Peo in Interest of SW

24CA1876 Peo in Interest of SW 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1876
El Paso County District Court No. 21JV756
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.W., a Child,

and Concerning T.P. and L.L.W., JR.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFRIMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Fox and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 17, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Amy C. Fitch, Assistant County Attorney,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant T.P.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant L.L.W., JR.
¶1 T.P. (mother) and L.L.W., JR. (father) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with S.W. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2021, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services received a report that mother had given birth to a child

while incarcerated and that the child was experiencing withdrawal

symptoms resulting from mother’s prenatal substance use. Based

on this information, the Department filed a petition in dependency

or neglect. Mother admitted to the petition, the juvenile court

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected, and the court

adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 In January 2022, the Department amended its petition,

naming father as a respondent parent. The Department personally

served father while he was in court in a dependency or neglect case

for the child’s older sibling. Father didn’t appear for this case, so

the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected by

default judgment. The court also determined that no appropriate

treatment plan could be devised for father because he had

abandoned the child. See § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2024.

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¶4 In August 2022, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held a termination

hearing in May 2023. After hearing the evidence, the court found

that, following mother’s release from prison in February 2023, she

had made significant progress on her own, despite the Department’s

lack of reasonable efforts. The court therefore denied the

Department’s motion and ordered the Department to develop a

more comprehensive treatment plan for mother.

¶5 Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court adopted an amended

treatment plan that required mother to (1) cooperate with the

Department and the professionals; (2) attend family time;

(3) address her substance abuse issues; (4) complete a domestic

violence evaluation and comply with recommendations;

(5) participate in a psychological evaluation; (6) demonstrate self-

sufficiency; and (7) engage in family preservation and life skills

training.

¶6 In March 2024, the Department again moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. One month before the scheduled

termination hearing, father appeared in court for the first time. The

matter proceeded to a hearing in August 2024. After hearing the

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evidence, the juvenile court terminated father’s parental rights

under section 19-3-604(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and terminated mother’s

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c).

II. Continuance

¶7 Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

denying his continuance motion. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, when

ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance

the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice

against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for

permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. In

expedited permanency planning cases, such as this one, a court

cannot grant a continuance unless the moving party establishes

(1) good cause for the continuance and (2) that the continuance will

serve the child’s best interests. § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 We review the denial of a continuance motion for an abuse of

discretion. See C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638

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(Colo. 2004). Under this standard, we will not disturb the juvenile

court’s decision absent a showing that it was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair or was based on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of law. People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,

¶ 41; People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 10.

B. Relevant Facts and Analysis

¶ 10 As noted, father first appeared in this case one month before

the second termination hearing. The juvenile court appointed

counsel for father and set a review hearing for two weeks later. At

the review hearing, father’s appointed counsel appeared and stated

that it would be difficult for her to prepare for a termination hearing

in two weeks because she needed to “look into an expert,” “get the

case file reviewed,” and “get the certificates of completion [for]

different services” that father had completed.

¶ 11 The juvenile court construed counsel’s statement as a request

for a continuance but denied the request on the basis that further

delay would not be in the child’s best interests. In doing so, the

court noted that (1) the case had been open for almost three years;

(2) the child had been out of the home for his entire life; (3) father

knew about the case but decided to participate only at the last

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minute; and (4) father had already had extra time to participate in

the case, considering that the court could’ve terminated his

parental rights following the first termination hearing.

¶ 12 Still, the juvenile court recognized that the short timeframe

put counsel in a difficult spot and, as a result, the court agreed to

accommodate her as much as possible. For example, the court

ordered the Department to provide discovery within seven days or

as soon as possible. The court also made counsel’s exhibit list,

witness list, and any expert endorsements due just before the

hearing.

