25CA0185•Cari v Messersmith
Testo completo
25CA0185 Cari v Messersmith 02-05-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA0185 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31539 Honorable Jill D. Dorancy, Judge Deysi Cari, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Natalie Jean Vona Messersmith, Defendant-Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 5, 2026 Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Darin L. Schanker, Denver, Colorado; Barrios Wool, LLC, Zachary L. Wool, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Plaintiff-Appellee Montgomery Amatuzio, Max K. Jones, Jr., Natalie R. Norcutt, Sarah K. Vogel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1 ¶ 1 Defendant, Natalie Jean Vona Messersmith, appeals the judgment entered by the trial court following a jury trial and finding her liable for injuring plaintiff, Deysi Cari, in a motor vehicle accident. We affirm. I. Background ¶ 2 Messersmith struck Cari with her car while Cari, a pedestrian, was in a crosswalk. Cari sustained leg and back injuries in the crash, as well as a traumatic brain injury and ensuing cognitive defects. ¶ 3 Cari filed a personal injury claim against Messersmith. Although Messersmith admitted negligence, the case proceeded to trial on the nature and extent of Cari’s injuries and associated damages. A jury awarded Cari $7,110,624.00 in damages, and the trial court calculated the associated interest at $2,428,793.60. ¶ 4 This appeal concerns a pretrial discovery dispute. Messersmith retained an expert witness, Dr. Laura Rieffel, a neuropsychologist, to conduct a two-day examination evaluating the extent and effects of Cari’s traumatic brain injury and to prepare a report. Although Rieffel completed her report, Messersmith’s expert disclosures did not include (1) the testing materials Rieffel used
2 during the examination; (2) Cari’s answers; (3) any scoring analyses; or (4) any guides on test administration and interpretation.1 ¶ 5 Cari’s attorneys insisted that Messersmith disclose this information to counsel pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a) and (b), as well as C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1). Messersmith’s attorneys declined. As a result, about a month before trial, in accordance with the case management order, the parties filed a “Joint Notice of Discovery Impasse,” requesting that the court resolve the dispute. In the notice, Cari argued that Rieffel’s testing materials, analysis, and results constituted “data and information the expert considered while forming her opinions for the case,” Garrigan v. Bowen, 243 P.3d 231, 237 (Colo. 2010), and, thus, must be disclosed to counsel under C.R.C.P. 26 and 35. Messersmith countered that those rules did not require disclosure of the requested materials and that “raw data is protected from disclosure to non-neuropsychologists 1 As we discuss below, Rieffel did disclose this information to Cari’s treating neuropsychologist, who was designated as an expert for Cari pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(II). Citing the same ethical rules as Rieffel, however, Cari’s psychologist declined to share the materials that he received from Rieffel with Cari’s attorneys.
3 because the tests can only provide accurate information if the test takers are unaware of the test contents, instruction, and pre- examination procedures.” Messersmith stressed that providing raw data to non-neuropsychologists, including Cari’s attorneys, violated a neuropsychologist’s professional ethical obligations because such nonexperts were not required to keep testing materials confidential.2 ¶ 6 The trial court held a hearing on the dispute during which counsel for both sides presented legal argument. Relying in part on a federal magistrate judge’s reasoning in a nearly identical situation involving Rieffel’s refusal to disclose testing materials and underlying data associated with an expert report, see Wright v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 538, 542 (D. Colo. 2023), the court ruled that Rieffel was required to “produce the facts and data which were obtained during the [C.R.C.P. 35] exam upon which [Rieffel] based her opinion to plaintiff’s counsel.” (We will refer to 2 In the notice, Cari seemingly acknowledged that she had not turned over to Messersmith’s counsel any similar materials generated by Cari’s treating neuropsychologist. She noted, however, that Messersmith had never requested such materials and argued that, at the time the parties filed the notice, the discovery deadline for any such requests had passed.
