Peo v. Hicks

22CA1903 Peo v Hicks 02-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1903
Boulder County District Court No. 21CR266
Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Robert William Hicks,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Harris and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eric A. Samler, Alternate Defense Counsel, Hollis A. Whitson, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Robert William Hicks appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of second degree murder

and third degree assault. He contends that the district court erred

by (1) failing to appropriately instruct the jury on self-defense;

(2) limiting his questioning of a witness; and (3) denying his motion

to suppress testimony regarding statements he made and

observations of his demeanor while he was in police custody. We

reject those contentions and affirm the conviction.

I. Background

¶2 On February 14, 2021, Hicks and his roommate (the victim)

met up with another friend to celebrate the friend’s birthday. That

afternoon, while the three were driving to a restaurant to get

something to eat, Hicks and the victim got into a fistfight.

According to the friend’s testimony at trial, the victim ended up with

swollen eyes, a bloody nose, bloody lips, and swollen cheeks after

being “hit about 20 times.” After the three returned to the

apartment Hicks and the victim shared, the friend went home,

leaving Hicks and the victim alone.

¶3 Approximately forty-five minutes later, Hicks called 911 and

told the operator that the victim was having trouble breathing, had

1
“some sort of trauma to his stomach,” and needed paramedics.

Hicks said that he did not know what happened and “had no idea”

what had caused the victim’s condition.

¶4 When the police arrived, one of the two responding officers

found the victim unconscious in his bedroom. The victim was

transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. A

forensic pathologist testified at trial that the victim had suffered

eleven stab wounds spanning from his mid-thigh to his chest, one

of which “injured the left iliac artery and the left iliac vein,” leading

to a “quick mass of blood loss.” The pathologist testified that a

person would have lost consciousness “within seconds” after

sustaining such wounds.

¶5 The other responding officer stayed with Hicks in the living

room area. Hicks told the officer that the victim “possibly fell on

something sharp and . . . possibly did something to his own health.”

Approximately ten minutes later, the officer placed Hicks in

handcuffs and moved him into the hallway outside the apartment

door. Hicks was subsequently taken to the police station and

placed in an interview room. At no point that evening did the police

2
advise him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966).

¶6 The People charged Hicks with third degree assault for the

fistfight and first degree murder for the stabbing. Hicks testified at

trial that he stabbed the victim in self-defense. Specifically, he

testified that he was eating dinner in the kitchen when the victim

approached him, “holding a knife in his right [hand] down by his

waist,” and grabbed his head. Fearing for his life, Hicks “started

jabbing and poking at [the victim] repeatedly with the knife that [he]

had” been using to eat. After Hicks stabbed him, the victim

retreated to his bedroom. The prosecution’s theory of the case was

that the physical evidence did not support Hicks’s testimony that

the fight started in the kitchen. Rather, the evidence showed that

Hicks attacked the victim in his bedroom, where the police later

found him unconscious.

¶7 The jury found Hicks guilty of third degree assault and second

degree murder, and the district court sentenced him to thirty-six

years in prison.

¶8 Hicks now appeals.

3
II. Self-Defense Instruction

¶9 Hicks contends that the district court reversibly erred by

refusing to instruct the jury on his right to use deadly force to repel

a second degree assault and by failing to provide a definition of

“great bodily injury.” We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 “We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether the

instructions accurately informed the jury of the governing law,”

considering “all of the instructions given by the trial court together

to determine whether they properly advised the jury.” Roberts v.

People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 18. But we review a district court’s decision

to give, or not give, a particular jury instruction for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Jones, 2023 COA 104, ¶ 16. “An abuse of

discretion occurs when a trial court’s ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or contrary to law.” People v. Van Meter,

2018 COA 13, ¶ 9.

¶ 11 “[W]hen the evidence presented properly raises the issue of an

affirmative defense, the affirmative defense effectively becomes an

additional element of the charged offense . . . .” Roberts, ¶ 22. If a

district court fails to properly instruct the jury on an affirmative

4
defense, “then the prosecution’s burden of proof has been

impermissibly lowered, implicating a defendant’s constitutional

rights.” Pearson v. People, 2022 CO 4, ¶ 16. “Such an error, if

preserved, is subject to constitutional harmless error review.” Id. A

constitutional error requires reversal unless it was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11. Under

this standard, we must reverse if there is any reasonable possibility

that the error might have contributed to the conviction. Id.

