Peo in Interest of CKJD

24CA1464 Peo in Interest of CKJD 03-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1464
Weld County District Court No. 20JV250
Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.K.J.D., a Child,

and Concerning A.Q. and C.D.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Román, C.J., and Martinez*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 6, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant A.Q.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant C.D.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.Q. (mother) and

C.D. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with C.K.J.D. (child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The child was born on May 10, 2020. Two days later, the

Weld County Department of Human Services (Department) received

a referral expressing concerns about domestic violence between

mother and father. The caseworker went to the hospital and spoke

with mother. She observed that mother had multiple bruises and a

scratch near her right collarbone. The caseworker also became

concerned about possible substance use by the parents. As a

result, the Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect

and the child was placed in foster care.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. Among

other things, the parents’ treatment plans required them to (1)

cooperate and communicate with the Department; (2) address

substance abuse issues; (3) learn and use additional parenting

skills to meet the child’s developmental needs; (4) address mental

health concerns; and (5) demonstrate an ability to provide

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financially for the child’s basic needs. Mother’s treatment plan also

required her to demonstrate protective parenting capacity and

address the high levels of conflict in her relationship with father.

Father was further required to cooperate with any criminal case and

address conflict and anger issues in his relationship with mother in

order to demonstrate safe parenting when the child is in the home.

¶4 Three years after the petition was filed, the child was returned

to the parents’ custody. But two months later, the Department

received a referral with concerns about domestic violence between

mother and father in front of the child. The caseworker spoke with

mother, who reported the details of a domestic violence incident

and provided the caseworker with pictures of her injuries. Mother

was granted continued temporary custody of the child, and the

court ordered that the child not have any contact with father until

he contacted the Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL).

¶5 Father was later arrested for violating a protection order. At

the time of his arrest, mother and the child were with him. Based

on this information, as well as mother’s social media posts, the

Department developed concerns that mother was allowing the child

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to have contact with father, in violation of the juvenile court’s order.

As a result, the child was returned to the foster home.

¶6 In January 2024, the Department moved to terminate both

mother’s and father’s parental rights. After a three-day hearing, the

juvenile court granted the motion.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 To terminate a parent’s rights, the court must find, by clear

and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) an appropriate treatment plan has not

been reasonably complied with or has not been successful; (3) the

parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s condition or conduct is unlikely

to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. A juvenile court’s factual

findings will not be set aside “unless so clearly erroneous as to find

no support in the record.” People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d

603, 613 (Colo. 1982). We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal

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conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of witnesses; sufficiency,

probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the discretion of

the juvenile court. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶

15.

B. Compliance with Treatment Plan

¶9 Both father and mother contend that the court erred by

finding that they did not comply sufficiently with their treatment

plan. Father argues that he complied with his treatment plan at

multiple points during the case. Mother asserts that, despite

barriers, she completed numerous treatment services over a four-

year span of the case. We discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 10 It is a parent’s responsibility to ensure compliance with, and

the success of, the treatment plan. People in Interest of A.H., 736

P.2d 425, 428 (Colo. App. 1987). A treatment plan is successful if it

renders a parent fit or corrects the conduct or condition that led to

state intervention. C.A.K., 652 P.2d at 611. Partial compliance, or

even substantial compliance, may not result in a successful plan

that renders the parent fit. People in Interest of D.M.W., 752 P.2d

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587, 588 (Colo. App. 1987). If a child is under six years old when

the petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the court “shall not

find” that a parent has reasonably complied with or been successful

at a court-approved treatment plan if the parent (1) exhibits the

same problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement and (2) is unable or unwilling to provide nurturing

and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional,

and mental health needs and conditions. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).

1. Father

¶ 11 The juvenile court acknowledged that father completed a

substantial amount of work during the four years the case was

open. But the court ultimately determined he had not complied

with his treatment plan. The court found that the case opened with

concerns of domestic violence and substance use and those issues

were still present at the time of the termination hearing.

¶ 12 Regarding issues of domestic violence, the court observed that

three years after the petition was filed the child returned home to

the parents. Just two months later, there was further domestic

violence, and the child was removed from father for a second time.