4 this order as “the disclosure order.”) As for the confidentiality and ethical concerns underpinning Rieffel’s objection to disclosing these materials, the court instructed the parties to confer regarding exactly what materials would be disclosed and to submit a proposed protective order that would prevent any further dissemination. ¶ 7 Messersmith declined to collaborate on the protective order and instead filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling. In the motion, she argued that the court erred by failing to hear from Rieffel directly about her ethical concerns and by leaving her with no means to appeal its ruling, as she was a nonparty. Messersmith also maintained that Cari should subpoena Rieffel for the requested materials since counsel “neither own[ed] nor control[led]” the ordered materials. Messersmith attached a personal letter from Rieffel to the motion. In the letter, Rieffel wrote that she could not “ethically provide” the requested materials to Cari’s counsel — even pursuant to a protective order — and therefore had “no choice but to withdraw.” ¶ 8 The court denied the motion to reconsider its disclosure order. Messersmith failed to produce the materials in question.
5 ¶ 9 Meanwhile, with trial about three weeks away, the parties were still trying to schedule Rieffel’s deposition. Rieffel’s personal lawyer emailed to confirm that the deposition was canceled given “recent developments” in the case, but, through counsel, Messersmith told Cari that Rieffel would still testify at trial. Cari then filed an expedited motion to strike Rieffel as an expert and for sanctions. ¶ 10 In an order issued less than two weeks before trial, the trial court precluded Rieffel’s testimony and expert report. As the court put it, “If Dr. Rieffel is unable or unwilling to comply with a Court Order or with the Rules of Civil Procedures, she shall not be permitted to testify at the trial.” The court also ruled in the alternative that Rieffel’s withdrawal had mooted the issue. In addition, the court “decline[d] to permit [Messersmith] to include another neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” as an expert at such a late stage in the proceedings. The court reasoned that the defense had created the issue by choosing to retain Rieffel despite the federal magistrate judge’s ruling in Wright, which put counsel “on notice” that compliance with discovery requirements “would be an issue for Dr. Rieffel.”
6 ¶ 11 The case was tried to a jury. Rieffel did not testify — although two other defense experts did. After the verdict, Messersmith sought a new trial under C.R.C.P. 59, arguing that Rieffel’s report and testimony had been improperly excluded and that, at trial, “[Cari]’s counsel unfairly leveraged Dr. Rieffel’s exclusion by alleging that none of [Messersmith]’s experts claimed that [Cari] was malingering or exaggerating and instead all agreed that [Cari] had sustained a [traumatic brain injury].” ¶ 12 The trial court denied Messersmith’s post-trial motion and entered judgment in Cari’s favor. Messersmith now appeals, contending that the court reversibly erred by (1) requiring disclosure of the aforementioned materials under C.R.C.P. 26 and 35; (2) sanctioning Messersmith by excluding Rieffel; (3) refusing to allow Rieffel to be replaced by another expert; and (4) denying Messersmith’s request for a trial continuance. II. Mootness ¶ 13 At the threshold, we address Cari’s argument that we should affirm the disclosure order for testing materials and the order striking Rieffel as a witness because Rieffel’s withdrawal from the
7 case rendered any challenges to those rulings moot. We agree in part. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶ 14 “A case is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy.” San Juan Hut Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2023 COA 10, ¶ 24 (citation omitted). The same rule applies to discrete issues within the case as a whole: “An issue is moot if ‘a judgment which, when rendered, cannot have any effect upon an existing controversy.’” In re Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). ¶ 15 Mootness is a legal question that we review de novo. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina, 2013 COA 155, ¶ 23. B. Analysis ¶ 16 Messersmith challenges two separate facets of the trial court’s rulings regarding Rieffel: (1) the order requiring production of testing materials and related documents pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26 and 35 once a protective order was in place and (2) the decision to strike Rieffel as an expert witness as a sanction for the defense’s noncompliance with that order. Cari argues that both arguments are moot given Rieffel’s withdrawal.