¶ 13 The record shows that counsel was able to prepare a case and

defend father’s rights at the termination hearing, despite the short

amount of time she had to do so. Notably, within ten days of the

review hearing, counsel filed a motion to set aside the default

adjudication, arguing that the Department hadn’t properly served

father and therefore the adjudication was void. Counsel then made

an extensive oral argument on her motion at the outset of the

termination hearing. (That motion was denied and is not at issue in

this appeal.) Then, during the hearing, counsel cross-examined

witnesses, challenged the qualifications of the Department’s

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experts, and made a closing argument. Counsel also indicated that

she had received discovery and had had the opportunity to review it

before the termination hearing.

¶ 14 On appeal, father asserts two reasons why he had good cause

for a continuance and a continuance was in the child’s best

interests. See § 19-3-104. First, he contends that a continuance

would’ve allowed him time to engage in services. But, as discussed

in more detail below, because father didn’t have a treatment plan,

the Department didn’t have to provide him any services, nor was he

entitled to a reasonable time to engage in services. See People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶¶ 34, 37. Second, father

maintains that he needed a continuance so counsel could “present

a complete defense.” But, as recounted above, the juvenile court

made accommodations for counsel to help her prepare for the

termination hearing, and nothing in the record suggests that

counsel was unprepared at the hearing. Indeed, father doesn’t

point to anything specific that he claims his counsel could’ve done

or any specific evidence his counsel could’ve presented if she’d had

more time to prepare for the hearing.

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¶ 15 We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in the juvenile

court’s denial of father’s motion for a continuance because the

court properly weighed the need for orderly and expeditious

administration of justice against the facts underlying the motion

and the child’s need for permanency. See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638;

R.J.B., ¶ 11.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 16 The parents both assert that the juvenile court erred by

finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

them and reunify them with the child. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 Section 19-3-604 sets forth three separate grounds for

terminating parental rights. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA

57M, ¶ 19. Two of those grounds, subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c), are

pertinent to this appeal.

¶ 18 First, a juvenile court may terminate parental rights when the

parent has abandoned the child by (1) surrendering physical

custody of the child for six months or more and (2) showing no firm

intention to resume physical custody of the child or make

permanent legal arrangements for the child’s care. § 19-3-

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604(1)(a)(I). When a department seeks to terminate parental rights

based on abandonment, a treatment plan isn’t required. L.M., ¶ 19.

Thus, when a court terminates parental rights under subsection

(1)(a), the court doesn’t need to consider whether the department

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. S.Z.S., ¶ 37.

¶ 19 Second, a juvenile court may terminate parental rights if

(1) the parent hasn’t complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been successful; (2) the parent is

unfit; and (3) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c). Before the court may

find a parent unfit under subsection (1)(c), the department must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the

family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 20 Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care”

to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114). Services

provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable

efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). The services required under

section 19-3-208 include, among other things, screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

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home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additionally, to the

extent that funding is available, a department must provide drug

and alcohol treatment services, as well as transportation to services

when other appropriate transportation isn’t available. § 19-3-

208(2)(d)(I), (V).

¶ 21 The juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. Because a parent is

ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011), the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment in determining whether the department

made reasonable efforts, see People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA

210, ¶ 12.

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¶ 22 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error, meaning that we will not

disturb those findings unless they are so clearly erroneous as to

find no support in the record. Id.; see also People in Interest of A.A.,

2020 COA 154, ¶ 7. However, we review de novo the court’s legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. A.S.L., ¶ 8.

B. Father

¶ 23 Father asserts that the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts when it didn’t provide him with family time until shortly

before the termination. But because the juvenile court terminated

father’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a), it didn’t have

to consider whether the Department made reasonable efforts before

entering its termination order. See S.Z.S., ¶ 37. And, notably,

father doesn’t contest the court’s finding of abandonment under

section 19-3-604(1)(a). We therefore reject father’s assertion.

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C. Mother

¶ 24 Mother argues that the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts because it didn’t provide her with family time, transportation

to visits, substance abuse treatment and monitored sobriety, and

housing resources. We are not persuaded.