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At that time, mother disclosed that additional domestic violence had

occurred after the child was returned home.

¶ 13 These findings were supported by the caseworker’s testimony

detailing mother’s statements that, after the child’s return home,

father beat and strangled her. As a result of this violence, mother

had significant bruising, chunks of her hair ripped out, and a

broken orbital socket. She told the caseworker she feared for her

life. The caseworker was concerned that the child heard, and

possibly saw, incidents of domestic violence because he talked

about hitting, kicking, and punching, and described seeing blood in

his mother’s hair. The child’s therapist testified to behaviors during

the child’s play that indicated he had witnessed domestic violence.

The court took judicial notice of father’s pending criminal charges.

Those charges included second degree assault, felony menacing,

third degree assault, false imprisonment, child abuse, and thirty-six

counts of violation of a protection order. Mother was a named

victim.

¶ 14 In terms of father’s substance use, the court recognized that

father had completed inpatient programs and relapse prevention

during which he had become more consistent with taking drug

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tests; however, concerns remained regarding his sobriety. The

court’s findings were supported by the caseworker’s testimony

about suspicions of a relapse and drug use leading to the incident

of domestic violence when the child returned home. Both parents

had described to her father’s substance use as a trigger for

domestic violence, but mother denied any incidents of domestic

violence when father was sober.

¶ 15 The court also found that father had not successfully complied

with the treatment plan objective requiring him to provide for the

child’s basic needs, including food, clothing, housing, and access to

medical care. True, for most of the case, father had complied with

this objective. However, he was in custody at the time of the

termination hearing as a result of two criminal cases and was still

facing an issue of parole. Therefore, father had not complied with

the objective regarding criminal cases nor was he in a position to

care for the child.

¶ 16 The court concluded that it had no information as to when

father may be able to provide for the child’s needs. Father admitted

that he was not capable, at that time, of caring for the child.

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¶ 17 Because the court’s findings regarding father’s lack of

compliance with his treatment plan are supported by the evidence,

we will not disturb them or the court’s legal conclusions.

2. Mother

¶ 18 The juvenile court recognized mother’s substantial work

during the pendency of the case but ultimately determined that she

had not complied with her treatment plan. The court found that

mother’s treatment plan was put in place to address issues of

domestic violence, protective parenting capacity, and sobriety; yet

those issues persisted four years later.

¶ 19 The court acknowledged the cycle of domestic violence, and

that denial is a part of that cycle. Nevertheless, the court’s

concerns regarding mother’s ability to protect the child from

exposure to domestic violence were not alleviated. This finding is

supported by the evidence. Specifically, after the child was removed

from father’s care for a second time, mother retained temporary

custody. The caseworker expressed to mother the need to comply

with the juvenile court’s order, ensuring the child did not have any

contact with father outside of the Department’s oversight. Two

months later, mother and the child were seen with father, once

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again raising concerns about mother’s protective capacity, and the

child was removed from mother’s care for a second time. The

caseworker testified and father admitted that he had contact with

the child while mother had temporary custody, in violation of the

juvenile court’s order.

¶ 20 The court also found that there were ongoing compliance

issues regarding mother’s use of marijuana and monitored sobriety.

Specifically, the court found the child was exposed to controlled

substances while in mother’s care, and there were indications that

mother believed she could continue to use marijuana without

affecting the child. In support, the caseworker testified that the

child’s statements, after his return to the parents and before his

second removal from mother, indicated he was exposed to drugs in

the home. After the child was removed from the home for a second

time, he was given a hair follicle test which was positive for

methamphetamine and THC. Due to the timing history, the

caseworker concluded that the child was exposed to drugs while in

mother’s care. When asked, mother could offer no explanation for

how the child could have been exposed to such substances. In the

termination report, the caseworker noted mother did not show

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concern about this positive result or the possible short- and

long-term impacts of drug exposure to the child. The record also

reflected that mother had the ability to be sober, having submitted

negative drug tests; however, when she became stressed, she

returned to using marijuana. At the time of the termination

hearing, mother was again testing positive for THC and missing

drug tests.