8 1. Order to Produce Testing Materials ¶ 17 Because the disclosure order preceded — and led to — Rieffel’s withdrawal, we disagree with Cari’s argument that Messersmith’s challenge to the order is moot. Had the trial court not issued the disclosure order, Rieffel would have presumably testified on behalf of the defense, and the trial court would not have prohibited Messersmith from retaining another “neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” following Rieffel’s withdrawal. As a result, an appellate determination that the court incorrectly ordered disclosure of the testing materials and related documents would likely have a “practical legal effect upon the existing controversy.” San Juan Hut Sys., ¶ 24 (citation omitted); see also Stor-N-Lock Partners # 15, LLC v. City of Thornton, 2018 COA 65, ¶ 38 (“An issue is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical effect on an existing controversy.”). ¶ 18 Moreover, contrary to Cari’s claim on appeal, the trial court did not “explicitly recognize[]” at any point that Rieffel’s withdrawal had any effect on the propriety of the disclosure order. Rather, as we discuss below, the court found that Rieffel’s withdrawal rendered moot only its decision to strike Rieffel as a witness. Thus,
9 unlike the order imposing sanctions on the defense, which we consider next, Messersmith’s failure on appeal to address mootness with respect to the discovery order does not bar appellate review of that issue. 2. Order Striking Rieffel as a Sanction for Noncompliance ¶ 19 We reach the opposite conclusion regarding the trial court’s decision to strike Rieffel as a witness as a sanction for noncompliance with its disclosure order. In its order imposing sanctions on the defense, the court acknowledged Rieffel’s letter stating that she could not ethically comply with the court’s discovery ruling and that, as a result, she had “no choice but to withdraw” from the case as a witness. While the court determined that striking Rieffel was an appropriate sanction for the defense’s noncompliance with the discovery order, it found that “the issue [was] also moot” due to Rieffel’s withdrawal. ¶ 20 Messersmith does not address, much less challenge, the trial court’s alternative mootness determination in her opening brief on appeal. When a district court’s ruling is based on alternative grounds, an appellant must address each of those grounds in her opening brief. IBC Denv. II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d
10 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2008) (when a lower tribunal gives more than one reason for a decision, each of which independently supports the judgment, the appellant must challenge each reason on appeal). And we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See W. Innovations, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 187 P.3d 1155, 1160 (Colo. App. 2008). ¶ 21 We therefore decline to consider Messersmith’s argument, raised for the first time in her reply brief, that Rieffel’s declaration that she “ha[d] no choice but to withdraw” was merely “conditional” and “contingent upon the Trial Court maintaining its prior position requiring [Messersmith] to produce Dr. Rieffel’s testing materials and documents.”3 ¶ 22 Accordingly, because the issue is not properly before us, we must leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that Rieffel’s 3 In any event, the trial court did not interpret Rieffel’s statement as “conditional.” To the contrary, it explicitly ruled — albeit in the alternative — that Rieffel’s withdrawal rendered moot its decision on Cari’s sanctions motion. If the trial court’s understanding of Rieffel’s statement was wrong (i.e., if Rieffel’s withdrawal was truly “conditional”), the defense should have raised that issue with the trial court.
11 withdrawal rendered moot its decision to strike her as a sanction for noncompliance with the discovery order. III. The Disclosure Order ¶ 23 Messersmith contends that the disclosure order was erroneous because it was the result of an incorrect interpretation of C.R.C.P. 26 and 35 by the trial court. Specifically, she argues that the trial court “erred in ruling that [Messersmith] was automatically required to produce her expert’s testing materials and raw data under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35, neither of which require the production of documents, especially those not in the custody or control of [Messersmith].” ¶ 24 Cari defends the disclosure order on the merits, but she argues at the outset that Messersmith did not preserve the arguments that she asserts on appeal. Although it is a close call given the arguments presented in the Joint Notice of Discovery Impasse and at the hearing on the discovery dispute, we conclude that the trial court’s disclosure order encompasses at least some of the arguments that Messersmith advances on appeal. See In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 71 n.7 (“[W]here a trial court addresses an argument, whether that argument was preserved is
12 moot.”). To the extent that Messersmith raised her appellate arguments below or the trial court otherwise considered the issues on appeal, we address the disclosure order on the merits. A. Applicable Law ¶ 25 Expert witness disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) must be made by a written report signed by the witness. See Garrigan, 243 P.3d at 235. Among other things, the report must contain (1) “a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor”; (2) “a list of the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions”; and (3) “references to literature that may be used during the witness’s testimony.” C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a)-(c). “‘[D]ata or other information’ is a broad phrase inclusive of whatever information an expert actually considers in forming her opinions.” Garrigan, 243 P.3d at 236. It even includes information the expert reviewed but rejected when forming her opinions. Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 241 (Colo. 2002). And under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I), an expert considers information in forming the opinions if the expert reviews the information with the purpose of forming opinions about the case at issue. Gall, 44 P.3d at 241.