¶ 25 At the first termination hearing in May 2023, the juvenile

court found that the Department had failed to make reasonable

efforts for mother for two primary reasons: (1) it hadn’t provided in-

person visits and (2) it hadn’t developed a more comprehensive

treatment plan following mother’s release from prison in February

2023. Yet, at the second termination hearing, the court noted that,

although “reasonable efforts was a big point at the termination

hearing last year,” the Department’s efforts were “not an issue

anymore.” Specifically, the court found that the Department had

provided mother with the necessary services to complete the main

components of her treatment plan — namely, family time,

substance abuse, domestic violence, and life skills. As set forth

below, the record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 26 First, the record shows that the Department provided mother

with family time services from May 2023 until the termination

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hearing. See § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). The caseworker testified that the

Department had referred mother to four different family time service

providers. For the most part, the Department arranged for three

visits per week: two visits in Colorado Springs (where the child

lived) and one visit at mother’s home in Denver. However, the

Department had to stop visits at mother’s home because she

continued to have contact with father in violation of the juvenile

court’s order. Even so, the Department continued to offer three

visits per week for the rest of the case.

¶ 27 Second, the record also shows that the Department provided

mother with transportation to her visits in Colorado Springs. See

§ 19-3-208(2)(d)(I). The caseworker explained that mother initially

received rides to Colorado Springs from staff at her halfway house

or through Medicaid transport. Then, staff from the visitation

facility would pick her up at a bus stop in Colorado Springs and

take her to the facility. Around February 2024, the caseworker

learned that mother could no longer get rides to Colorado Springs,

so the Department provided mother with tickets for the “Bustang,” a

regional bus service between Denver and Colorado Springs. As

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before, a staff member from the provider met mother and

transported her the rest of the way.

¶ 28 Third, the record indicates that the Department provided

mother with resources for substance abuse, domestic violence, and

life skills. See § 19-3-208(2)(b)(III), (d)(V). The caseworker referred

mother to a provider for a substance abuse evaluation and random

drug screens, but she never did the evaluation or submitted a

screen. The Department also referred mother for a domestic

violence evaluation, and although she completed an evaluation and

did some treatment, her provider discharged her for lack of

participation. Finally, the Department provided mother life skills

through two different providers, but both providers discharged her

for lack of participation.

¶ 29 Despite this record, mother submits, for the five reasons

addressed below, that the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts. We disagree as follows:

1. Mother’s reliance on the Department’s lack of efforts

before May 2023 is unavailing because the issue in the

second termination hearing was whether the Department

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provided reasonable efforts after the first termination

hearing.

2. Contrary to mother’s assertion, the record doesn’t show

that she had to arrange her own drug screens, treatment,

and housing because the Department failed to do so.

Rather, the record shows that, for part of the case,

mother had access to drug screens, treatment, and

housing resources through parole. Therefore the

Department didn’t need to provide additional resources.

3. The record doesn’t support mother’s contention that she

didn’t have family time between May 2023 and

September 2023. To be sure, the record shows that there

were some issues with a family time supervisor during

this period, but the Department arranged for mother to

have a new supervisor.

4. Although the record indicates that mother may have

missed some visits because her bus was stuck in traffic

or behind schedule, we are not convinced the

Department’s efforts were lacking. The family time

supervisor testified that mother could’ve taken an earlier

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bus to ensure that she made it on time. And the

Department offered mother make-up visits for

transportation-related absences.

5. Nor are we convinced that the Department failed to

provide transportation services during the time mother

was receiving rides from staff at her halfway house or

through Medicaid because section 19-3-208(2)(d)(I)

requires only that the Department provide a parent with

transportation to services “when other appropriate

transportation is not available.”

¶ 30 In sum, because the record shows that the Department

provided mother with the necessary resources to comply with her

treatment plan, the juvenile court didn’t err in finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915.

IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE LUM concur.

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