Peo v McCarty

24CA1554 Peo v McCarty 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1554
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22CR1478
Honorable Eric White, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Justyn Layne McCarty,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Dunn and Brenton, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly Cunningham, Deputy
State Public Defender, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

1
¶ 1 Defendant, Justyn Layne McCarty, appeals his conviction for
resisting arrest. McCarty contends that the trial court erred by
giving jury instructions on the initial aggressor and provocation
exceptions to self-defense, limiting his cross-examination of two
police officers, denying his motion to suppress, and ordering him to
pay restitution for certain medical expenses. For reasons explained
more fully below, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the
restitution order.
I. Background
¶ 2 The jury heard evidence from which it could reasonably find
the following facts. Officers Matthew Campbell, Davidson Belizaire,
and Scott Lockwood were responding to a call for service in the
vicinity of East Mississippi Avenue and Chambers Road. Campbell
was driving a marked police car; Lockwood and Belizaire were
behind Campbell in a second marked police car. As Campbell
turned a corner, McCarty ran toward Campbell’s vehicle and
Campbell heard a loud thump on the back of his patrol car.
Campbell then saw McCarty walking away from the vehicle and
pulled into a nearby parking lot. McCarty was about fifty feet away
when both Campbell and Belizaire got out of their cars; Lockwood

2
stayed in his patrol car. Campbell ordered McCarty to stop walking
and to “come and talk” with him.
¶ 3 Campbell testified that McCarty turned around, bent over and
dragged his hand across the ground, and began walking toward him
in a “confrontational or aggressive manner.” Campbell elaborated
that McCarty was “tensing up” and “trying to puff his chest out”
and that his hands were “in a balled-up position.” Campbell
testified that he was “concerned” for his life and safety as McCarty
approached.
¶ 4 McCarty was wearing a chest protector1 over what appeared to
be a pulled-up shirt. As McCarty approached, Campbell twice said,
“Get down on the ground.” As McCarty came toward Campbell’s
side, Campbell said, “Are you going to stop and talk to me?” At that
point, McCarty lunged his head toward Campbell and Campbell
grabbed ahold of the chest protector. McCarty swung one arm in a
downward motion toward Campbell’s arm, which was holding the
chest protector, and used his other arm to try to put Belizaire in a
1 This is the term used by the parties and is not further defined in
the record. The object seemed to have straps across the shoulders,
arm protection that extended to the wrist, and a thin, oblong piece
that covered part of McCarty’s front from his chest to navel.

3
headlock. Campbell then began trying to wrestle McCarty to the
ground, apparently dislodging McCarty’s grip on Belizaire in the
process. As Campbell restrained McCarty, Campbell said McCarty
bit his hand, causing “excruciating pain.” Campbell began
punching McCarty “as hard as [he] physically [could] in the face”
with the goal of getting McCarty to release his bite. After “multiple
punches,” McCarty released Campbell’s hand; the officers then
wrestled McCarty to the ground, where they were able to subdue
him. Footage from the officers’ body-worn camera, which captured
the brief, chaotic interaction, was admitted into evidence.
¶ 5 Campbell and Belizaire were both taken to the emergency
room and treated for injuries sustained during the fight.
Campbell’s injuries were primarily on his hands.
¶ 6 The prosecution charged McCarty with three counts of second
degree assault, two counts of resisting arrest, and a crime of
violence sentence enhancer. The jury found McCarty guilty on one
count of resisting arrest but acquitted him of the remaining
charges.
¶ 7 The trial court sentenced McCarty to two years of supervised
probation and imposed restitution in the amount of $6,306.23.

4
II. Discussion
¶ 8 We begin by addressing McCarty’s contention that the trial
court erred by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor and
provocation exceptions to self-defense.
A. Jury Instructions
¶ 9 At the instruction conference, the prosecution objected to the
jury being instructed on self-defense. After the court denied that
objection, the prosecution asked that the court instruct the jury on
both the provocation and initial aggressor exceptions to self-
defense. The court provided these instructions over McCarty’s
objection.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We review de novo whether sufficient evidence exists to
support a requested jury instruction. Castillo v. People, 2018 CO
62, ¶ 32. “A trial court should instruct the jury concerning an
exception to an asserted affirmative defense if some evidence
supports the exception.” People v. Rios, 2014 COA 90, ¶ 42. In
reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
giving the instruction. Id.