13 ¶ 26 Similarly, C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1) requires, upon request by the opposing party, delivery to that party “a copy of a detailed written report of the examiner setting out his or her findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses, and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition.” B. Analysis ¶ 27 As we understand it, Messersmith argues that the testing materials and related documents that Rieffel used during her Rule 35 examination of Cari fall outside the scope of the disclosure requirements of C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1), and that if Cari’s counsel wanted those materials, they needed to issue a request for production or subpoena Rieffel for the same. She also maintains that the testing information was “privileged or protected from disclosure,” although she offers no legal authority for that claim. ¶ 28 Regarding the scope of expert disclosure requirements, in appellate briefing and at oral argument, Messersmith asserted that C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1) do not include a mechanism that required disclosure of the testing materials and related documents and that, absent a formal C.R.C.P. 34 discovery
14 request or a subpoena duces tecum issued directly to Rieffel, the defense had no obligation to produce the documents. We do not consider this argument because Messersmith did not raise it in the trial court. See O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Arguments never presented to, considered by, or ruled upon by a trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).4 ¶ 29 To support its conclusion that the defense was required to disclose Rieffel’s testing materials, the trial court appropriately looked to the federal magistrate judge’s decision in Wright as persuasive authority. See Garrigan, 243 P.3d at 235 (“Because the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned on the federal rules, we may also look to the federal rules and decisions for guidance.”). The Wright court made short work of a virtually identical argument 4 The trial court found, with record support, that Cari’s counsel did request Rieffel’s testing materials and related documents. The request appeared be an informal one, however, rather than a request for production under C.R.C.P. 34 or a subpoena duces tecum issued to Rieffel directly. Given the trial court’s finding that Cari’s counsel requested the materials in question, we do not need to address Messersmith’s claim that the trial court erroneously ruled that Messersmith was “automatically” required to produce them.
15 involving a virtually identical objection to the production of testing materials asserted by Rieffel herself. Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2), which requires production of “diagnoses, conclusions, and the results of any tests,” and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), which requires written reports to contain “‘the facts or data considered by the witness’ in forming their opinions,” the Wright court ruled that Rieffel must produce “the raw test data” as part of her expert disclosures. Wright, 344 F.R.D. at 542 (emphasis omitted) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2); and then quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii)). ¶ 30 The Wright court’s interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 35 is consistent with a host of cases nationwide that have addressed similar questions. See, e.g., Bain v. Wrend, No. 15-cv-202, 2017 WL 11505976, at *2 (D. Vt. Sep. 6, 2017) (unpublished order) (Because “raw test score[s] are clearly ‘data considered by the witness’” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), “[t]here is no basis for skirting the requirements of the rule, which were added to ensure complete disclosure in advance of trial of the substance and basis for expert testimony.”); see also Frazier v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 08-cv- 02730, 2010 WL 447785, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2010) (unpublished
16 order) (“[C]oncerns about contractual or ethical limitations on the disclosure of [psychological testing materials]” may be addressed by the entry of a protective order.); Glennon v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-00038, 2021 WL 3130050, at *6 (S.D. Ga. July 23, 2021) (unpublished order) (granting the plaintiff’s request “for raw data and test materials, but only subject to entry of a protective order”); Guinn v. Praxair, Inc., No. 17-11436, 2019 WL 12096811, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2019) (unpublished order) (observing, despite restrictions in Illinois law, that “federal district courts in Illinois have determined that [psychological testing] materials may be disclosed pursuant to a protective order”).5 5 For the first time on appeal, Messersmith suggests that C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(b) should be interpreted differently from the corresponding federal rule because, while the Colorado rule requires disclosure of “a list of the data or other information considered by the witness,” the federal rule requires disclosure of “the facts or data considered by the witness,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), without mentioning “a list.” We decline to consider this argument because it was not raised in the trial court. See O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App. 2010). Regardless, Messersmith’s claim runs counter to the holding in Garrigan v. Bowen, 243 P.3d 231 (Colo. 2010), in which the Colorado Supreme Court relied on federal cases interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) as an interpretive aid for C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(b) without ever suggesting that the two rules differ in scope.