B. Governing Law

¶ 12 “[A] person is justified in using physical force upon another

person in order to defend himself” from what “he reasonably

believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by

that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he

reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.”

§ 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2024. “Deadly physical force may be used

only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is

inadequate” and, as relevant here, either (1) “[t]he actor has

reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he . . . is in

imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury,”

5
or (2) “[t]he other person is committing or reasonably appears about

to commit” first or second degree assault. § 18-1-704(2)(a), (c).

¶ 13 “Great bodily injury,” which is not statutorily defined, means

the same thing as “serious bodily injury,” which is statutorily

defined. People v. Reed, 695 P.2d 806, 808 (Colo. App. 1984)

(“[T]here is no rational basis for distinguishing between ‘great’ and

‘serious’ as applied to bodily injury.”). At the time of Hicks’s trial,

“serious bodily injury” was defined as

bodily injury which, either at the time of the
actual injury or at a later time, involves a
substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of
serious permanent disfigurement, a
substantial risk of protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any part or
organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or
burns of the second or third degree.

§ 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2022.1

¶ 14 As relevant here, a person commits first degree assault if,

“[w]ith intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, he

causes serious bodily injury to any person by means of a deadly

weapon.” § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

1 The definition has since been updated to clarify that “a

penetrating knife . . . wound” constitutes serious bodily injury.
§ 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2024.

6
¶ 15 Again as relevant here, a person commits second degree

assault if,

(b) [w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to
another person, he . . . causes such injury to
any person by means of a deadly weapon; or

....

(d) [h]e recklessly causes serious bodily injury
to another person by means of a deadly
weapon.

§ 18-3-203(1)(b), (d), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 16 “Bodily injury” means “physical pain, illness, or any

impairment of physical or mental condition.” § 18-1-901(3)(c),

C.R.S. 2024.

C. Additional Background

¶ 17 At trial, as discussed above, Hicks testified that he was eating

dinner in the kitchen when the victim approached him with a knife

and violently grabbed his head. To defend himself, he started

“jabbing and poking” at the victim with the knife he had been using

to eat. On direct examination, Hicks testified about his fear of

injury and the possibility that the victim had in fact cut him:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Why did you feel like
you needed to defend yourself? What were you
afraid of?

7
[HICKS:] He was going to stab me. And based
on the earlier incident that we had during the
day, I would have got stabbed.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So in your mind, you
believed that he was going to stab you?

[HICKS:] He was, yeah.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Now, is it possible he
may have cut you in some way or cut your
clothing?

[HICKS:] He might have briefly made an
attempt to stab me, and he might have made
contact, and, sure, he might have got me,[2]
but I was a good bit quicker than he was, and
he — it was — it was nothing near the extent
of what ended up happening to him.

On cross-examination, Hicks confirmed that he “believed [the

victim] was going to stab [him]” and that he believed he was “going

to be seriously injured” or “possibly killed.”

¶ 18 Hicks tendered instructions that would have informed the jury

that he was justified in using deadly force not only if he reasonably

believed he was in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving

great bodily injury, § 18-1-704(2)(a), but also if the victim

reasonably appeared poised to commit first or second degree

2 Hicks later testified that the victim did not injure him in any way

with the knife.

8
assault, § 18-1-704(2)(c). He also tendered instructions setting

forth the elements of first and second degree assault.

¶ 19 His proposed first degree assault instruction tracked the

language of section 18-3-202(1)(a) and would have informed the

jury that a person commits first degree assault if, with intent to

cause serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious

bodily injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon. His

proposed second degree assault instruction tracked the language of

section 18-3-203(1)(d) and would have informed the jury that a

person commits “assault in the second degree (reckless)” if the

person “recklessly caused serious bodily injury to another person,

by means of a deadly weapon.” He also tendered an instruction

containing the definition of “serious bodily injury.”

