Peo v. Eddins

18CA0734 Peo v Eddins 11-24-2021

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0734

Jefferson County District Court No. 16CR7364

Honorable Christie A. Bachmeyer, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Scott Alexander Eddins,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO

Grove and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced November 24, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Carty, Assistant Attorney

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Victor T. Owens, Alternate Defense Counsel, Parker, Colorado, for Defendant-

Appellant

1

¶ 1

Defendant, Scott Alexander Eddins, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of burglary

and felony menacing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2

In October 2015, the victims were awoken in the night by

three armed intruders, some of whom wore masks. The victims

fought with the intruders; during the fight, one had his mask pulled

off, dropped some items, and fired a shot. As the intruders fled, one

aimed a gun at the victims who were giving chase.

¶ 3

The Lakewood police collected the items dropped by the

intruders. Based, in part, on DNA evidence collected from those

items, the police identified Eddins as one of the intruders.

¶ 4

Eddins was charged with two counts of first degree burglary

and four counts of felony menacing. See §§ 18-4-202(1), 18-3-

206(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2021. A jury found him guilty as charged. The

trial court merged the burglary convictions.

II. Motion to Suppress

¶ 5

Eddins contends that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress his statements to police. He argues that he was

in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

2

when he made the statements but he did not receive Miranda

warnings. We discern no error.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 6

We draw the following facts from the undisputed evidence

presented at the suppression hearing, the redacted version of the

police detective’s recorded interview with Eddins that was admitted

at trial, and the trial court’s order. The unredacted recording of the

interview was played at the hearing and is the basis of some of the

court’s findings, but it is not in the appellate record. We presume

any missing portions of the record support the court’s order. People

v. Montgomery, 2014 COA 166, ¶ 22.

1. The Police Interview

¶ 7

Detective Karen Turnbull investigated the home invasion.

After identifying Eddins as a potential suspect, the detective

interviewed him at the Denver County Jail, where he was being held

on an unrelated case.

¶ 8

The detective met Eddins in the jail’s locked interview area.

The interview room had one entrance and a table with two chairs,

and it was large enough for only two people to sit at the table.

3

¶ 9

Eddins was called to the interview room, but he was not

escorted by jail staff or handcuffed. He sat across from the

detective, who was not armed and did not block the door. The door

was left open at the start of the interview but was closed shortly

thereafter due to noise outside the room.

¶ 10

After introducing herself, the detective informed Eddins that

she wanted to discuss the October 2015 incident. The detective

asked, “Do you know anything about that case?” Eddins answered,

I’d be willing to tell you a little bit about that

because I do know a little bit about it — but

um, I was under duress — uh, somebody had

threatened my family — and then I seen that

person, you know, shooting people. And uh,

I’d be willing to share that information, and uh

— but I’d like to have some amnesty involved

in that case.

The detective told him that she could not make any promises

regarding amnesty.

¶ 11

Then the detective said, “Because you’re not free to leave, I’ve

got to advise you of your rights; not because you’re locked up on

this thing, but because you’re locked up on something else.” (The

detective did not specify whether she was referring to Eddins’s

4

freedom to leave the jail or the interview room.) Before the detective

could give the Miranda advisements, however, Eddins interjected,

I’ve already talked to the detect — or to the

officer, and I told them about these people.

Little bit about what’s going on. And I told

them I wanted to speak to, you know, a

detective about some things that I’d seen —

someone shot and some things go down that

was not cool at all — and that’s got me scared

for my family.

¶ 12

The detective gave him the Miranda warnings. She also

informed Eddins that he did not have to answer any questions and

that, if he decided to answer some questions, he did not have to

answer all of them. The detective asked Eddins if he would be

willing to talk to her about the case. He said he would like to have

an attorney, and the detective told him that she would arrange for

him to have an attorney present. Eddins said he understood but

went on to say,

I’m not admitting any — any part of what went

down. And let me please tell you, I’m not —

I’m not trying to be hard or difficult with you

because I’m willing to share information. I just

want to make sure that, um, I’m not, uh,

thrown in to the — to the wolves because I was

under duress for my family and everything was

threatened . . . .

5

The detective interrupted Eddins, told him that they could not talk

any further, and ended the interview.

2. The Court’s Ruling

¶ 13

Defense counsel argued that Eddins’s statements in the

interview should be suppressed because he was in custody and the

detective failed to give him Miranda warnings before the statements.

