Marriage of Walden

24CA0875 Marriage of Walden 04-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0875
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR31140
Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Amelia Walden,

Appellant,

and

David Walden,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Dunn and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 10, 2025

Wells Family Law, P.C., Kaela Zihlman, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Smith Balicki Finn Laraway, LLC, Ashley L. Balicki, William D. Taylor,
Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Amelia Walden

(mother) appeals part of the district court’s permanent orders

allocating joint decision-making responsibility between her and

David Walden (father) and rejecting her assertion that domestic

abuse and child abuse allegations warranted a different result. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and father were married in 2018. They share parental

responsibilities for their son, born in 2021. In May 2022, an

altercation ensued which resulted in father being arrested and

charged with assault, disturbing the peace, destruction of private

property, and wrongs to minors. Father agreed to a deferred

judgment on the latter charge, and it was later dismissed.

¶3 Not long after the altercation, mother filed her petition for

dissolution of marriage. In that proceeding, the parties filed a

signed memorandum of understanding resolving the issue of

parenting time (“memorandum”). The memorandum required

regular and frequent communication between mother and father via

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the communication app TalkingParents1 regarding emergencies and

updates in their son’s life, discussions about scheduling of routine

appointments for him, and advance notice of his extracurricular

and school-related events. The memorandum also detailed

schedules for parenting time; their son’s whereabouts; and

agreements concerning the parents’ sobriety and mental health,

social media and privacy as it related to their son; and long-term

decisions such as prohibited punishments and recreational

activities.

¶4 The district court held a permanent orders hearing to address

outstanding issues on decision-making responsibility and

spousal/child support. Mother argued that the May 2022

altercation constituted domestic violence and child abuse, and

there was no evidence to prove that she and father could make

decisions cooperatively in the best interest of their son and in a

1 TalkingParents is a website that parties in domestic relations

litigation use to discuss matters relating to their children. In re
Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 28, 428 P.3d 550, 554. It
was created to address “poor communication between co-parents
and a lack of reliable records.” TalkingParents,
https://talkingparents.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 13, 2025).

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manner that was safe to the abused party as required under section

14-10-124(4)(a)(I) and (II), C.R.S. 2024.

¶5 At the hearing, mother, father, and the court-appointed child

and family investigator (“CFI”) testified about the May 2022

altercation and related matters.

¶6 On the domestic violence argument, the court found that

father had committed an act of domestic violence against mother.

However, the court found that the parties could communicate

cooperatively and ordered the parties to exercise joint decision-

making responsibility under section 14-10-124(a)(II)(A).

¶7 As to the child abuse argument, the court found that father

had successfully completed his deferred judgment and sentence,

and that the wrongs to minors conviction had been dismissed and

sealed. It held that the deferred judgment was not for child abuse

or neglect under section 18-6-401, C.R.S. 2024, and therefore

section 14-10-124(4)(a)(I) did not apply.

¶8 That same day, the court issued partial permanent orders

memorializing its findings, as well as approving the memorandum.

The court later issued an amended decree of dissolution of marriage

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and permanent orders adopting the partial permanent orders, and a

support order.

¶9 Mother now appeals the court’s allocation of joint decision-

making responsibility.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 10 A district court has broad discretion to allocate decision-

making responsibilities. See In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA

116M, ¶ 23, 428 P.3d 550, 554. We therefore review district court

orders allocating decision-making responsibilities for abuse of

discretion. Id. at ¶ 26, 428 P.3d at 554; see Spahmer v. Gullette,

113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 11 A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a

misapprehension or misapplication of the law. Spahmer, 113 P.3d

at 161. We will uphold a court’s allocation of decision-making

responsibilities when the evidence supports it. Morgan, ¶ 26, 428

P.3d at 554.

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III. Analysis

A. Domestic Violence Allegations

¶ 12 Mother makes two arguments related to the district court

allocating joint decision-making responsibilities to the parents: that

the court failed to consider the totality of section 14-10-

124(4)(a)(II)(A), and that it failed to consider substantial evidence

that joint decision-making would not be safe for mother.

