Marriage of Martin

25CA2172 Marriage of Martin 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2172
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21DR31449
Honorable Garen Gervey, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Christen Joel Martin,
Appellant,
and
Michele Jeannine Smith,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART,
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Grove and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Christen Joel Martin, Pro Se
Michele Jeannine Smith, Pro Se

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¶ 1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between
Christen Joel Martin (father) and Michele Jeannine Martin (mother),
father appeals the district court’s order that modified parental
responsibilities and terminated maintenance. We dismiss the
portion of the appeal concerning parenting time, reverse the part of
the order modifying decision-making responsibility, and affirm the
part of the order terminating maintenance. The case is remanded
for further proceedings on mother’s motion to modify decision-
making responsibility.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
¶ 2 In 2022, the district court dissolved the marriage. In the
permanent orders, the court allocated to mother primary parenting
time with their two children, and it allocated to father one overnight
visit every other weekend plus a weekly dinner visit. It ordered the
parties to equally share decision-making responsibility. And it
ordered father to pay $950 per month in maintenance for four
years.
¶ 3 About two years later, father filed a motion to terminate
maintenance. He then filed a motion to modify parenting time,
ultimately asking that the court allocate to him equal parenting

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time with the children. Mother also filed a motion to modify
parenting time and decision-making responsibility. She proposed
only a slight increase to father’s parenting time and asked the court
to allocate to her sole decision-making responsibility.
¶ 4 After a hearing, the court modified parental responsibilities
and terminated maintenance. Beginning with parenting time, the
court ordered a four-phased-step-up parenting schedule for father
that allowed him to progress to equal parenting time over the
course of a year. Because father had a history of being late to or
canceling his parenting time, the court conditioned his progression
through the phases of the parenting schedule on his consistent and
timely exercise of parenting time. It also ordered that father would
forfeit his parenting time if he was late to pick up or drop off the
children and that if he was late more than once, he would regress to
the previous phase of the parenting schedule. Once father
completed the last phase of the step-up parenting schedule, which
was projected to occur at the end of summer in 2026, the equal
parenting time schedule became permanent, and father was no
longer subject to the forfeiture and regression provisions.

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¶ 5 Moving to decision-making responsibility, the court ordered
that until father reached the third phase of the step-up parenting
schedule, mother had sole authority over decisions concerning the
children. The court further ordered that, once father reached the
third phase, the parties shall exercise joint decision-making
responsibility, but it allocated to mother tiebreaker authority over
all major decisions.
¶ 6 As to maintenance, the court determined that the parties’
relatively equal financial circumstances warranted terminating
maintenance. The court ordered that the termination was effective
as of the date of the order, declining to retroactively terminate
father’s obligation back to the date he filed his motion in April 2024
— seventeen months earlier.
II. Parenting Time
¶ 7 Father contends that the district court reversibly erred by
“imposing a punitive, one-sided phased-compliance parenting-time
schedule with automatic forfeitures and regressions for minor
lateness.” Father also contends that, when it ordered the step-up
parenting schedule, the court incorrectly found that “he did not

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specify when or how” he proposed to increase his parenting time.
We dismiss this portion of the appeal as moot.
¶ 8 After father filed his opening brief, this court issued a show
cause order asking whether his appeal of the parenting time order
had been rendered moot. In re Marriage of Martin, (Colo. App. No.
25CA2172, Aug. 17, 2026) (unpublished order). The show cause
order explained that it appeared from the record that father had
completed the four-phased-step-up parenting schedule, which
triggered his equal parenting time and ended any possibility that he
would be subject to forfeiture or regression under the parenting
time order. In response, father conceded that the provisions of the
step-up parenting schedule had expired, but he maintained that his
appeal of parenting time was not moot.
¶ 9 An appellate court will not render an opinion on the merits of
an issue when later events have rendered the issue moot. In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 50.
An issue is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would have no
practical legal effect on the existing controversy. Id.; see also In re
Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding
that an appeal of the district court’s original parenting time order

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was moot when that order was superseded by a later order
modifying parenting time).
¶ 10 On appeal, father contests the court’s step-up parenting
schedule and a finding the court made when it imposed that
schedule. For relief, he asks us to vacate the step-up schedule and
direct the court to implement an equal parenting time schedule.
However, father does not dispute that he is presently exercising
equal parenting time, and that he is no longer subject to the
provisions that could have altered that allocation. Because the
step-up parenting schedule is no longer in effect, any ruling we
issue concerning the propriety of that plan is moot. We therefore
dismiss this part of father’s appeal. See S.Z.S., ¶ 50.
III. Decision-Making Responsibility
¶ 11 Father next contends that the district court erred by modifying
decision-making responsibility without making the necessary
finding that the children were endangered. We agree.
¶ 12 A court may not modify a decree allocating decision-making
responsibility unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since
the decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the
children or of a party to whom decision-making responsibility was

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allocated and that modification is necessary to serve the children’s
best interests. § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2026. However, when
applying this standard, “the court shall retain” the original
allocation of decision-making responsibility, unless, as relevant
here, doing so would endanger the children’s physical health or
significantly impair the children’s emotional development and the
harm likely caused by the change is outweighed by the advantage of
a change. § 14-10-131(2)(c).
¶ 13 We review a court’s order modifying decision-making
responsibility for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of
Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion when it
misapplies the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair manner. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45.
We review de novo whether the court correctly applied the law.
Crouch, ¶ 21.
¶ 14 In support of its decision modifying decision-making
responsibility, the district court found that (1) the parties were
unable to cooperate and make decisions jointly; and (2) father had
not spent a significant amount of time with the children, which had
created a disparity of information between the parties concerning