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2. Provocation Exception
¶ 11 McCarty argues there was insufficient evidence to support
instructing the jury on the provocation exception. We disagree.
¶ 12 “When a defendant relies on an affirmative defense, he
essentially admits the commission of the elements of the charged
offense but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate his conduct.”
Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 21. “If the evidence presented
properly raises the issue of an affirmative defense, the affirmative
defense is treated as an additional element of the charged offense.”
Id.
¶ 13 Under section 18-1-704(3)(a), C.R.S. 2026, “a person is not
justified in using physical force if[,] . . . [w]ith intent to cause bodily
injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful
physical force by that other person.” The supreme court has
interpreted that statute to mean that
a defendant forfeits self-defense as an
affirmative defense to legally justify his use of
physical force upon another person if: (1) the
other person uses unlawful physical force
against him; (2) the defendant provoked the
use of such physical force by the other person;
and (3) the defendant intended his provocation
to goad the other person into attacking him in

6
order to provide a pretext to injure or kill that
person.
Galvan, ¶ 19.
¶ 14 The provocation exception requires proof that the victims (in
this case, Campbell and Belizaire) used or threatened the use of
unlawful physical force against McCarty. See § 18-1-704(1);
Galvan, ¶ 19. This factor is unchallenged. Rather, the parties
dispute whether McCarty provoked Campbell’s actions against him.
McCarty contends that insufficient evidence was presented for a
reasonable jury to conclude that he provoked Campbell’s unlawful
use of force. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
giving the instruction, as we must, we disagree.
¶ 15 The physical encounter between McCarty and the officers was
short: only a matter of minutes. The prosecution presented
evidence that McCarty struck the back of Campbell’s patrol car and
walked away, but then he walked towards Campbell in the parking
lot. Campbell testified that McCarty approached him in a
“confrontational or aggressive manner.” And the bodycam video
confirmed that McCarty first walked away but then turned back
quickly toward Campbell, disregarded Campbell’s instructions to

7
stop, got close to Campbell, and lunged his head toward him. At
this point, Campbell grabbed ahold of McCarty’s chest protector
and “stiff-armed” him to prevent him from getting any closer to the
officers. From there, the encounter deteriorated into a chaotic fight.
¶ 16 Viewed in the light most favorable to providing the provocation
instruction, we conclude there was some evidence to support the
claim that McCarty had provoked the encounter with Campbell.
See Rios, ¶ 42. The weight and credibility of that evidence was a
matter for the jury to determine, and it did so. People v. Price, 2023
COA 96, ¶ 26. Thus, the trial court did not err by providing the
provocation instruction.
3. Initial Aggressor Exception
¶ 17 “A court may give an initial aggressor instruction if the
evidence will support a reasonable inference that the defendant
initiated the physical conflict by using or threatening the imminent
use of unlawful physical force.” People v. Griffin, 224 P.3d 292, 300
(Colo. App. 2009). And “the court should instruct the jury on both
self-defense and the initial aggressor exception” when there is “some
evidence that the defendant is the initial aggressor.” People v.
Newell, 2017 COA 27, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

8
¶ 18 Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support
giving the initial aggressor instruction. There is no dispute that
McCarty struck Campbell’s car. Although McCarty walked away at
first, he returned to the scene as Campbell had instructed. But, as
noted above, Campbell testified that McCarty’s demeanor as he
reapproached the officers was threatening: his chest was inflated,
his fists were balled, he was breathing heavily, and he came within
inches of Campbell. Both officers testified that they feared for their
safety. This evidence, while somewhat thin, was sufficient to
conclude that McCarty was the initial aggressor in the encounter.
¶ 19 Because there was some evidence that McCarty was the initial
aggressor, we perceive no error in the trial court’s decision to give
the initial aggressor instruction. See id.
B. Cross-Examination of Officers
¶ 20 McCarty next contends that the trial court erred by limiting
the scope of his cross-examination of both Campbell and Belizaire.
First, he argues that he should have been able to cross-examine
both officers about their possible exposure to criminal charges and
civil penalties for allegedly using excessive physical force. Second,
he argues that the trial court improperly limited his ability to