¶ 13 Because these arguments both rest on the assertion that the

court ignored the provision of this statute that requires

consideration of mother’s safety, we consolidate them into the

contention that the court did not consider the statutory provisions

relating to the safety of the abused parent and therefore did not

consider the totality of the statute. We reject mother’s contention.

¶ 14 Under section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A), if a court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that a party in a dissolution

proceeding committed domestic violence, it is not in the best

interest of the child to allocate joint decision-making responsibility

over the objection of the abused party unless the court finds

credible evidence of the ability of the parties to decide matters

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cooperatively in the best interest of the child in a manner that is

safe for the abused party and the child.

¶ 15 While express findings are preferred, the court’s findings here

are sufficiently explicit to give us a clear understanding of the basis

of its order. See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9, 466

P.3d 968 (“The district court must make sufficiently explicit findings

of fact to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis

of its order.”). If the district court orders joint decision-making

responsibility and the record supports the finding that the parties

can work cooperatively, then the court has not abused its discretion

even if it has found domestic violence was committed. Morgan, ¶¶

25-26, 428 P.3d at 554.

¶ 16 In its oral ruling, the court stated that it had considered

mother’s concerns about being retraumatized if the court awarded

joint decision-making responsibility. However, the court also

recognized that father understood the terms of the protection order

to mean his communication with mother had to be limited to

updates on their son, and that he could communicate with mother

only through TalkingParents in accordance with that protection

order. The court ordered the continued use of TalkingParents as

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the exclusive form of communication between them in accordance

with the parties’ memorandum.

¶ 17 In her reply brief, mother tries to distinguish Morgan by

stating the court in Morgan “expressly made findings and fashioned

its orders regarding consideration of the mother’s safety,” citing the

court’s order to switch communication methods from

TalkingParents to Civil Communicator, another communications

app. However, the Morgan order resulted from the mother there

identifying specific instances of the father violating his protection

order to harass her through TalkingParents, as well as the parties’

agreement to use another communication program. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29,

428 P.3d at 554-55.

¶ 18 In this case, by contrast, mother provided no examples to

demonstrate that continued use of TalkingParents was unsafe for

her. To the contrary, the parties’ memorandum detailed an agreed-

upon use of TalkingParents to regularly update each other on their

son’s life, coordinate schedules, and discuss aligning their son’s

routine and diet. Further, the CFI found that the parties were able

to engage in “healthy and productive communications.”

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¶ 19 Because the court considered mother’s argument in light of

section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A), we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion when it allocated joint decision-making

responsibility to the parties.

B. Child Abuse Allegations

¶ 20 Mother next argues that the district court erred by finding that

father did not commit child abuse under section 14-10-124(4)(A)(I).

We disagree. As with mother’s contentions regarding domestic

violence, we consolidate her two arguments regarding child abuse

into one.

¶ 21 Where a claim of child abuse is made, the court shall consider

“[w]hether one of the parties has committed an act of child abuse or

neglect as defined in section 18-6-401, C.R.S. [2024], or as defined

under the law of any state, which factor must be supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.” § 14-10-124(4)(a)(I).

¶ 22 Under D.R.M.C. section 34-46:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly, intentionally
or negligently and without justifiable excuse, to cause:
(1) The life of a minor to be endangered;
(2) The health or physical well-being of a minor to be
injured or endangered;
(3) The punishment or tormenting of any minor not in the
legal care, custody or control of such person; or

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(4) The endangerment or impairment of the morals of any
minor.

D.R.M.C. § 34-46(a). The ordinance includes a host of other

infractions that amount to a wrong to a minor under this section,

including abandonment, neglect, and cruelty on the part of a legal

caregiver, D.R.M.C. § 34-46(b), and providing a firearm to or failing

to remove a firearm from the possession of a minor, D.R.M.C. § 34-

46(c)-(e).

¶ 23 Here, the parties dispute the application of D.R.M.C. section

34-46(a) to section 18-6-401(1)(a). That statute provides:

A person commits child abuse if such person
causes an injury to a child’s life or health, or
permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a
situation that poses a threat of injury to the
child’s life or health, or engages in a continued
pattern of conduct that results in
malnourishment, lack of proper medical care,
cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an
accumulation of injuries that ultimately
results in the death of a child or serious bodily
injury to a child.

