Clarence Wayne Dixon v. DAVID SHINN , Director, Arizona Department of Corrections

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLARENCE W AYNE DIXON ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DAVID SHINN , Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 22-99006
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-00258-
DJH
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2022
San Francisco, California
Filed May 10, 2022
Before: Jay S. Bybee, Daniel A. Bress, and
Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bress

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2 DIXON V . SHINN
SUMMARY*
Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying
Clarence Dixon’s federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in which Dixon challenged an Arizona state court’s
determination that he is competent to be executed, and
denied his motion for a stay of execution.
Because the only claim Dixon raised in his § 2254
petition alleged incompetency to be executed under Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), his petition is not barred
as second or successive under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The panel
nonetheless evaluated Dixon’s claim under AEDPA’s highly
deferential standards of review.
Dixon argued under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) that the
Arizona state court’s rejection of his incompetency claim
was an unreasonable application of Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford. In those cases, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state
from inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is
insane, which is determined according to whether the
prisoner’s mental illness deprives him of the mental capacity
to understand that he is being executed as a punishment for
a crime. The panel explained that the sole inquiry is whether
the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his
death sentence. Noting that the state court correctly
articulated the governing legal standard, the panel concluded
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DIXON V . SHINN 3
that Dixon did not demonstrate it was objectively
unreasonable for the state court to conclude that he is
competent to be executed in light of the full record before it,
and could not conclude that the state court’s decision was an
unreasonable application of Panetti.
The panel also rejected Dixon’s argument under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) that the state court’s decision was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The
panel held that Dixon did not demonstrate that the state
court’s use of Dr. Carlos Vega’s observations—including
that Dixon does not suffer from paranoid schizophrenia—
reflects an unreasonable determination of the facts. The
panel held that the state court’s reliance on Dixon’s writings
and his intelligence level was not objectively unreasonable.
The panel also held that the state court could reasonably
conclude that Dixon made a challenged statement to
Dr. Vega, and could reasonably rely on the statement as
evidence that Dixon is rationally understanding the reason
for his execution.
COUNSEL
Eriz Zuckerman (argued), Amanda C. Bass, and Cary
Sandman, Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Jon M.
Sands, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public
Defender, Phoenix, Arizona; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Jeffrey L. Sparks (argued), Chief Counsel, Capital Litigation
Section; J.D. Nielsen and Ginger Jarvis, Assistant Attorneys
General; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the
Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; for Respondent-
Appellee.

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4 DIXON V . SHINN
OPINION
BRESS, Circuit Judge:
Clarence Dixon, an inmate incarcerated on death row in
Arizona who is set to be executed on May 11, 2022, appeals
the denial of his federal habeas petition and seeks a stay of
his execution. He challenges an Arizona state court’s
determination that he is competent to be executed. We
conclude that the Arizona state court’s decision is not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, nor does it result in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Dixon is therefore not entitled
to relief.
I
In June 1977, Dixon was charged in Arizona state court
with assault with a deadly weapon after he struck a teenage
girl with a metal pipe. Dixon v. Ryan, 932 F.3d 789, 796
(9th Cir. 2019). After Dixon waived his right to a jury trial,
the court found him not guilty by reason of insanity and
ordered him released on January 5, 1978. Id. The next day,
Deana Bowdoin, a 21-year-old student at Arizona State
University, was found dead in her apartment with a belt
tightly cinched around her neck. State v. Dixon, 250 P.3d
1174, 1177–78 (Ariz. 2011). Bowdoin had been restrained,
strangled, and stabbed several times. Id. Investigators also
found semen in Bowdoin’s vagina and on her clothing. Id.
Bowdoin’s murder would remain unsolved for nearly
twenty-five years.
In 1985, Dixon violently sexually assaulted a student at
Northern Arizona University (NAU) who was out jogging,
dragging her into a forest and forcing her to engage in