¶ 21 Because the court’s findings regarding mother’s lack of

compliance with her treatment plan are supported by the evidence,

we will not disturb them or the court’s legal conclusions.

C. Fitness

¶ 22 Mother next asserts that the court erred when it found her

unfit. She seems to argue that, because she substantially complied

with her treatment plan, she should have been found to be a fit

parent. Additionally, she argues that poverty and a lack of

resources were the basis for the termination and, if she were given

more time to secure employment and housing, she would be a fit

parent. We discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 23 In determining parental fitness, the court must consider

whether the conduct or condition of the parent renders her unable

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or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to include, at

a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to

meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

conditions. § 19-3-604(2). In determining unfitness, the court may

consider whether a parent has been rehabilitated and whether the

child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent

twenty-two months. § 19-3-604(2)(h), (k).

¶ 24 In determining that mother was unfit, the court found that an

appropriate treatment plan was adopted, was not reasonably

complied with and, most importantly, was not successful. In

particular, the court found that after four years there were still

concerns regarding mother’s ability to protect the child and ensure

he was not repeatedly exposed to domestic violence. As discussed

above, at one point, mother was in compliance with her treatment

plan and the child was returned to her. However, the child was

removed again because of an incident of domestic violence and

mother’s failure to follow the juvenile court’s order regarding

limitations on the child’s contact with father. The caseworker

testified that she did not believe mother to be a fit parent due to the

ongoing concerns of domestic violence and lack of protection of the

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child. The psychologist that completed the parental competency

evaluation (PCE) stated that mother managed the abusive

relationship through “avoidance, including avoiding how it placed

her children in an unsafe situation.” This expert further discussed

how mother minimized the child’s trauma and had not gained the

awareness necessary to appropriately protect the child.

¶ 25 As noted, mother continued to use substances, including

when the child was returned home during the case. The

Department’s termination report stated, “There have been concerns

of [mother’s] lack of understanding of the THC use and being sober

around her child or having a sober caregiver.” It further stated that

although mother “had stopped using THC for a few weeks,” she

reported that “she only did [so] because she thought family time

would expand. When [mother] realized family time would not be

expanded, she started using THC again.”

¶ 26 The court found that, although mother consistently attended

family time, her time had not expanded, the child was struggling

with transitions, and the prognosis from the experts going forward

was discouraging. Mother’s family time remained therapeutically

supervised, and the child’s engagement with mother had not

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increased. The caseworker testified that, during transitions for

family time, the child was dysregulated, crying, screaming and, at

one point, would hide under a chair and repeatedly scream “no.”

The psychologist testified, “there’s so much that’s still so severe

despite all of the recommendations [she] would normally

recommend. And this has gone on for so long, and it still hasn’t

changed.” She concluded that there was no viable path to

reunification and that it would be in the child’s best interest to

discontinue visits. In reaching this conclusion, the psychologist

considered the child’s reactions to visits as well as mother’s

“neglectful and parentification dynamics” that continued despite

interventions. The child was diagnosed with complex

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and his therapist testified

that he had likely been exposed to multiple traumas.

¶ 27 We are not persuaded by mother’s argument that she

“experienced numerous barriers” to successful completion of her

treatment plan. During mother’s temporary custody of the child,

the caseworker spoke with mother about applying for benefits and

attempted to provide clothes and toiletries to mother. The family

advocate sent mother a list of extensive resources near her, and the

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Department helped with her rent. The Department also obtained a

life skills coach for mother to help with resumes, housing, applying

for housing, and working with a service that gives cars to parents.

The caseworker testified that there were no other services that

could be offered to mother that hadn’t previously been offered to

help her reunify with the child.

¶ 28 Because the court’s findings and conclusions that mother is

unfit are supported by the record, we will not disturb them on

appeal.

D. Reasonable Time

¶ 29 Each parent asserts the court erred by finding that they could

not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.