¶ 14

In a written order, the trial court denied Eddins’s suppression

motion on the ground that he was not in custody for Miranda

purposes during the interview. Given this conclusion, the court did

not address the prosecution’s argument that Eddins’s statements

after he received Miranda warnings were spontaneous, rather than

the result of interrogation.

B. Miranda and Related Principles

¶ 15

Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a

mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9.

We defer to a trial court’s findings of fact so long as the record

supports them. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 353 (Colo. 2003).

We review de novo the legal determination of whether a person is in

custody. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010). We

6

may consider undisputed facts in the record, in addition to the trial

court’s factual findings. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 16.

¶ 16

A person subjected to custodial interrogation by law

enforcement must first receive an advisement of their Fifth

Amendment rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79; see also People v.

Gonzalez-Zamora, 251 P.3d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 2011). A suspect

may waive their rights and make a statement to police but must do

so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently before the statement

may be used against them in a criminal proceeding. See Gonzalez-

Zamora, 251 P.3d at 1074.

¶ 17

Miranda protections apply only when a suspect has been

subjected to both custody and interrogation. Effland, 240 P.3d at

873. Interrogation refers to express questioning, as well as any

words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980).

¶ 18

To determine if a person was in custody, we normally ask

whether a reasonable person in the same position would have

believed their freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree

associated with a formal arrest. People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453,

7

464 (Colo. 2002). This is an objective test based on all the

circumstances. Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 353.

¶ 19

The traditional test for custody, however, does not apply to a

prison or jail setting because it would lead to the conclusion that all

prison questioning is custodial given that a reasonable person

would always believe they could not leave the prison freely. People

v. Parsons, 15 P.3d 799, 801 (Colo. App. 2000); see People v.

Denison, 918 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1996). So a person is not

necessarily in custody for Miranda purposes if they are questioned

in jail or prison. People v. J.D., 989 P.2d 762, 768 (Colo. 1999); see

also Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511-12 (2012).

¶ 20

To assess whether an inmate is in custody for Miranda

purposes, a court must consider whether there has been “a change

in the surroundings of the prisoner that results in an added

imposition on his freedom of movement.” Denison, 918 P.2d at

1116. Relevant factors include (1) the language used in summoning

the inmate; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation;

(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his

guilt;, and (4) any additional pressure exerted to detain him. Id.

Because these factors are not exhaustive, a court may also consider

8

[t]he time, place, and purpose of the

encounter; the persons present during the

interrogation; the words spoken by the officer

to the defendant; the officer’s tone of voice and

general demeanor; the length and mood of the

interrogation; whether any limitation of

movement or other form of restraint was

placed on the defendant during the

interrogation; the officer’s response to any

questions asked by the defendant; whether

directions were given to the defendant during

the interrogation; and the defendant’s verbal or

nonverbal response to such directions.

J.D., 989 P.2d at 768 (citation omitted).

C. Analysis

¶ 21

We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying

Eddins’s motion to suppress. To some extent, we reach this

conclusion on different grounds from those articulated by the trial

court. See People in Interest of K.D.W., 2020 COA 110, ¶ 32.

¶ 22

First, as for Eddins’s statements made before the detective

said he was not free to leave, we conclude that he was not in

custody. According to Eddins’s comments in the interview, he

expressed interest in speaking to a detective before the interview.

And he was not escorted to the interview room. These facts suggest

that the jail staff did not exert additional pressure on him to speak

with Detective Turnbull. During the interview, Eddins was not

9

handcuffed, the detective’s tone was conversational, she was not

armed, she did not block the exit in the interview room, no officers

were just outside the room, and the door to the room was initially

left open but was later closed due to outside noise.

¶ 23

We conclude that these circumstances did not amount to an

added imposition on Eddins’s freedom of movement. See, e.g.,

Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116-17 (no custody where tone was not

accusatory, defendant was not handcuffed, and door to interview

area was open); Parsons, 15 P.3d at 802-03 (no custody where

interview was conducted in conference room, the investigators’ tone

was conversational, and they were not armed). Further, Eddins

was not confronted with evidence of his guilt. Rather, he was asked

an open-ended question: “Do you know anything about [the home

invasion]?” See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1117 (open-ended questions,

as opposed to evidence of guilt, do not support a custody

determination); Parsons, 15 P.3d at 802-03 (defendant was not

confronted with evidence of his guilt).