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DIXON V . SHINN 5
numerous sexual acts at knifepoint. State v. Dixon, 735 P.2d
761, 762 (Ariz. 1987). After a jury trial, Dixon was
convicted of aggravated assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse,
and four counts of sexual assault. Id. at 765. He received a
consecutive life sentence on each count. Id. at 766.
Dixon’s DNA was obtained during the police
investigation into this 1985 assault. Dixon, 932 F.3d at 796.
Many years later, in 2001, a detective ran the DNA
recovered from Bowdoin’s murder and found a match with
Dixon, who had lived across the street from Bowdoin at the
time of her murder. Dixon, 250 P.3d at 1177. There was no
indication of previous contact between the two. Id. at 1177–
78.
In November 2002, Dixon was indicted for first-degree
murder, or, alternatively, first-degree rape and felony murder
for the death of Bowdoin. Dixon, 932 F.3d at 796. Dixon
moved to change counsel and later to waive his right to
counsel. Id. at 797. He explained that he wished to pursue
a legal theory that counsel had determined was not viable,
specifically, that the DNA evidence should be suppressed
because it was illegally obtained by NAU campus police in
connection with his 1985 assault conviction. Id. at 797, 803.
The trial court determined that Dixon “understood the
charges against him” and “the potential penalties for the
crime.” Id. at 797. Dixon informed the court that “he was
not aware of any current mental health issues that would
prevent him from proceeding to trial.” Id. Dixon’s counsel
agreed with this assessment, and the court allowed Dixon to
represent himself. Id. at 797–98.
On January 15, 2008, the jury convicted Dixon of
premeditated murder and felony murder and later sentenced
him to death. Id. at 799. The Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Dixon, 250 P.3d 1174

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6 DIXON V . SHINN
(Ariz. 2011), and the Supreme Court denied Dixon’s petition
for writ of certiorari, Dixon v. Arizona, 565 U.S. 964 (2011).
On March 18, 2013, represented by counsel, Dixon filed
a state habeas petition. Dixon, 932 F.3d at 800. The trial
court (the same judge that had presided over Dixon’s trial)
denied relief. As relevant here, the court rejected Dixon’s
claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge
Dixon’s competency to waive counsel, or that the court had
violated Dixon’s due process rights by failing to hold a
competency hearing sua sponte. Id. at 800, 804. Among
other things, the court noted that Dixon was “coherent and
rational,” “able to adequately advance his positions,”
“cogent in his thought processes,” and “lucid in argument.”
The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Dixon’s
petition for review. Id. at 800.
On December 19, 2014, Dixon filed a federal habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied
the petition, and we affirmed. Id. at 795. On Dixon’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, we held that the Arizona
state court had not unreasonably applied Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because “the record
contains no evidence of competency issues at any time
throughout the course of the[] proceedings.” Id. at 802–03.
The Supreme Court again denied Dixon’s petition for writ of
certiorari. Dixon v. Shinn, 140 S. Ct. 2810 (2020).
Dixon’s execution was later set for May 11, 2022. On
April 8, 2022, Dixon requested a hearing in Arizona state
court on his competency to be executed. At the hearing, both
Dixon and the State presented expert testimony, and the
parties also submitted thirty-nine exhibits. Dr. Carlos Vega
testified for the State, and Dr. Lauro Amezcua-Patiño
testified for Dixon. Both experts also submitted reports.
After hearing the evidence, the Arizona Superior Court

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DIXON V . SHINN 7
found that Dixon failed to prove he was incompetent to be
executed. The Arizona Supreme Court declined jurisdiction
over Dixon’s petition for review of the Superior Court’s
decision.
On May 9, 2022, Dixon filed a federal habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the state court’s
competency determination. Dixon also filed an
accompanying motion to stay his execution. The district
court denied relief on May 10, 2022. Dixon now appeals.
We granted a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1).1
II
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Dixon’s
§ 2254 petition. Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 804 (9th Cir.
2021).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) generally prohibits state prisoners from
filing “second or successive” federal habeas petitions unless
“certain narrow requirements” are met. Jones v. Ryan,
733 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2013). However, “the provisions
of AEDPA addressing ‘second or successive’ petitions” do
not apply to a § 2254 application based on alleged
incompetency to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986). Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
945 (2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)). Because this is
the only claim Dixon raises in his § 2254 petition, his
petition is not barred as second or successive under AEDPA.
1 We grant Dixon’s motion to transmit a physical exhibit. Dkt.
No. 13.

