MILLER v. POTOSHINSKY.

27 P. 17

1 Colo.App. 32

MILLER et al.
v.
POTOSHINSKY.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

June 30, 1891

Appeal
from district court, Arapahoe county

W.W.
Cover and Geo. C. Norris, for appellants.

BISSELL,
J.

This
controversy grows out of an alleged contract of hiring. In
1884 Joseph Potoshinsky was a Jewish rabbi living in Chicago.
Some time in December of that year the appellants, Miller and
Krepitsky, opened a correspondence with the rabbi looking to
his employment to render them certain specified service. The
final letter, which contains [1 Colo.App. 33] the offer of
employment, in substance undertakes to pay Potoshinsky $35
per month for his services,--$20 to kill cattle according to
the Jewish law, and $15 for the instruction of their
children. Without details, this was their substantial
proposition. This offer was accepted, and the rabbi came to
Denver, and rendered the service for which he had been
engaged. Substantially, there is no controversy as to these
propositions. It may be stated that in the trial court some
question was raised as to the insufficiency of the
correspondence to make a legal contract, but the judge very
properly held that, if the correspondence was followed by a
performance under its proposition, it was ample as a contract
to bind the appellants, and a breach would give a cause of
action. The principal defense was rested upon the alleged
performance by the promisors up to a certain date, when,
according to their contention, the contract was modified, and
substantially abandoned, with the consent of the rabbi, who
expressly, and by his conduct, accepted the responsibility of
a Jewish congregation in place of that which resulted from
the letters. That there was some sort of a modification or
change in the relation of the parties is evident from the
verdict of the jury, who accepted neither version given as
entirely accurate, and found that the engagement had been
entered into, but that it had been subsequently so modified
as to entitle the appellants to a reduction of the amount
claimed. The appellants maintain that the verdict was not a
just one, and that it is unsupported by the evidence. This is
the only error alleged, discussed, or relied on. In reality,
nothing else is apparent in the record upon which an argument
could be predicated. This is not available for the purposes
of reversal. The case, as presented, is not brought within
any of the well-recognized rules which cover such cases. The
employment and the performance were both established, and,
under instructions which plainly and clearly expressed the
law, the two remaining inquiries, whether the contract had
been modified or whether it had been terminated, were left [1
Colo.App. 34] to the jury. The verdict disposed of those
questions, and cannot be said to be without support from the
testimony. It is wholly unnecessary to ascertain the date or
the extent of the modification as expressed in the verdict.
It is enough that it is sustained by the evidence to such an
extent that no appellate tribunal would be justified in
setting it aside. The judgment must be affirmed.