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the children. The court also adopted its previous findings related to
the children’s best interests concerning parenting time. See § 14-
10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2026. The court then allocated to mother
sole decision-making responsibility until father reached phase three
of the step-up parenting schedule, and it ordered that, once he
reached this phase, the parties would “share joint decision making.”
However, the court ordered that if they cannot agree, mother had
“the tiebreaker” and that she “shall make the final decision on all
issues.”
¶ 15 In doing so, the court failed to analyze, let alone determine,
whether the previous allocation of joint decision-making
responsibility endangered the children’s physical health or
significantly impaired their emotional development. See § 14-10-
131(2)(c). Nor did the court make any other findings that would
justify modifying decision-making responsibility under the statute.
See § 14-10-131(2)(a)-(b.7). The court thus misapplied the law by
modifying the original allocation of decision-making responsibility
without making the required findings.
¶ 16 We therefore reverse the court’s order modifying decision-
making responsibility and remand this matter to the district court

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for reconsideration. The court shall consider the parties’ and the
children’s circumstances at the time of the remand proceedings and
conduct a hearing on remand to allow the parties to present
relevant evidence on those present circumstances. See In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27.
¶ 17 Given that this part of the order is reversed, we need not
address father’s remaining arguments concerning the court’s ruling
modifying decision-making responsibility.
IV. Maintenance
¶ 18 Father also contends that the district court erred by not
ordering the termination of maintenance retroactive to the date he
filed his motion. We disagree.
¶ 19 An order terminating maintenance is generally effective as of
the date the party filed the motion to modify, “unless the court finds
that it would cause undue hardship or substantial injustice.” § 14-
10-122(1)(d), C.R.S. 2026; see In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA
205, ¶ 40. We will not disturb the court’s decision on whether to
retroactively terminate maintenance absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion. See Nelson, ¶ 40. And we defer to the

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court’s factual findings unless they have no record support. In re
Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶¶ 30-31.
¶ 20 Approximately seventeen months after father filed his motion
to terminate his $950 per month maintenance obligation, the
district court granted his request. But the court found that “it
would cause undue hardship on [m]other to make the termination
effective as of the date of the filing of [father’s] motion.” The court
explained that retroactively terminating maintenance “would
theoretically” require mother “to pay [f]ather back at least $16,160
in maintenance,” which “would be a substantial hardship” for her.
The court also noted that, during this time, father’s inconsistent
exercise of parenting time required mother to unexpectedly adjust
her work schedule and that interfered with her ability to work full-
time.
¶ 21 Father disagrees with the court’s decision and argues that the
court incorrectly believed that a retroactive termination would
require mother to repay him $16,160 in one lump sum payment.
He argues that the court, instead, could have applied the retroactive
termination amount as a credit toward his unpaid maintenance
arrears and his ongoing child support obligation. However, under

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the abuse of discretion standard, we ask “not whether we would
have reached a different result but, rather, whether the [district]
court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” See E-
470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo.
App. 2006). That is, just because another option may have been
available to the district court, we will not second-guess the court’s
decision when the court acted reasonably, and the record supports
its decision.
¶ 22 During the pendency of father’s motion to terminate
maintenance, father’s maintenance obligation totaled $16,150. The
court determined, with record support, that depriving mother of this
maintenance and requiring her to reimburse father would cause her
undue financial hardship. Indeed, when father filed his motion to
terminate maintenance, mother reported earning only $1,440 per
month and that she relied on maintenance to meet her financial
needs. Mother also reported that her earnings had recently
increased to $4,333 per month, but she explained that she started
that job only a week before the modification hearing. And even
though, at the time of the modification hearing, mother had not yet
received all the maintenance due to her and, thus, may not have to

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actually pay father back the entire $16,150, the court reasonably
determined that depriving her of unpaid arrears and requiring her
to repay the rest would cause her substantial hardship. Moreover,
contrary to father’s suggestion, nothing in the court’s ruling
indicates that it believed mother had to repay father in one lump
sum payment.
¶ 23 Father also contends that the court erred by “fail[ing] to
adjudicate [his] maintenance arrears balance.” At the hearing,
father presented a certification of his arrears from the Arapahoe
County Delegate Child Support Service Unit (CSS). CSS reported
that his maintenance arrears, at that time, were $6,084. Father
agreed with the amount and asked the court to void his arrears in
connection with the retroactive termination of maintenance.
Mother did not dispute the amount of his arrears but asked that his
maintenance obligation continue, which would include his
obligation to satisfy his arrears.
¶ 24 We presume that the court considered this undisputed
amount of arrears when entering its ruling. See In re Marriage of
Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21. By declining to retroactively
terminate his maintenance obligation, the court determined that

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father was obligated to pay the outstanding arrears balance and
implicitly accepted the undisputed amount. See S.Z.S., ¶ 23
(acknowledging that a court’s findings may be implicit).
¶ 25 The record thus supports the court’s decision that the
retroactive termination of maintenance back to the date of father’s
motion would cause mother undue hardship. See § 14-10-
122(1)(d); Capparelli, ¶¶ 30-31; Nelson, ¶ 40.
V. Disposition
¶ 26 We dismiss the portion of the appeal concerning the district
court’s order modifying parenting time as moot. We reverse the
portion of the order modifying decision-making responsibility and
remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings. We
affirm the court’s order terminating maintenance.
¶ 27 To the extent not otherwise addressed, we discharge the
remaining portions of this court’s show cause order.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE LUM concur.