¶ 20 At the jury instruction conference, the prosecutor argued that,

because “the testimony that we have is that [Hicks] was in fear for

his life or essentially receiving great bodily injury,” it was sufficient

under the facts of this case to instruct the jury that he was entitled

to use deadly force if he reasonably believed he was in imminent

danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury. The court

agreed that it should include only those instructions that “are

9
factually supported by the evidence,” and it declined to give Hicks’s

tendered instructions regarding first and second degree assault.

Because the definition of “serious bodily injury” was contained in an

instruction listing definitions relevant to first and second degree

assault, this definition was also not provided to the jury.

¶ 21 Ultimately, the jury was instructed as follows:

The defendant was legally authorized to use
deadly physical force upon another person
without first retreating if:

1. he used that deadly physical force in order
to defend himself from what he reasonably
believed to be the use or imminent use of
unlawful physical force by that other
person, and

2. he reasonably believed a lesser degree of
force was inadequate, and

3. he had a reasonable ground to believe, and
did believe, that he was in imminent danger
of being killed or of receiving great bodily
injury.

D. Second Degree Assault

¶ 22 Hicks argues that the district court erred by refusing to

instruct the jury that he was justified in using deadly force if the

victim reasonably appeared about to commit second degree assault.

See § 18-1-704(2)(c). Specifically, he argues that a person may

10
commit second degree assault intending to cause only bodily injury,

not serious bodily injury, see § 18-3-203(1)(b), and that “[t]he jury

could have believed that it was unreasonable for Mr. Hicks to

believe that [the victim] would cause him serious or great bodily

injury, but they could have believed that it was reasonable for

Mr. Hicks to believe that [the victim] . . . might cause him pain.”

Relying on Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009), he argues

that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury that he was

justified in using deadly force if he “reasonably believed that [the

victim] intended to cause [him] bodily injury” lessened the

prosecution’s burden of disproving his affirmative defense of

self-defense.

¶ 23 Assuming, without deciding, that this issue was preserved and

that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on bodily

11
injury, thereby lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof,3 we

conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 24 Even if we assume Hicks acted in self-defense, the evidence is

overwhelming that Hicks did not act with a reasonable degree of

force. See Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Colo. 1991) (“A

constitutional error is harmless when the evidence properly received

against a defendant is so overwhelming that the constitutional

violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). While Hicks

claimed that he “wasn’t trying to cause [the victim] harm” and that

he stabbed the victim for only “a couple seconds,” he inflicted eleven

stab wounds on the victim, spread all over the victim’s body. And

while Hicks claimed to have stabbed the victim in response to the

victim approaching him with a knife, the victim had no apparent

defensive injuries and Hicks had no knife injuries from the victim.

3 Contrary to Hicks’s argument on appeal, his tendered instruction

did not inform the jury that “a person may commit second degree
assault intending to cause only bodily injury.” Instead, his
tendered instruction informed the jury that a person commits
second degree assault (reckless) by causing “serious bodily injury.”
This is because his tendered instruction did not come from section
18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024 (describing an “intent to cause bodily
injury”), but instead came from section 18-3-203(1)(d) (describing
recklessly causing “serious bodily injury”).

12
In fact, Hicks appeared unable to recreate the physical movements

that could have caused the eleven stab wounds. Thus, even if the

jury believed there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Hicks

acted in self-defense, there was overwhelming evidence that he did

not act with a reasonable degree of force when he stabbed the

victim eleven times. See § 18-1-704(2).