§ 18-6-401(1)(a).

¶ 24 In a separate case, father was charged with wrongs to minors

under D.R.M.C. section 34-46. However, he successfully completed

a deferred judgment and sentence on that charge, so the case was

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dismissed and sealed. Father argues that his successful completion

of the deferred judgment and the sealing of that case meant it was

legally proper for the district court not to consider the charge.

¶ 25 A deferred judgment “is not a conviction [or] a sentence” but,

rather, “a dispositional alternative imposed in lieu of a judgment

and sentence.” DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 13, 487 P.3d 658

(quoting People v. Anderson, 2015 COA 12, ¶ 15, 348 P.3d 491).

Upon successful completion of a deferred judgment, a defendant

withdraws a guilty plea and the charge is dismissed with prejudice.

People v. Widhalm, 642 P2d 498, 500 (Colo. 1982).

¶ 26 How a court reviews the underlying facts of a successfully

completed deferred judgment, however, varies depending on the

circumstance. See, e.g., McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, 463 P.3d

254 (holding that successful completion of a deferred judgment

results in the charge being dismissed with prejudice). But see, e.g.,

Partners in Change, L.L.C. v. Philp, 197 P.3d 232, 234 (Colo. App.

2008) (holding that successful completion of a deferred judgment

did not absolve a plaintiff of his required compliance with the

domestic violence standards because the controlling statute

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extended continued compliance to individuals who receive a

deferred judgment).

¶ 27 Although no binding authority addresses how a deferred

judgment may impact a district court’s child abuse determination

analysis under section 14-10-124(4)(a)(I), we do not need to address

this issue here because our conclusions would not affect our

resolution of this issue. The wrongs against minors ordinance

contains provisions not covered in the Colorado Revised Statutes,

and nothing in the record indicates what provision of the D.R.M.C.

applied to father’s deferred judgment. Thus, we need not discuss

whether a deferred judgment on a child abuse conviction suffices to

find that father committed child abuse in a case when the record

does not show whether father’s deferred judgment was premised on

the provision of the D.R.M.C. that overlaps section 18-6-401.

Instead, we affirm the district court’s ruling because the record

supports the district court’s finding that father did not commit child

abuse as defined by section 18-6-401.

¶ 28 Mother contends that the court erroneously applied the

D.R.M.C. provision rather than section 18-6-401, as required by

section 14-10-124(4)(a)(I). We reject this contention because

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mother misapprehends the district court’s holding. The court

addressed D.R.M.C. section 34-46 because father’s deferred

judgment was based on it, and therefore it could serve as evidence

to prove that father had committed child abuse as defined in

section 18-6-401.

¶ 29 However, the court determined that certain provisions of

D.R.M.C. section 34-46 did not fall within the statutory definition of

child abuse. We agree with this conclusion.

¶ 30 While the Denver ordinance and the child abuse statute

overlap, each contains offenses that may violate one provision but

not the other. Specifically, D.R.M.C. section 34-46(a)(4) identifies

the “endangerment or impairment of the morals” of a minor as a

punishable offense, while section 18-6-401 contains no comparable

provision. Significantly, father’s deferred judgment did not specify

the D.R.M.C. provision to which he was admitting guilt.

¶ 31 None of the parties here identified, on appeal or in the district

court, which provision of D.R.M.C. section 34-46 applied to father’s

charged actions. Absent clarification as to what provision of

D.R.M.C. section 34-46 applied to father’s criminal case, the court

found that mother failed to prove by a preponderance of the

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evidence that father had committed child abuse as defined in

section 18-6-401.

¶ 32 Mother nevertheless maintains that her testimony regarding

the May 2022 altercation constituted sufficient evidence for the

court to find that father’s acts amounted to child abuse under

section 18-6-401, and that the court’s finding otherwise was

therefore an abuse of discretion. However, her testimony, which the

court acknowledged in its findings, does not negate the contrary

evidence considered by the court, and certainly does not prove that

the court abused its discretion in determining that father had not

committed child abuse.

¶ 33 Consequently, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that father’s actions did not amount to child

abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.

IV. Disposition

¶ 34 The district court’s judgment and related orders are affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE TOW concur.

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