Peo in Interest of NRGV

24CA0949 Peo in Interest of NRGV 02-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0949
Mesa County District Court No. 22JV90
Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of N.R.G.V., a Child,

and Concerning J.A.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Tow and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 6, 2025

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant Count Attorney, Grand
Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.A.G. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with N.R.G.V. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect alleging concerns about the

cleanliness and safety of the family home, and mother’s substance

abuse and mental health. When the petition was filed, N.R.G.V.

was two years old.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate parental rights.

After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.

¶5 Mother appeals. She contends that the juvenile court erred by

determining that (1) the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her as a parent; (2) she could not become a fit parent

within a reasonable time; and (3) there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. We conclude that the record supports

these findings and therefore affirm.

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II. Standard of Review

¶6 A judgment terminating parental rights presents mixed

questions of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021

CO 14, ¶ 15. A determination of the proper legal standard to be

applied in a case and the application of that standard to the

particular facts of the case are questions of law that we review de

novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.

However, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s factual findings

when they are supported by the record. Id. at ¶ 32; see also A.M., ¶

15. It is the role of the juvenile court to make determinations about

the credibility of the witnesses as well as the sufficiency, probative

value, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from it. A.M., ¶ 15.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Mother first challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite

her with the child.

A. Relevant Law

¶8 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, a juvenile court must consider whether the

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Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and

reunite her with the child. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-

604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-

103(114). Appropriate services provided in accordance with section

19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶9 The juvenile court must consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to comply with the plan. People

in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). The

court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in

treatment in determining whether the department made reasonable

efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

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B. The Record Shows the Department Made Reasonable Efforts

¶ 10 Mother asserts the Department failed to provide services to

support her treatment plan goals requiring her to improve the

condition of her home, get sober, and improve her mental health.

In particular, she alleges that the Department failed to assist her

with transportation issues that persisted throughout the case and

served as a “barrier” to her ability to comply with the treatment

plan.

¶ 11 In support, mother points to the testimony of her proffered

expert on the subject. Mother’s expert opined that the Department

did not provide adequate transportation assistance or domestic

violence treatment, failed to meet with mother monthly, and did not

seek additional sources of funding to assist her. We discern no

error.

¶ 12 First, we note that the court did not find mother’s expert’s

testimony or report to be persuasive. And that credibility

determination is solely for the juvenile court to make. See A.M., ¶

15.

¶ 13 Second, the record shows the Department offered mother

multiple bus passes, assistance in cleaning her home, a family

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therapy referral, multiple referrals for in-patient substance abuse

and mental health treatment, and a life skills worker. Additionally,

the caseworker contacted mother monthly to inquire about her

treatment plan engagement.

¶ 14 Nevertheless, mother argues that any noncompliance was due

to the Department’s persistent failure to provide her transportation

support. But the record shows mother was offered five ninety-day

bus passes throughout the case and, when bus transportation

proved difficult, the caseworker offered to drive mother to services.

Mother acknowledged during her testimony that though the

caseworker offered to transport her, she declined. The caseworker

testified that while providing gas cards is another way to provide

support for transportation, it was not a viable option here because

neither mother nor her partner had a valid driver’s license.

Mother’s claim that the Department’s failure to provide

transportation support impeded her ability to comply with family

visits is also belied by the record as her noncompliance continued

when she was offered virtual visits, as she attended only two of

thirty-two virtual sessions offered.

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¶ 15 Mother also claims that the Department did not provide

domestic violence treatment. We recognize that although domestic

violence was described as a concern in mother’s previous

relationship, her current treatment plan did not expressly address

those concerns. Nevertheless, the caseworker testified that the co-

occurring treatment program mother was referred to could have

provided domestic violence treatment.

¶ 16 The primary concerns related to mother’s substance abuse

and mental health issues remained at the time of termination.

Mother struggled with illicit drug use throughout the case and

never attended any substance abuse or mental health treatment

despite numerous Department referrals.

¶ 17 Mother further argues that the Department never sought out

additional sources of funding to assist her with services. But she

cites no law, and we are aware of none, that would require the

Department to do so as part of its obligation to provide reasonable

efforts under section 19-3-208.

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IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 18 We next consider and reject mother’s assertion that the court

erred by finding she could not become a fit parent withing a

reasonable period of time.

A. Relevant Law

¶ 19 Another prerequisite to termination is a determination by clear

and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and cannot become

fit within a reasonable period of time. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(III).

¶ 20 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 p.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). At a

minimum, reasonable parental care requires that a parent provide

nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 9.

¶ 21 A reasonable period of time is not an indefinite time but must

be considered based on the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child. People in Interest of A.J., 143

P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). When determining whether a

parent can become fit within a reasonable time, the “court may

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consider whether any change has occurred during the pendency of

the dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent’s social history,

and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or

condition.” People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo.

App. 2003).

¶ 22 If a parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan,

the court need not give the parent additional time to comply. See

People in Interest of R.B.S., 717 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. App. 1986).

When, as here, a child is under six years old when a petition is

filed, the court must consider the expedited permanency planning

(EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),

19-1-123(1)(a), 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

B. The Record Shows Mother Could Not Become Fit Within a
Reasonable Time

¶ 23 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit and could not

become fit in a reasonable time because she had eighteen months

to comply with her treatment plan and had made no progress

towards sobriety during that time. Mother contends this was error

because she made significant efforts to address her treatment plan

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objectives, such as attending family time when she had

transportation and completing two co-occurring assessments.

Based on this, she contends that she could have made meaningful

progress in an additional six months.

¶ 24 We recognize that mother consistently attended family time in

the beginning of the case, and those visits reportedly went well.

However, her attendance significantly decreased as the case

progressed. And while most of the in-person family time visits went

well, they were not without reported safety concerns.

¶ 25 It is also true that mother completed two co-occurring

assessments, but she never followed through with any treatment for

her substance abuse or mental health concerns.

¶ 26 The caseworker testified that not only had mother failed to

address the problems that caused the case to open, but she was

also “a little bit worse off” at the time of termination than she was at

the beginning of the case a year and a half prior.

¶ 27 Given these supported findings and considering that this was

an EPP case, we cannot say that the court erred by finding that

mother could not become a fit parent after giving her a year and a

half to work on her treatment plan.

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V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 28 Lastly, we address mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s

finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination.

A. Relevant Law

¶ 29 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before terminating parental rights. People in Interest of

M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122-23 (Colo. 1986). In doing so, the court

must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. See § 19-3-604(3); People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 35.

¶ 30 If the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds that

termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

proposed alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Permanent

placement is not a viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a

stable, permanent home that can be assured only by adoption. S.N-

V., 300 P.3d at 920.

B. The Record Shows There Was No Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 31 The juvenile court found that the child needed “stability,

permanency, predictability, structure, and routine” and that

termination was in the child’s best interests.

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¶ 32 Mother points out that the placement provider testified they

would be willing to retain placement of the child if the court did not

terminate parental rights. Mother also notes that she had a strong

bond with her child. Consequently, she contends, it would have

been in the child’s best interests to maintain an ongoing

relationship with her.

¶ 33 But mother’s assertion ignores other testimony from the

placement provider and the caseworker. The placement provider

stated that they would prefer to adopt the child. And the

caseworker testified that she believed it was in the child’s best

interests to have permanency. The caseworker further reported

that the child was flourishing in his current placement, and that

the current placement could reliably meet the child’s needs in a

home that was free of substances.

¶ 34 We conclude that the court considered and eliminated less

drastic alternatives and there is record support for the court’s

finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. B.H., ¶ 80.

VI. Disposition

¶ 35 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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