¶ 25 Additionally, the evidence is overwhelming that, contrary to

Hicks’s testimony, the fatal wound was inflicted with a knife in the

bedroom. While Hicks claimed he stabbed the victim in the kitchen

and severed his artery there, the tested blood in the kitchen was

Hicks’s own, not the victim’s.4 And while Hicks claimed that the

victim walked from the kitchen into the bedroom after Hicks

stabbed him and that Hicks talked to the victim through the

bedroom door for at least fifteen minutes, the pathologist testified

that the wound to the victim’s left iliac artery would have rendered

him unconscious within seconds or a few minutes. Further, there

was only one knife found in the bedroom. While Hicks claimed that

the knife found in the victim’s bedroom was the one the victim used

4 Hicks testified that he cut himself on the knife he used to stab the

victim.

13
to attack him and that he never touched it, eighty-eight percent of

the DNA on the handle of that knife belonged to Hicks. Since Hicks

never testified that the victim attacked him in the bedroom, the

infliction of the fatal wound there undermines his claim of

self-defense.

¶ 26 Following Kaufman, we continue to narrowly focus on the

particular facts of Hicks’s self-defense claim to determine whether

the conviction here was influenced by the district court’s failure to

instruct the jury that Hicks was justified in using deadly force if he

reasonably believed the victim intended to cause him only bodily

injury. In Kaufman, the supreme court held that the district court

plainly erred by erroneously instructing the jury that second degree

assault required an intent to cause serious bodily injury rather

than merely bodily injury. 202 P.3d at 549. At trial, there was

conflicting testimony regarding whether the victim had his arms in

the air as he approached the defendant or whether he reached

behind his back as he approached, leading the defendant to believe

he was reaching for a weapon. Id. at 547. After analyzing the

testimony in detail, including testimony regarding the victim’s

physical size, intoxication, and use of an antisemitic slur, the

14
supreme court concluded that “the evidence may have supported a

jury finding of intent to cause [only] bodily injury.” Id. at 550.

Because the jury was precluded from considering “whether [the

defendant’s] actions were justified if he reasonably believed that [the

victim] only intended to cause him bodily injury (i.e., physical

pain),” the instructional error could have prevented the jury from

accepting the defendant’s claim of self-defense, and reversal was

required under the plain error standard. Id. at 549.

¶ 27 This case, in contrast, did not turn on Hicks’s perception of

whether the victim intended to cause him bodily injury with a knife

or serious bodily injury, whether with a knife or by any other

means. Rather, it turned on whether or not the jury believed that

the victim attacked Hicks with a knife at all. As Hicks put it, the

“central dispute was whether (as Mr. Hicks testified) [the victim]

came out of his room with a knife and tried to attack Mr. Hicks as

he was eating, or whether (according to the People’s theory) [the

victim] never left his room but instead was attacked there by

Hicks.” If the jury believed that the victim attacked Hicks with a

knife, then the risk of serious bodily injury was obvious — as Hicks

himself repeatedly testified, he believed he was going to be stabbed

15
and was “going to be seriously injured” or “possibly killed.”5

Because the only self-defense theory offered at trial was that the

victim attacked Hicks with a knife, causing him to fear being killed

or seriously injured, the jury had no basis to believe that Hicks

feared only bodily injury but not serious bodily injury.

¶ 28 While a slight possibility may exist that the jury could have

believed that (1) Hicks used a reasonable degree of force; (2) the

fatal wound was not inflicted in the bedroom, or the victim attacked

Hicks in the bedroom; or (3) Hicks had a reasonable fear of bodily

injury from a knife but not serious bodily injury, the likelihood of

the jury having a reasonable doubt as to all of these propositions is

so remote that we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that

any error might have contributed to the conviction. Thus, the

court’s failure to instruct on fear of bodily injury as a defense was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

5 Although Hicks argues in his reply brief that his testimony

reflected merely “a fear of being injured in general,” he
acknowledges several times in his opening brief that he testified he
was afraid specifically of being stabbed, noting that “Mr. Hicks
testified he was afraid that [the victim] would stab him” and
“Mr. Hicks feared that [the victim] would stab him.”