9
confront Campbell concerning the status of his Peace Officer
Standards and Training (POST) certification.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 21 We review a trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-
examination for an abuse of discretion. People v. Marsh, 396 P.3d
1, 17 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2017 CO 10M. “A trial court’s
discretionary ruling [on cross-examination] will not be overturned
unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Id.
¶ 22 A defendant’s right to cross-examine an adverse witness in a
criminal proceeding is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, that right is “not absolute,” and the trial
court can limit cross-examination “to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process.” Id. at 18 (quoting People v.
Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo. 1982)). “Thus, a trial court has wide
latitude, insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, to place
reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,
for example, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’[s] safety, or interrogation which is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.” Id. (quoting Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162,
166 (Colo. 1992)). “The trial court must exercise its discretion to

10
preclude inquiries that have no probative value, are irrelevant, or
are prejudicial.” Id. (quoting People v. Hendrickson, 45 P.3d 786,
788 (Colo. App. 2001)).
¶ 23 Section 18-8-803, C.R.S. 2026, prohibits a peace officer from
using excessive force. See also § 16-2.5-101(1), C.R.S. 2026
(defining a peace officer). Section 18-8-802(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026,
requires a peace officer to intervene when they witness another
officer using excessive force “in pursuance of [their] law
enforcement duties.”
2. Excessive Use of Force
¶ 24 At trial, McCarty sought to question Campbell about state law
concerning peace officers’ use of excessive force.
¶ 25 Defense counsel’s first exchange with Campbell is captured
below:
[Defense counsel:] Now, Officer Campbell, you
mentioned earlier that the Aurora Police
Department, you are trained on specific use of
force situations, correct?
[Campbell:] Yes, ma’am.
[Defense counsel:] The Aurora Police
Department, they’re required by law to have
this use of force policy, correct?
[Campbell:] Yes, ma’am.

11
[Defense counsel:] And that use of force policy
forbids officers from using chokeholds,
correct?
¶ 26 At this point, the prosecution objected to relevancy and that
the question about chokeholds was outside the scope of direct
examination. McCarty argued that, because he asserted self-
defense, the officer’s use of excessive force was relevant. The trial
court initially held that the question was relevant to the issue of
self-defense and stated it would allow the witness to answer
whether he was aware of the policy.
¶ 27 Defense counsel’s next exchange with Campbell was as
follows:
[Defense counsel:] So, Officer, we were talking
about the use of force policy at the Aurora
Police Department, and that policy specifically
forbids officers from using chokeholds on
individuals, correct?
[Campbell:] Yes, ma’am.
[Defense counsel:] And that’s not just the
Aurora PD policy. That’s actually the state law
in Colorado, correct?
[Campbell:] Yes, ma’am.
[Defense counsel:] And then if an officer uses
excessive force on an individual, there are
consequences, right?

12
¶ 28 The prosecution again objected on the same grounds.
McCarty argued that the questioning was relevant because “if there
was a use of . . . excessive force finding against [Campbell], there
could be consequences. So [the questioning] goes to his motive to
testify today about . . . why he acted this way. It goes to his motive
and credibility.” The prosecution argued that there had not been
any finding of excessive force and that defense counsel’s line of
questioning was irrelevant. The court sustained the prosecution’s
objection due to “the form of the question,” which called for a legal
conclusion. Defense counsel did not rephrase the question but
moved to another topic.
¶ 29 Defense counsel then cross-examined Belizaire as follows:
[Defense counsel:] And you know that the law
in Colorado requires an officer to intervene if
they see excessive force?
[Prosecutor]: I’m going to object to relevance.
[Belizaire]: Correct.
[The Court:] Wait.
[Belizaire]: Oh.
[The Court]: So correct as to his knowledge of
the law. The [c]ourt will instruct the jurors as
to the law. Sustained.