¶ 24

Second, we assume without deciding that, after the detective

said Eddins was not free to leave, a reasonable inmate in his

position would have believed himself to be in custody. The

10

statements he made immediately after the detective’s comment,

however, were not the product of interrogation. Rather, after the

detective informed Eddins that he was not free to leave and that she

was going to advise him of his rights — but before she could read

him his rights — he spontaneously said he had previously

requested to speak to an officer regarding what he had seen, that he

had seen some things “go down,” and that he feared for his family.

A court need not suppress custodial statements that were not the

result of police questioning. See People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010,

1015 (Colo. 2008) (holding that the defendant’s custodial

statements were admissible where the detective had not asked any

questions likely to elicit an incriminating response).

¶ 25

After the detective gave Eddins the Miranda advisement and

asked if he was willing to talk with her, he requested a lawyer. The

detective said one would be provided so Eddins could decide what

he wanted to do in this case. He then volunteered a few more

statements. We conclude that all his statements made after the

Miranda warning were admissible because they were not the

product of interrogation and indicated a waiver of his rights as to

those statements. See People v. Leyba, 2019 COA 144, ¶¶ 16, 26-

11

30, aff’d, 2021 CO 54, ¶¶ 18-19, 23-25; People v. Banuelos, 674

P.2d 964, 966 (Colo. App. 1983).

¶ 26

In sum, the record supports the trial court’s denial of the

motion to suppress Eddins’s statements to Detective Turnbull.

III. Alternate Suspect Evidence

¶ 27

Eddins next contends that the trial court erred by excluding

evidence that an alternate suspect — David Mascarenas —

committed the charged crimes instead of Eddins. We conclude that

the court acted within its discretion.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 28

At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the intruders

in the home invasion were Eddins, David Martinez, and Sharon

Bateman. Defense counsel initially sought to show that the police

investigation was inadequate and should have focused more on

Martinez and his alleged associate, Mascarenas.

¶ 29

Later, in response to defense counsel’s questions, Detective

Turnbull testified that she was aware that Martinez was dangerous.

Defense counsel then attempted to ask about the facts of one of two

earlier robberies that Martinez and Mascarenas had allegedly

committed together. The prosecutor objected, and a somewhat

12

confusing colloquy ensued. The trial court attempted to discern

whether, despite the defense’s earlier arguments about why this

evidence was relevant, defense counsel now sought to elicit the facts

of the other robberies to show that Mascarenas was an alternate

suspect in the crimes charged here. Defense counsel ultimately

argued that the evidence she sought to elicit would show that

Mascarenas was a possible alternate suspect in this case.

¶ 30

After hearing arguments about the proffered evidence, the

court explained that “under [CRE] 701, [the detective] is not even a

perceiving witness. Any information she had would be hearsay.”

Following further discussion, the court ruled that the alternate

suspect evidence was inadmissible under People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO

53. The court also reiterated that the detective’s testimony about

the alternate suspect evidence (i.e., the details of the other

robberies) would be hearsay. But the court allowed defense counsel

to ask the detective “whether or not Mascarenas was known to

associate with Mr. Martinez in these criminal offenses.”

¶ 31

When the cross-examination resumed, defense counsel asked

the detective whether Mascarenas’s name had come up in her

investigation. She said she did not recall. Counsel followed up

13

with, “In your investigation of David Martinez, did you become

aware that David Martinez and David Mascarenas committed

serious crimes together?” The detective answered, “I heard that

name David Mascarenas afterwards, after I finished the

investigation, just through the court proceedings. I wasn’t aware it

[sic] before then.”

¶ 32

Defense counsel asked whether Martinez was involved in

another case (the Littleton case), and the detective said she did not

know anything about the Littleton case. Then, in response to

counsel’s question whether “the only thing you know about the

Littleton case is that David Martinez and David Mascarenas did this

crime together,” the defective testified, “I don’t even know that.”

B. Relevant Principles

¶ 33

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA

178, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion if, among other things, its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 34

To be admissible, alternate suspect evidence must be relevant

under CRE 401 and not excludable under CRE 403. Elmarr, ¶¶ 31-

32. To be relevant, alternate suspect evidence must establish a

14

non-speculative connection or nexus between the alternate suspect

and the crime charged. Id. at ¶ 23. Where the evidence concerns

the alternate suspect’s other acts, a court must decide whether all

the similar acts and circumstances, taken together, support a

finding that the same person probably was involved in both the

other act and the charged crime. Id. Where alternate suspect

evidence concerns out-of-court statements, the evidence must also

satisfy the rules governing hearsay. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 41.