16
E. Definition of “Great Bodily Injury”

¶ 29 Next, Hicks argues that, because the jury was instructed that

self-defense required a belief “that he was in imminent danger of

being killed or of receiving great bodily injury,” the district court

erred by failing to provide a definition of “great bodily injury.”

Because “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” mean the

same thing, Reed, 695 P.2d at 808, he argues that the court should

have provided the definition of serious bodily injury set forth in

section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2022. We conclude that any error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 30 In general, “[w]hen the legislature includes particular

definitions for terms it uses in a statute, those definitions, not an

average person’s understanding of the terms, govern.” People v.

Rigsby, 2020 CO 74, ¶ 24. In this case, however, the precise

definition of great or serious bodily injury was never implicated. If

the jury believed Hicks’s testimony, then it was clear that he had a

reasonable fear of being stabbed or killed. But if the jury accepted

the prosecution’s version of events — that Hicks attacked the victim

in his bedroom and never faced any danger — then the definition of

great or serious bodily injury was irrelevant. In either case, there is

17
no reasonable possibility that the lack of the definition might have

contributed to Hicks’s conviction.

¶ 31 Indeed, any error in failing to define great or serious bodily

injury would have inured to Hicks’s benefit. The jury received an

instruction in connection with the third degree assault charge

defining “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment

of physical or mental condition.” Without a definition of great or

serious bodily injury, the jury would reasonably have relied on that

definition to discern the meaning of “great bodily injury.” Thus, the

alleged instructional error could only have benefited Hicks because

the jury would likely have interpreted “great bodily injury” to mean

simply “great physical pain,” thereby raising the prosecution’s

burden by allowing Hicks to use deadly force if he was in

reasonable fear of “great physical pain” as opposed to “a substantial

risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent

disfigurement, a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of

the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures,

or burns of the second or third degree.” § 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S.

2022.

18
¶ 32 We thus conclude that no reversible instructional error

occurred.

III. Evidentiary Ruling

¶ 33 Hicks contends that the district court erred by limiting his

questioning of a detective who helped process the crime scene. We

again disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 34 The district court has broad discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence based on its relevance, probative value,

and prejudicial impact. People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20. This

includes the discretion to rule on the admissibility of expert

testimony. Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 8. We review these

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v. Quillen,

2023 COA 22M, ¶ 14. The district court abuses its discretion if its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if the

court misapplies the law. Id.

B. Governing Law

¶ 35 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

19
the evidence.” CRE 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. CRE

403. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. CRE 402.

¶ 36 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of

an opinion or otherwise.” CRE 702. Expert testimony “is that

which goes beyond the realm of common experience and requires

experience, skills, or knowledge that the ordinary person would not

have.” Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 22. To determine

whether expert testimony is admissible under CRE 702, the court

must determine, among other things, the “qualifications of the

witness.” People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 70 (Colo. 2001).

C. Additional Background

¶ 37 A detective who helped process the crime scene was asked by

her supervisor “to conduct a walk-through of the apartment in

relation to blood pattern analysis.” In a report of her findings, she

20
wrote that there was blood “consistent with an arterial spurt stain”

on the dishwasher in the kitchen. According to her report,

• such a stain “is created when blood is ejected in a stream

under pressure, often occurring when an artery or the

heart is breached, and the circulatory system is still

under pressure”;

• “[i]t is known from the autopsy report that [the victim]

received a stab wound . . . to the left internal iliac artery

and left iliac vein”; and

• “[t]he stain patterns in the kitchen would be indicative of

this injury being created in the kitchen.”

However, this initial analysis was later disproven by DNA testing

that showed it was not the victim’s blood on the dishwasher —

rather, it was Hicks’s blood. Hicks testified that he accidentally cut

himself.

¶ 38 Hicks first sought to have the detective testify to the

conclusions in her report “to corroborate his testimony that the

confrontation with [the victim] occurred in the kitchen.” But the

district court determined that the detective was not qualified as a

blood spatter expert and that there was “little to no . . . content in

21
[her] report which could be elicited” that was outside the scope of

expert testimony. Hicks did not challenge the court’s ruling that

the detective was not qualified to give expert testimony, but he

argued that she could still testify “[t]hat she was asked to do a

walk-through in relation to blood pattern analysis”; “that she

walked around and she looked at different locations . . . where there

was blood located”; and “that there can be pertinent or helpful

information gained from looking at the different blood patterns.”