13
¶ 30 McCarty argues on appeal that because criminal penalties or
civil liability could have potentially resulted from the officers’
conduct, his counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine
the officers on the use of force to illustrate their potential motive for
testifying in a manner that minimized their use of force and
overstated McCarty’s.
¶ 31 But the court sustained the prosecution’s objection on the
grounds that the questions called for a legal conclusion, not on
relevancy grounds. It was not the jury’s responsibility to determine
whether Campbell had used excessive force and, by extension, if
Belizaire had stood by while Campbell did so. As the trial court
recognized, it alone was responsible for determining the controlling
legal standards in the case, not the jury. See People v. Beilke, 232
P.3d 146, 152 (Colo. App. 2009) (a witness may not testify that a
particular legal standard has or has not been met). We agree with
the trial court that the questions, as framed, called for the officers
to give legal opinions. We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion
and, consequently, no error in the trial court’s ruling limiting the
cross-examination of Campbell and Belizaire concerning excessive
force.

14
3. POST Certification
¶ 32 McCarty next challenges the trial court’s decision to take a
lunch break before allowing his counsel to cross-examine Campbell
concerning the status of his POST certification. We discern no
error.
a. Additional Facts
¶ 33 Campbell testified that he was POST certified. During cross-
examination, defense counsel attempted to confront Campbell with
a printout from the POST certification database indicating Campbell
was not presently certified. The prosecutor objected, arguing that
the evidence was not relevant. At a conference with counsel outside
the presence of the jury, defense counsel presented the court with
the POST database record, which indicated that “Campbell [was]
not certified and employed by the Aurora Police Department.” The
trial court determined that the POST database evidence was
relevant.
¶ 34 The prosecutor then asked the trial court to adjourn for an
early lunch so that they could evaluate the computer record. The
trial court granted the request and recessed for an hourlong lunch
break.

15
¶ 35 The court reconvened after the lunch break outside the
presence of the jury. The prosecutor explained that over the lunch
hour, they had contacted an individual at the POST Board who
confirmed that the entry for McCarty was wrong and immediately
corrected the error. The prosecution indicated that the POST
database had been corrected and that McCarty would now show as
POST certified. The trial court then permitted the defense to speak
with the representatives that the prosecution had spoken to, but
defense counsel was not able to reach them. The court denied
defense counsel’s request for a mistrial and also declined to require
the prosecution to provide a written summary of the information
they had obtained from the POST representative and the Aurora
Police Department officer.
¶ 36 Once Campbell’s cross-examination resumed, McCarty’s
counsel elected to examine him only about still images from his
body camera footage and did not pursue cross-examination
concerning the apparently erroneous POST record that had shown
that Campbell was not certified.

16
¶ 37 On appeal, McCarty argues only that the trial court reversibly
erred by limiting his right to confront Campbell before the lunch
break about the POST record showing that he was not certified.
b. Applicable Law
¶ 38 The trial court controls the scope and duration of cross-
examination. People v. Jaramillo, 183 P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. App.
2008). The court has “discretion to preclude inquiries that have no
probative value, are irrelevant, or are prejudicial.” Id.
c. Analysis
¶ 39 Crucially, neither at trial nor on appeal does McCarty
challenge the accuracy of the information that the prosecution was
able to obtain over the lunch hour. So, as the trial court pointed
out, if it had permitted the cross-examination to proceed without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to investigate the
accuracy of the POST certification database record, it would have
allowed the jury to hear evidence that was later determined to be
inaccurate.
¶ 40 Trials are a truth-finding process. See People v. Cole, 584 P.2d
71, 75 (Colo. 1978) (“The quest for justice in a criminal trial centers
on the search for truth.”). Because the procedure adopted by the

17
trial court allowed the jury to receive accurate information and
avoided the presentation of inaccurate evidence, we reject McCarty’s
contention that the court reversibly erred by pausing defense
counsel’s cross-examination of Campbell to permit further
investigation of the POST database record.
C. Motions to Suppress
¶ 41 McCarty next contends that the trial court erred by denying
his two motions to suppress. Before trial, McCarty argued that his
interaction with the police officers was an “unconstitutional stop”
because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initially stop
him, and therefore any observations made by Campbell and
Belizaire about his behavior should be suppressed. McCarty filed a
second motion arguing that his arrest was warrantless and lacked
probable cause, and therefore any information about the arrest
should be suppressed.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 42 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of fact and law. People v. Tomaske, 2019 CO 35, ¶ 7. We
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the
record. Id. We review de novo the trial court’s conclusions of law.