¶ 30 In determining whether a parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, the court may consider whether any changes

occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d

351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). A reasonable time is not an indefinite

time, and it must be determined by considering the physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. People in

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Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). When a

child is under six years old at the time of filing the petition in

dependency and neglect, the juvenile court must consider the

expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions, which require

that such children be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously

as possible. § 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 31 This case was open for 1,521 days, almost the child’s entire

life. The court found that keeping the case open longer, or allowing

the parents additional time, was not in the child’s best interest.

The court likewise found that the child was struggling. This was

evident in the testimony provided by the child’s therapist that (1)

the child’s play involved intrusion, violation, and intense fear

indicative of trauma and domestic violence; and (2) the child had

regressed to the age of approximately six months.

¶ 32 Multiple professionals testified about the child’s need for

permanency:

• The expert who completed the parent-child interactional and

father’s psychological evaluation testified that, from the child’s

perspective, “time is of the essence, and [f]ather’s problems are

chronic and slow to change.” He further testified that “if

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things are continuing down the same path and there’s been

the same issues . . . he would say that time is up.”

• The caseworker testified that the child does not have time to

wait and see if mother can get long-term sobriety or the ability

to be protective of the child’s safety long-term. The caseworker

discussed concerns about the long-term effects the trauma

would have on the child the longer the case continued without

resolution.

• The child’s therapist indicated that, without permanency and

stability, the child would lack empathy, morality, and

consequences to social norms, as well as increased risks of

criminality, deviance, and issues in relationships.

¶ 33 Furthermore, the parents had four years to comply with their

treatment plans, and although the child had returned home at one

point in the case, he was removed from the parents for a second

time. In short, the concerns that led to the dependency and neglect

action remained at the time of the termination hearing.

¶ 34 Consequently, we conclude that the record supports the

juvenile court’s finding that the conduct or condition that rendered

the parties unfit would not change within a reasonable time.

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E. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 35 Last, we reject mother’s contention that the court erred in

finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination,

specifically, allowing mother additional time or granting an

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to the foster parents.

¶ 36 Implicit in the statutory scheme is a requirement that the

juvenile court consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives before

terminating parental rights. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d

1108, 1122-23 (Colo. 1986). If a proposed alternative is to be

viable, it must not only be adequate, it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. “[L]ong-term or permanent placement with a

family member or foster family, short of termination, may not be a

viable less drastic alternative if it does not provide adequate

permanence that adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s

needs.” People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41.

¶ 37 The court determined there were no alternatives short of

terminating the parent-child relationship that would adequately

serve the child’s best interests. The court noted that this is an EPP

case and found that keeping the case open or ending the case with

an APR would not give the child the stability he needs. The court

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considered testimony from the child’s therapist regarding the child’s

complex PTSD diagnosis and extreme reactions to transitions. The

court found that the foster parents did not want an APR and were

able to provide the child with a permanent home.

¶ 38 The record supports the court’s finding. The child needed

permanency and stability. The caseworker specifically testified that

the child does not have time to wait for mother to comply with her

treatment plan. The caseworker opined that an APR to the foster

parents would not be in the child’s best interests because it would

leave open too much ambiguity for the child. The caseworker also

testified that the foster parents were not willing to accept an APR.

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011) (a

juvenile court may consider whether the caregiver favors adoption

over an APR).

¶ 39 To the extent mother argues that the court erred by not

considering placement with the child’s younger siblings as a less

drastic alternative, her argument is not supported by the record.

Mother asserts that nothing shows that the Department

investigated whether the siblings’ kinship placement would be an

appropriate placement for the child in this case. On the contrary,

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the kinship placement for the younger children specifically

indicated they were only an option for the two younger children and

did not have enough room for this child. Additionally, when the

child was removed from mother’s care for the second time, the

Department indicated that the foster home would be the “least

traumatic placement” for the child, but the Department would

consider an appropriate placement willing to take all three siblings

if found.

¶ 40 We perceive no error in the juvenile court’s determinations

that no less drastic alternatives existed, and that termination of

mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

III. Disposition

¶ 41 We affirm the judgment.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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