¶ 39 The prosecutor objected to this testimony on two grounds.

First, it was cumulative, because another detective had already

testified that the police look for blood at a crime scene in order to

figure out what happened. And second, it risked confusing the

jury, because

the second that we put a detective on the
stand to testify about going in there to look at
blood pattern[s], this jury, based on the
questions that they just asked related to this
last witness, is going to have 150,000
questions about what those patterns mean
and what they told her and what she was able
to determine from them, and she’s not
qualified to provide that testimony. And then
the jury is going to be wondering, even though
they’re instructed not to, well, why aren’t these
questions being answered.

22
The district court sustained the objection and ruled that “there will

not be testimony on this issue presented by [the detective].”

D. Discussion

¶ 40 Hicks argues that the district court erred by not permitting the

detective to testify that she walked through the apartment “in

relation to blood pattern analysis” and that law enforcement can

gain “helpful information . . . from looking at the different blood

patterns.” Although he insists that he “was not seeking to elicit an

expert opinion,” he argues that the detective’s testimony was

“pivotal” to the “central dispute” regarding whether the victim

attacked Hicks in the kitchen or Hicks attacked the victim in his

bedroom.

¶ 41 Hicks does not explain how the detective’s testimony about

gaining information from blood patterns could have supported his

account that he stabbed the victim in the kitchen without straying

into the realm of expert testimony. Nor does he explain how the

detective’s testimony could have supported his account of the

incident given that the blood on the dishwasher was not from the

victim. Further, we agree with the district court that the detective’s

testimony would have been cumulative, as another detective who

23
helped process the crime scene testified about the bloodstains in

the apartment and the fact that the police looked for blood in

“various locations to sort of help tell the story of where people were

moving around.” We thus discern no abuse of discretion in the

court’s ruling limiting the detective’s testimony. See Elmarr, ¶ 20.

¶ 42 We are not persuaded otherwise by Hicks’s alternative

argument that the detective’s testimony was necessary to allow him

“to point out to the jury that law enforcement could have done

further investigation and testing of the [blood] evidence” but did not

do so. On the contrary, another detective testified that, although

she could have had the “bloodstains and patterns analyzed by an

expert to determine how they potentially may have been deposited,”

she chose not to “send any sort of photographs or information to

have a blood spatter expert analyze these blood stains.” Hicks was

thus able to elicit that law enforcement could have ordered expert

blood spatter analysis but elected not to. And during closing

argument, defense counsel discussed the alleged deficiencies in the

investigation and emphasized the potential evidence that was not

collected or presented, including blood spatter analysis. See

People v. Brown, 2014 COA 155M-2, ¶ 16 (concluding that no

24
reversible error occurred where the defendant “was able to present

to the jury most of the evidence underlying his contention that the

police investigation was deficient and to argue the purported

inadequacy in closing”).

IV. Miranda Violation

¶ 43 Last, Hicks argues that, because he was never given a Miranda

advisement, the district court should not have allowed testimony

regarding (1) his demeanor while in police custody; (2) statements

he made about the fistfight; and (3) the fact that he did not initially

say that he had acted in self-defense. We begin by describing the

governing law and standard of review, then turn to Hicks’s

arguments.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

¶ 44 Before conducting a custodial interrogation, officers must give

a suspect a Miranda advisement to inform him of his constitutional

rights to remain silent and request an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 444. Statements made during a custodial interrogation are

admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief only if they were

preceded by a Miranda advisement (unless the suspect voluntarily,

25
knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights, an issue not relevant

to this appeal). See Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 56, ¶ 11.

¶ 45 In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,

we defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by the

record and review the court’s application of law de novo. See

People v. Sampson, 2017 CO 100, ¶ 16. When a defendant raises

Miranda contentions on appeal that he did not raise before the

district court, we review those contentions for plain error. Phillips v.