17 ¶ 31 We agree with the trial court’s resolution of the discovery dispute. Consistent with Wright and similar federal cases cited above, the court correctly ruled that any restrictions Rieffel’s professional association placed on the dissemination of testing materials must yield to the requirements of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Because they revealed “the basis and reasons” for Rieffel’s opinion, C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)(a), the materials were highly relevant to the admissibility of Rieffel’s testimony, and depriving Cari of access to them would have hamstrung her attorneys’ ability to fully explore the reliability of the data underpinning her expert opinions as contemplated by CRE 702. See People in Interest of A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 21 (The inquiry under CRE 702 “must focus on the reliability of the principles underlying the specific opinions offered rather than of casework in the abstract.”). Moreover, as many courts have recognized, Rieffel’s concerns about her professional obligations and the proprietary nature of the materials could be addressed by the issuance of a protective order. Thus, we discern no error in the trial court’s disclosure order.
18 IV. Sanctions ¶ 32 Messersmith next challenges the trial court’s imposition of sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 based on her failure to comply with the disclosure order. She does so from several different angles. ¶ 33 First, she argues that the court should not have imposed sanctions because there was no violation of C.R.C.P. 26 or 35. We have already rejected that argument, so we do not consider it further. ¶ 34 Second, Messersmith argues that the court erred by striking Rieffel as a witness without first holding an evidentiary hearing at which the defense could present witnesses to explain the various barriers to the disclosure of the testing materials and related documents. Relatedly, she argues that the court abused its discretion by barring Rieffel from testifying altogether rather than crafting a narrower sanction that would have prohibited her from testifying about only the results of the Rule 35 examination. But as we have already concluded, Messersmith’s failure to address in her opening brief the trial court’s finding that Rieffel had withdrawn as a witness precludes us from considering any issues related to either
19 the procedures that preceded the sanction or the scope of the court’s order. ¶ 35 Finally, Messersmith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that she was not permitted to replace Rieffel with another neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist, or psychologist. We consider that question below. A. Standard of Review ¶ 36 We interpret rules of procedure de novo. Cath. Health Initiatives Colo. v. Earl Swensson Assocs., Inc., 2017 CO 94, ¶ 8. We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 702 (Colo. 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. An appellate court may affirm the trial court’s ruling based on any grounds that are supported by the record. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38. B. Scope of the Sanction 1. Applicable Law ¶ 37 When a party fails to make a required pretrial disclosure, the district court may impose appropriate sanctions, including
20 excluding the undisclosed evidence. See Mullins v. Med. Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2013 COA 134, ¶ 37; C.R.C.P. 37(c)(1). But Rule 37(c)(1) is not an “automatic rule of exclusion.” Cath. Health Initiatives Colo., ¶ 12. Instead, it is a “flexible” framework that gives the district court “discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction proportionate to any harm caused.” Id. at ¶ 11. ¶ 38 The burden is on the nondisclosing party to show that the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 978 (Colo. 1999). Some considerations that may be relevant to this inquiry are (1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the party’s explanation for the failure to disclose; (3) the potential prejudice or surprise to the opposing party; (4) the availability of a continuance to cure the prejudice; (5) the extent to which admission of the testimony would disrupt trial; and (6) the nondisclosing party’s bad faith or willfulness. Id. The question of harm is not whether the undisclosed evidence is “potentially harmful to the opposing side’s case” but “whether the failure to disclose the evidence in a timely fashion will prejudice the opposing party by denying that party an adequate opportunity to defend against the evidence.” Id. at 979.