18
Id. The United States and Colorado Constitutions both protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7.
¶ 43 There are three types of citizen-police encounters: “(1) arrests;
(2) investigatory stops; and (3) consensual interviews.” People v.
Scheffer, 224 P.3d 279, 284 (Colo. App. 2009). “Because arrests
and investigatory stops are seizures, they implicate the search and
seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment and article II, section
7.” Id. “In contrast, a consensual encounter — a contact in which
the voluntary cooperation of a citizen is elicited by police through
noncoercive questioning — is not a seizure, and thus, does not
implicate constitutional search and seizure protections.” Id.
(quoting People v. Valencia, 169 P.3d 212, 217 (Colo. App. 2007)).
When, as here, a person is detained without a warrant, the
prosecution has the burden to prove that the warrantless conduct
of law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 155 (Colo. 2001).
2. Analysis
¶ 44 At the motions hearing, McCarty argued that Campbell did not
have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that, because there was

19
no reasonable suspicion and the police did not obtain a warrant, he
was improperly arrested after the fight occurred. The trial court
determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
McCarty based on their reasonable belief that he had committed
criminal mischief by striking Campbell’s patrol car. Campbell
initially pursued this reasonable suspicion but then broke off the
investigation. But, the court concluded, McCarty thereafter
consensually engaged with the officers by returning to where they
were.
¶ 45 A seizure requires “actual physical force or a show of authority
sufficient that an innocent person would feel that submission was
required.” People v. Taylor, 2018 CO 35, ¶ 9. But there was no
evidence provided that the officers drew weapons, turned on lights
or sirens, or otherwise pursued McCarty. Police officers do not
implicate the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment by
merely asking an individual questions, even when those questions
might pertain to criminal conduct.
¶ 46 After the officers halted their initial investigatory stop,
McCarty was not obligated to comply with their instructions or
otherwise answer any questions they might have had for him.

20
Nonetheless, McCarty decided to turn around. He then bent over
and dragged his hand across the ground before returning to
confront the officers, as previously described. The trial court
determined that when McCarty approached within inches, Campbell
was justified in grabbing McCarty’s chest protector. The encounter
devolved further when McCarty swung at Campbell and placed
Belizaire in a headlock. At that point, the court concluded, the
officers had probable cause to arrest McCarty.
¶ 47 We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if there is evidence
in the record to support them. People v. Marquez, 195 P.3d 697,
699 (Colo. 2008). Here, there was ample evidence to support the
trial court’s factual determinations, including footage from the
officers’ bodycams, still images from that footage, and extensive
testimony from Campbell. Because the trial court’s factual findings
are supported, we will not second-guess them.
¶ 48 An arrest occurs when, “in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave.” People v. Ealum, 211 P.3d 48, 51
(Colo. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544,
554 (1980)). Here, there is no dispute that McCarty was ultimately

21
arrested. Instead, the focus is whether the arrest was
constitutional. The trial court determined that McCarty’s arrest
was constitutional because there was sufficient probable cause.
Based on the record and the trial court’s findings, we discern no
error in this ruling.
¶ 49 Finally, even if we had concluded that law enforcement
unlawfully seized McCarty, such a seizure could not justify the
suppression of evidence related to McCarty subsequently resisting
arrest. See People v. Doke, 171 P.3d 237, 239 (Colo. App. 2007)
(evidence of a crime committed after a Fourth Amendment violation
is admissible even if the new crime was in response to the Fourth
Amendment violation).
D. Restitution
¶ 50 After McCarty’s trial concluded, the court held a restitution
hearing. At the hearing, the prosecution called a City of Aurora
worker’s compensation claim adjuster, who authenticated the
medical expenses related to the treatment of Campbell’s hands.
¶ 51 McCarty contends that the prosecution did not meet its
burden of establishing proximate cause between the conduct for