People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 38. Plain error is an error that is obvious

and substantial. Hagos, ¶ 14. An error is “obvious” if the

challenged action contravened a clear statutory command, a well-

settled legal principle, or Colorado case law. People v. Thompson,

2018 COA 83, ¶ 34, aff’d, 2020 CO 72. An error is “substantial” if

it so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to

cast doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Hagos,

¶ 14.

B. Testimony Regarding Hicks’s Demeanor

¶ 46 Hicks argues for the first time on appeal that the district court

should not have permitted two officers who spoke with him while he

was handcuffed in the hallway outside his apartment to testify

26
about his demeanor. Specifically, he argues that the officers should

not have been allowed to testify that (1) “when we would ask some

questions, [Hicks] would almost seem like he was about to cry at

certain points”; and (2) Hicks became “belligerent” and “combative”

when asked questions. Because this argument is unpreserved, we

review for plain error.

¶ 47 Hicks provides no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the

proposition that “Miranda required the court to suppress [the

officers’] descriptions of Hicks’s demeanor when he was asked

questions.” Contrary to Hicks’s argument, Miranda applies to a

suspect’s statements, not to officers’ observations of the suspect.

See People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20, 25 (Colo. 1995) (“The remedy for a

Miranda violation . . . is suppression of the statements obtained.”).

Given the lack of authority to support Hicks’s position, we conclude

that any error in the district court’s failure to suppress the officers’

testimony regarding his demeanor was not obvious. See Thompson,

¶ 34.

¶ 48 To the extent Hicks argues that his demeanor was an

expressive statement, he does not develop that argument. We

27
therefore decline to address it. See People v. Stone, 2021 COA 104,

¶ 52 (appellate courts do not address undeveloped arguments).

C. Statements About Fistfight

¶ 49 Second, Hicks argues that the district court should not have

permitted an officer who spoke with him while he was handcuffed to

testify regarding the fistfight earlier that day between Hicks and the

victim. Specifically, the officer had the following colloquy with the

prosecutor:

[PROSECUTOR:] At any point did Mr. Hicks
make a statement referencing the prior
incident?

[OFFICER:] Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:] And what was the statement
that Mr. Hicks made to you?

[OFFICER:] He said that they were arguing a
little bit earlier, and then — excuse my
language — that a little bitch was acting like a
little bitch.

[PROSECUTOR:] Did Mr. [Hicks] also indicate,
no, there was no prior incident?

[OFFICER:] He did, yes.

[PROSECUTOR:] Did he indicate who he was
referring to when he mentioned the little bitch?

[OFFICER:] No.

28
¶ 50 The officer did not testify that Hicks made these statements in

response to a question. Rather, Hicks’s statements appear to have

been spontaneous and voluntary. Spontaneous and voluntary

statements are not subject to suppression. See People v. White,

632 P.2d 609, 612 (Colo. App. 1981) (“spontaneous and voluntary

utterances” did not need to be suppressed even though the

defendant had not been given Miranda warnings before he made the

statements). We thus discern no error in their admission.

D. No Initial Mention of Self-Defense

¶ 51 Third, Hicks argues, without citation to the record, that

“[b]ecause Miranda warnings were never given,” “the officers [should

not] have been allowed to testify that Mr. Hicks did not state he was

acting in self-defense.” Parties “should not ‘expect the court to

peruse the record without the help of pinpoint citations.’”

O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 632 (Colo. App. 2010) (citations

omitted). Nevertheless, we believe Hicks is referring to the following

exchange between the prosecutor and one of the officers who

responded to his 911 call:

[PROSECUTOR:] Did he ever indicate to you
that he was just defending himself?

29
[OFFICER:] No.

¶ 52 Hicks does not develop his argument to explain why this

testimony is inadmissible and should have been suppressed. We

therefore do not address it. See Stone, ¶ 52.

V. Disposition

¶ 53 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

30