21 2. Analysis ¶ 39 Messersmith maintains that her failure to comply with the discovery order or otherwise disclose the requested materials was substantially justified or, alternatively, that the court’s sanctions were disproportionate to the harm caused. ¶ 40 Regarding the reasons for her noncompliance with the discovery order, Messersmith argues that withholding Rieffel’s materials was substantially justified because of (1) applicable professional ethical obligations; (2) examples of other neuropsychologists refusing disclosure orders due to their ethical obligations; (3) academic and professional articles outlining the rationale behind such refusals; (4) a Colorado district court order ruling that a neuropsychologist’s raw data was required to be disclosed only to opposing experts; and (5) defense counsel’s lack of custody and control over the documents. ¶ 41 Unsurprisingly, many of these arguments mirror those raised on Rieffel’s behalf in Wright. 344 F.R.D. at 540-41. They also appear in Rieffel’s letter of withdrawal, which claimed that disclosing the requested materials “would undermine current and future use of psychological and/or neuropsychological testing,”
22 given Cari’s “financial motive to misuse the materials”; that it could create copyright concerns; and that disclosure under a protective order would still create the risk of “inadvertent” disclosure to outside sources. ¶ 42 None of these concerns justify Messersmith’s noncompliance. As the cases above explain, “Any concerns about test security can be dealt with via the protective order and the designation of the materials to be produced as ‘confidential.’” Id. at 542. The trial court agreed with this view, noting that it had reviewed Wright and agreed with its determination that Rieffel’s concerns could be addressed if all the requested materials were “subject to a protective order.” The court performed a separate analysis of Rieffel’s professional ethical obligations and found she could adhere to the orders without violating them. As for defense counsel’s argument that he lacked custody and control over the requested materials, that does not relieve him of the obligation to disclose Rieffel’s written report with all required inclusions. See C.R.C.P. 35(b)(1); C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I). ¶ 43 Turning to the proportionality of the sanction, Messersmith argues that barring her from replacing Rieffel was a
23 disproportionate penalty and that, in imposing it, the trial court failed to account for (1) the importance of Rieffel’s testimony to the defense; (2) professional ethics that prohibited compliance; (3) the minimal prejudice suffered by Cari, given that Cari’s expert had the materials; (4) the court’s denial of a requested continuance; and (5) the fact that the noncompliance was not the result of bad faith. ¶ 44 We conclude that the trial court sufficiently addressed both prejudice and proportionality. See Todd, 980 P.2d at 979 (observing that a party will “likely” be prejudiced in cases when the failure to make expert disclosures without substantial justification occurs close to the time of trial). While Rieffel’s testimony may have been important to the defense, providing Cari with a full and fair opportunity to test the admissibility and credibility of her opinions was no less significant. Cf. Gall, 44 P.3d at 240 (“If an adverse party is to determine the extent to which the expert’s opinion has been shaped or influenced by the version of the facts selected and presented by the counsel retaining the expert, she must have access to the documents or materials that the expert considers. Without such access, the opposing party will be unable to conduct a full and fair cross-examination of the expert.”). The court
24 recognized the importance of the testing materials and related documents when it acknowledged that they might bear on its assessment of the reliability of Rieffel’s testimony under CRE 702 and 703. The refusal to disclose the materials impeded Cari’s counsel from laying the groundwork for that inquiry by thoroughly exploring the basis for Rieffel’s opinions. See Todd, 980 P.2d at 978 (“The purpose of [Rule 37(c)] is to provide parties with an incentive to make timely disclosures and to resist the temptation ‘to try to gain a tactical advantage at trial by exposing for the first time at that stage evidence that is favorable to their position.’” (citation omitted)). ¶ 45 The court also considered Rieffel’s professional ethical obligations. It observed that under the ethical standards set forth by the American Psychological Association, “test data” — defined as “raw and scaled scores, client/patient responses to test questions or stimuli, and psychologists notes and recordings concerning client/patient statements and behavior during exams” — could be provided “only as required by law or Court order” absent “client/patient release.” It therefore reasoned that Rieffel could comply with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and its court
25 order compelling production of the requested materials under a protective order.6 ¶ 46 As for the claimed lack of prejudice because Cari’s own neuropsychological expert possessed the requested materials, Cari’s counsel explained that a “‘just trust me’ opinion by an expert” unaccompanied by direct access to the testing materials and related documents would hinder his ability to test the reliability of Rieffel’s opinions and to effectively depose her and then cross-examine her at trial. The court agreed, reasoning that, in order to determine under CRE 702 and 703 whether an expert’s testimony is reliable and therefore admissible, “it is . . . appropriate and necessary to produce both the test materials and raw data” so that the basis for the Rule 35 examiner’s expertise and opinion can be established. ¶ 47 And finally, as outlined below, the court also found that there was no good cause for a trial continuance. 6 The Wright court made the same observation, pointing out that in a 2003 bulletin, the National Academy of Neuropsychology advised clinicians that if production of testing data is ordered, the “court order should be issued ensuring that all parties given access be required to maintain the confidentiality of the test data.” Wright v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 538, 540-41 (D. Colo. 2023).
