisions).

¶ 28 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts presents a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination that the Department satisfied the reasonable efforts

requirement. Id.

2. Analysis

¶ 29 The juvenile court found that there was “substantial evidence”

that the Department made reasonable efforts through “a multitude

of different services for [mother]” but “she failed to properly engage

with them, or in some cases refuse[d] them outright.”

¶ 30 Mother’s arguments rely largely on her general assertion that

she was not provided proper ADA accommodations or a

neuropsychological evaluation, which we have addressed and

rejected above.

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¶ 31 Mother also asserts the Department failed to accommodate her

PTSD by failing to change the family time location to allow her to

avoid driving on the highway. Contrarily, the record shows that

every time mother requested to change the location of her family

time — around ten times — the caseworker accommodated her

request. Nonetheless, she missed about half of her visits

throughout the case. The caseworker testified she worked to get

mother’s parent advocate approved to attend family time so that the

advocate could transport mother, but mother never set up

appointments to allow the advocate to do so.

¶ 32 Next, mother contends the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts when it failed to provide services after she lost

her Medicaid coverage. But mother fails to specify what services

should have been provided. See People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551,

555 (Colo. App. 2003) (“We decline to consider a bald legal

proposition presented without argument or development . . . .”).

Regardless, the caseworker testified she helped mother reapply for

Medicaid, worked with mother’s life skills provider to find

alternative insurance, and tried to set mother up with sliding scale

payments for mental health treatment. The Department also

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offered mother financial assistance to cover the cost of other bills to

offset the cost of therapy.

¶ 33 Lastly, mother asserts the Department failed to provide the

“minimum services the government was required to provide,” but

fails to describe what those services might be. And the record

contradicts mother’s argument. In addition to the accommodations

described above, the Department provided a substance abuse and

mental health evaluation, sobriety monitoring, supervised family

time, four referrals for parent coaching, virtual and in-person

parent educators, two parent-child interactional assessments,

domestic violence victim support services, individual therapy, group

therapy, a life skills provider, and housing assistance. Mother

largely failed to engage in or complete the majority of the offered

services that her treatment plan required. A.V., ¶ 12.

¶ 34 Therefore, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s

conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts.

IV. Disposition

¶ 35 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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