Peo in Interest of MV

24CA1844 Peo in Interest of MV 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1844
Adams County District Court No. 22JV30080
Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.V., a Child,

and Concerning A.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD*
Román, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Lisa A. Vigil, Assistant County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 A mother, A.M., appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating

her parent-child legal relationship with, her child, M.V. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Concerned about mother’s drug abuse, the Adams County

Human Services Department, which we shall shorten to “the

department,” assigned a caseworker to investigate the welfare of the

child. The child was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.

The caseworker saw that the then-five-year-old child did not speak,

was not potty trained, was not in school, and was not receiving

therapy. Mother admitted to the caseworker that she used illegal

drugs in the home that she shared with the child.

¶3 Mother voluntarily moved out of the home. The department

filed a petition in dependency and neglect, initially placing the child

with another person. But that person did not care for the child very

well, so the department removed him from her custody and placed

him in foster care.

¶4 The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected, and

it adopted a treatment plan for mother. Among other things, her

treatment plan required her to live a sober lifestyle.

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¶5 The department later asked the court to terminate mother’s

parent-child legal relationship with the child. Following a hearing,

the court granted the motion, and it terminated mother’s parental

rights.

II. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶6 Mother contends that the court erred by finding there were no

less drastic alternatives to terminating mother’s parental rights. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. A court’s determinations

regarding permanent placement and whether termination is in the

child’s best interests are factual findings entitled to deference,

unless the record does not support them. People in Interest of A.M.

v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 48. The credibility of witnesses, the

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, and the

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inferences and conclusions drawn from it are within the court’s

discretion. Id. at ¶ 15.

B. Applicable Law

¶8 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the court consider less drastic alternatives to

termination. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo.

1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court must

base its decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3), C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

just adequately meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be the best

option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. A juvenile court may consider and

weigh various factors in determining the viability of a less drastic

alternative, including (1) whether an alternative is available, People

in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 356 (Colo. App. 2007); (2) the

parent’s fitness to care for the child, People in Interest of A.R., 2012

COA 195M, ¶ 38; (3) whether an ongoing relationship with the

parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child, People in

Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006); and (4)

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whether an alternative would provide adequate permanence while

meeting the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs,

People in Interest of M.B., 70 P.3d 618, 626 (Colo. App. 2003).

C. Analysis

¶ 10 Mother asserts that (1) the department did not conduct a

proper search for placement options because it did not search for

all the people who might have been willing to enter into an

allocation of parental responsibilities; (2) the termination was not in

the child’s best interests because he was not in a permanent

placement; and (3) allowing more time to search for placement

options would have enabled mother to further work on her

treatment plan. We are not persuaded.

1. The Department’s Search Efforts

¶ 11 Mother submits that the department should have explored

“[a]ll possible relatives and kin[-]like placements” prior to

termination. Notably, however, she does not assert that she or

other relatives suggested any kin placement options for the child

that the department had not already investigated.

¶ 12 When looking for less drastic alternative placements, the

department must evaluate a reasonable number of people suggested

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by family members and by other interested people. See People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2004). But it “is not

responsible for ferreting out and investigating relatives who have

not been identified as placement alternatives.” People in Interest of

M.T., 121 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 13 The court found that the department had searched for

placement alternatives but that it had not found any relatives

available as acceptable placement options. The record shows that

the department investigated about twenty familial connections

nationwide and that none of these people were interested in taking

in the child. We therefore conclude that the record shows that not

only did the department seek out less drastic alternative

placements to termination of parental rights, but that an allocation

of parental responsibilities was not a viable option.

2. Permanency

¶ 14 True, as mother asserts, it would have been preferable for the

child to be placed in a permanent home before the court terminated

mother’s parental rights. But the lack of a permanent placement

was not a barrier to termination. See People in Interest of T.E.M.,

124 P.3d 905, 911 (Colo. App. 2005) (determining that termination

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was in the children’s best interests, even if they were not ultimately

adopted). The court found that the child required “a safe, stable,

therapeutic permanent home that [could] only be properly provided

through adoption.”

¶ 15 The record shows that, despite its efforts during the nearly

two-year-long case, the department had been unable to find an

acceptable permanent placement for the child. The caseworker

explained that a termination order would allow the department to

expand its search nationwide to foster parents, adoption websites,

and other resources to aid in the search for a permanent home.

The department would thus be able to look for an adoption home

that could cater to the child’s special needs. As the caseworker

explained, termination and adoption were in the child’s best

interests because stability was significantly important to the child

to ensure his continued improvement. See People in Interest of

J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Permanent

placement is not a viable less drastic alternative to termination if

the children need a stable, permanent home that can only be

assured by adoption.”).

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3. Additional Time

¶ 16 Mother submits that, because the child was not in a

permanent home, she should have been given more time to address

her treatment plan, namely her substance use issues.

¶ 17 A reasonable time for a parent to comply with a treatment plan

is not an indefinite time, and the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs must be considered. People in

Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 589 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 18 The court found that mother’s treatment plan was in place for

approximately twenty months “with minimal progress,” even though

this case was subject to expedited permanency planning provisions.

See § 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S. 2024 (children under the age of six

years should be placed in permanent homes as expeditiously as

possible). The court detailed how mother had not complied with the

objectives of her treatment plan, including observing how mother

had not maintained her sobriety.

¶ 19 This finding was supported by the caseworker’s testimony that

she had made four separate referrals for mother to complete a dual

diagnosis evaluation. Despite these referrals remaining open for the

duration of the case, mother did not complete the evaluation, and

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she did not complete drug testing. Plus, she was on probation

during the pendency of this case, and she did not comply with the

drug testing and sobriety conditions of her probation.

¶ 20 The court next found that “any further delay would not serve

the child’s best interest because a substantial and unreasonable

amount of time would be required for [mother] to become fit.” The

court also found that the “benefit of stability and permanency for

[the] child outweighs the benefit of maintaining the legal parental

relationship” between mother and the child.

¶ 21 The caseworker thought that mother would not be able to

meet the child’s special needs. This was due, in part, to mother’s

inconsistent participation in visiting with the child. The child did

poorly on those occasions when mother visited him, and his

behavioral problems became worse. For these and other reasons,

the caseworker thought that it would be in the child’s best interests

for the court to terminate mother’s parental rights so that he could

be adopted.

D. Conclusion

¶ 22 Considering the time that this case had remained open, the

department’s efforts to find placement options, the lack of

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alternative placement options, and the child’s need for permanency,

the court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to

termination was supported by the record.

¶ 23 We therefore affirm the court’s order. See People in Interest of

B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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