26 ¶ 48 Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from retaining “another neuropsychologist, neuropsychiatrist or psychologist” prior to trial. V. Motion To Continue Trial ¶ 49 Finally, Messersmith maintains the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to continue filed less than three weeks before the scheduled trial date. We perceive no error. A. Additional Facts ¶ 50 Messersmith filed a motion to continue the trial two days after Cari sought sanctions for noncompliance with the disclosure order. The motion asserted that Messersmith was “facing the loss of her primary expert witness” and therefore needed a continuance to allow her to “retain non-neuropsychologist experts” since “no neuropsychologist would comply with a court order requiring disclosure” of the requested materials. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Messersmith had not established good cause and that, in any event, the arguments were premature given that it had not yet ruled on the motion for sanctions and to limit Rieffel’s testimony.
27 ¶ 51 The court then revisited the request for a continuance in its order striking Rieffel as a sanction for noncompliance with the disclosure order. Based on the decision in Wright, the court observed that defense counsel had been “on notice since at least 2023 that this would be an issue for Dr. Rieffel.” The court thus ruled that it was “also on this basis” that it had denied the motion to continue the trial. B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 52 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805, 809 (Colo. 1993). Continuances are granted only for good cause. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1–11. The trial court must consider “the circumstances of the particular case, weighing the right of the party requesting the continuance to a fair hearing against the prejudice that may result from delay.” Voelker, 859 P.2d at 809 (quoting Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853, 858 (Colo. 1985)). Trial continuances “should be limited to circumstances in which unforeseen and exceptional circumstances require diligent attorneys to request an adjournment.” Kallas v. Spinozzi, 2014 COA 164, ¶ 41 (citation omitted). An appellate court may affirm the
28 trial court’s ruling based on any grounds that are supported by the record. Rush Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 406 (Colo. App. 2004). C. Analysis ¶ 53 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Credible trial dates are a vital component of our civil justice system, and parties rely on meaningful dates to plan and prepare accordingly. Todd, 980 P.2d at 976. When considering requests to continue trial, a court must “be careful not to reward a party who fails to make timely disclosures” and uphold the rules of civil procedure to disincentivize “dilatory discovery tactics and inefficient trial preparation,” as well as “abuse.” Id. at 979. ¶ 54 The record demonstrates that defense counsel had already evinced less-than-diligent discovery tactics prior to his renewed motion, including missing discovery deadlines, failing to read the court’s case management order, violating a court order to audio record Rieffel’s examination, failing to diligently schedule Rieffel’s deposition, and failing to participate in the drafting of a court- ordered protective order, among others.
29 ¶ 55 Against this backdrop, defense counsel complained that the court’s disclosure order was “unanticipated” and “unexpected.” However, counsel handpicked Rieffel as a Rule 35 expert despite the fact that the same issues had arisen in Wright. When the trial court adopted Wright’s reasoning and ordered disclosure, defense counsel did not comply and instead sought reconsideration, declined to participate in drafting the protective order, refused to produce the materials as ordered, and submitted a letter from Rieffel announcing her withdrawal as a witness. The reconsideration motion did not suggest that counsel was proactively attempting to secure another expert witness in light of Rieffel’s withdrawal and her refusal to comply with court-ordered discovery. ¶ 56 Based on these facts, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to find good cause for a continuance. See Kallas, ¶ 43 (explaining it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a continuance in light of foreseeability and numerous discovery violations). VI. Disposition ¶ 57 We affirm the judgment. JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.
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