22
which McCarty was convicted — resisting arrest — and the medical
expenses. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 52 “[C]lear error is the appropriate standard of review for
evaluating a [trial] court’s determination of proximate cause for
restitution.” Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 3. Thus, we must
affirm if the trial court’s finding is supported by the record. Id. at
¶ 34.
¶ 53 When conducting this analysis, we “evaluate whether the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the loss.”
People v. Poot-Baca, 2023 COA 112, ¶ 39. “Proximate cause in the
context of restitution is ‘a cause which in natural and probable
sequence produced the claimed loss and without which the claimed
loss would not have been sustained.’” Id. at ¶ 44 (quoting People v.
Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 12).
2. Analysis
¶ 54 Campbell sustained injuries to his hands and right arm during
the fight with McCarty. He was treated at a local hospital for his

23
injuries. Campbell later filed a claim with the City of Aurora risk
manager related to the injuries he sustained during the fight. The
worker’s compensation fund housed in that office “helps reimburse”
city workers for “100%” of the “medical costs that are related to
their original work injury.” The worker’s compensation fund paid
out $6,306.23 for Campbell’s medical expenses. The prosecution
sought that amount as part of the restitution award against
McCarty.
¶ 55 At the restitution hearing, the adjuster testified that he had
approved each medical charge relating to the incident that occurred
with McCarty. He also testified that the City of Aurora had not been
reimbursed for any of the payouts.
¶ 56 The jury convicted McCarty of resisting arrest but acquitted
him of assaulting Campbell and Belizaire. The fight that led to his
conviction was violent. Campbell provided extensive testimony
during trial about the fight, including that McCarty bit and clawed
at his hand and arms.
¶ 57 McCarty argues that the prosecution’s theory at trial was that
the assault charge involving Campbell was based on Campbell’s
testimony that McCarty bit his hand. And, McCarty argues, the

24
injuries to Campbell’s hand were caused by the alleged bite. Since
he was acquitted of the assault charge, McCarty’s argument
continues, there was no proof that he caused Campbell’s injuries.
¶ 58 McCarty also notes that the trial court justified its restitution
order by saying that the resisting arrest conviction required the jury
to find that McCarty used physical force. But as McCarty
accurately notes, resisting arrest may be established by a defendant
“using, or threatening to use, physical force or violence against a
peace officer,” and the court so instructed the jury. Thus, McCarty
concludes, the evidence does not support the court’s finding that
the resisting arrest conviction was causally connected to Campbell’s
hand injury.
¶ 59 While McCarty’s argument has some logical appeal, it
overlooks that the injuries suffered by Campbell — whether caused
by a bite or by Campbell repeatedly striking McCarty’s head — all
resulted from McCarty resisting arrest and the following fisticuffs.
Indeed, McCarty does not dispute that Campbell’s injuries resulted
from the melee between McCarty, Campbell, and Belizaire. Thus,
we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the restitution order.
See Poot-Baca, ¶ 39.

25
¶ 60 We therefore discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s determination that the prosecution had sufficiently proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that McCarty’s resisting arrest
was the proximate cause of Campbell’s injuries.
E. Cumulative Errors
¶ 61 Finally, McCarty contends that his conviction should be
reversed under the cumulative error doctrine.
¶ 62 Cumulative error requires that numerous errors were actually
committed by the trial court, not merely alleged. People v. Cook,
2014 COA 33, ¶ 72. “A conviction will not be reversed if the
cumulative effect of any errors did not substantially prejudice [the]
defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id.
¶ 63 As discussed at length above, we have determined that the
trial court did not commit any errors, much less multiple errors.
For that reason, we decline to reverse McCarty’s conviction.
III. Disposition
¶ 64 We affirm the judgment of conviction and the restitution order.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE BRENTON concur.