¶ 35

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay is

inadmissible except as provided by statute or rule. CRE 802.

C. Analysis

¶ 36

We need not decide whether the excluded evidence was

relevant alternate suspect evidence because we conclude that the

trial court reasonably excluded it as hearsay.1

¶ 37

Detective Turnbull testified that she learned of Mascarenas

after her investigation was completed, through unrelated court

1 Given our disposition, we do not reach the People’s claims that the

alternate suspect issue was waived and the alternate suspect

evidence was irrelevant.

15

proceedings. She said she knew very little, if anything, about

Mascarenas’s and Martinez’s participation in other crimes. So, to

the extent she would have testified about the details of other crimes

committed by Mascarenas and Martinez, her testimony would have

been hearsay (i.e., based on out-of-court statements she heard or

read). See People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 777 (Colo. App. 1990)

(affirming the trial court’s exclusion of alternate suspect evidence

offered via a police officer’s testimony where “the officer did not

possess first-hand knowledge of the [other] robbery and his

testimony was therefore hearsay”); CRE 701.

¶ 38

Nonetheless, Eddins contends that “the alternate suspect

evidence showing Martinez and Mascarenas committed similar

robberies to the home invasion in this case was not produced to

prove the matter asserted.” The relevance of alternate suspect

evidence concerning the suspect’s other acts, however, depends

entirely on the truth of the matter asserted in the evidence — that

the alternate suspect actually committed the other acts. See

Elmarr, ¶ 23. In other words, the detective’s testimony about the

other crimes would have been relevant alternate suspect evidence

only if the out-of-court assertions inherent in the testimony (that

16

Mascarenas and Martinez committed the other crimes) were true.

Hence, the detective’s testimony would have been hearsay.

¶ 39

Eddins also says the detective’s testimony about Martinez’s

and Mascarenas’s other robberies would not have been hearsay

because it was offered (1) to show that the detective failed to

conduct an adequate investigation given that the other robberies

had “distinctive similarities” to the crimes charged here; and (2) to

connect Martinez to the other robberies. But those purposes of the

evidence also depend on the truth of the matter asserted in out-of-

court statements — that the other robberies occurred and were

committed by Martinez and Mascarenas. Thus, the trial court

reasonably ruled that the proffered evidence was hearsay. See, e.g.,

People v. Zubiate, 2013 COA 69, ¶ 16 (affirming the trial court’s

ruling excluding evidence as hearsay where “the statement was only

relevant if it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted”), aff’d,

2017 CO 17.2

2 As an additional reason why the proffered alternate suspect

evidence was relevant, Eddins says it demonstrated the violence

often inflicted by Martinez and thus would have helped the jury

understand why Eddins “was experiencing duress and afraid of the

other people involved in the home invasion.” We discern three

problems with this theory of relevance: (1) Eddins did not assert a

17

¶ 40

Finally, we reject Eddins’s contention that the alternate

suspect evidence was admissible hearsay under the business record

exception. Because he did not raise this claim below, we review it

for plain error. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

¶ 41

Under the business record exception, a record kept in the

course of a regularly conducted business activity is admissible

under certain circumstances. See CRE 803(6). Eddins, however,

did not seek to admit any such record. Rather, Eddins sought to

admit testimony from a witness who, Eddins argues, might have

learned about the other incidents from a police report. But he cites

no authority holding that a witness may testify about the contents

of an alleged business record that has not been admitted into

evidence. In the cases Eddins cites, the document itself was

admitted. See People v. Warrick, 284 P.3d 139, 143-44 (Colo. App.

2011) (police booking sheets); People v. Carrasco, 85 P.3d 580, 583-

84 (Colo. App. 2003) (charging document); Lannon v. Taco Bell, Inc.,

duress defense; (2) this theory does not relate to an alternate

suspect because Martinez was an actual suspect, along with

Eddins, in the crimes charged here; and (3) this theory depends on

the truth of the matter asserted in out-of-court statements (that

Martinez committed the other crimes).

18

708 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Colo. App. 1985) (police offense reports),

aff’d, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987). Consequently, we do not discern

error, much less plain error, in the court’s failure to admit the

proffered testimony under CRE 803(6).

¶ 42

Because the proffered testimony about an alternate suspect

would have been inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. For this reason,

the court’s ruling did not violate Eddins’s confrontation rights. See

People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶¶ 68-69.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 43

The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.