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We must nonetheless evaluate Dixon’s claim under
AEDPA’s “highly deferential” standards of review. Renico
v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy,
521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). A § 2254 petition “shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings,” unless the state court
decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
(2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). When,
as here, the decision of the highest state court is unreasoned,
we “‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last
related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale,” and “presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018).
The standard established by AEDPA is “intentionally
‘difficult to meet.’” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316
(2015) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.
415, 419 (2014)). To prevail under § 2254(d)(1), “a prisoner
must show far more than that the state court’s decision was
‘merely wrong’ or ‘even clear error.’” Shinn v. Kayer,
141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020) (quoting Virginia v. LeBlanc,
137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017) (per curiam)). Rather, the
question is whether “the state court’s decision is so
obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, the state
court’s application of clearly established federal law “must
be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63, 75 (2003). Similarly, under § 2254(d)(2), “a state-court
factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the

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DIXON V . SHINN 9
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.
290, 301 (2010).
We conclude that Dixon has not demonstrated that he is
entitled to relief either under § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).
A
Dixon first argues that the Arizona state court’s rejection
of his incompetency claim was an unreasonable application
of Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits
the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner
who is insane,” Ford, 477 U.S. at 410, which is determined
according to whether the prisoner’s “mental illness deprives
him of the mental capacity to understand that he is being
executed as a punishment for a crime,” Panetti, 551 U.S.
at 954 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “The
critical question is whether a ‘prisoner’s mental state is so
distorted by a mental illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational
understanding’ of ‘the State’s rationale for his execution.’”
Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2019) (alterations
omitted) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958–59). Stated
another way, “the sole inquiry for the court [is] whether the
prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his death
sentence.” Id. at 728.
In this case, the state court correctly articulated the
governing legal standard and asked whether Dixon “lacks a
rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his
execution.” The court ultimately concluded that Dixon had
not made this showing because, although Dixon “has a
mental disorder or mental illness of schizophrenia,” this
illness “can fall within a broad spectrum” and does not on its

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own “decide the question of competency.” See also
Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 727 (“What matters is whether a
person has the ‘rational understanding’ Panetti requires—
not whether he has any particular memory or any particular
mental illness.”). The state court further found that Dixon’s
intelligence was “high-average,” and that he had shown
“sophistication, coherent and organized thinking, and fluent
language skills in the pleadings and motions that he has
drafted.”
In addition, the court found that “there were persuasive
observations that were also offered by Dr. Vega,” including
Dixon’s statement that “if he had a memory of the murder,
he would have a sense of relief on his way to his execution,”
which demonstrated that Dixon understood the execution to
be a punishment for the crime of conviction. As Dr. Vega
had further described in his expert report,
Clarence is so well aware of the State’s
rationale for his execution that he wishes he
resided in a different State, one that did not
have the death penalty. He also made it clear
that he does not want to die and believes that
there is nothing to be gained by his execution.
He even goes as far as to say that if he could
bring the victim back to life, he would. He
made it clear that he was “going to fight [his
execution] until the end.” He has deluded
himself into believing that he found case
law[] that supports his position.
Dr. Vega also testified that based on his interview of Dixon,
he observed that Dixon was “not the one least bit delusional”
and had a “very good grasp of reality.” Dixon also stated to
his own expert Dr. Amezcua-Patiño that state officials were

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DIXON V . SHINN 11
“not disagreeing” with his legal challenge to his conviction,
“they just want to kill me for murder.” As the district court
noted, although the experts disagreed on the ultimate
competency question, “[t]he experts agree that Dixon knows
that he was sentenced to death for the murder of Deana
Bowdoin.”
Dixon has not demonstrated it was objectively
unreasonable for the state court to conclude that he is
competent to be executed in light of the full record before it.
“[E]ven if ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might
disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review
that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s
determination.’” Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (alterations
omitted) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42
(2006)). A fairminded jurist could conclude that Dixon had
not shown an inability to “reach a rational understanding of
the reason for the execution.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
Dixon primarily argues that the state court erred by
giving insufficient weight to his “delusional, psychotic-
driven belief” that his conviction was invalid because the
1985 DNA evidence was obtained unlawfully by NAU
police and should have been suppressed. Dixon further
points to his belief that the legal system has not credited his
suppression argument because it is biased against him, in the
interest of protecting NAU and government entities from
embarrassment. However, the state court addressed this
argument, explaining that while Dixon’s “favored legal
theory” was “highly improbable,” this was not “dispositive
of the issue before this Court,” which was whether Dixon
was competent to be executed.
Dixon cites no clearly established federal law suggesting
that having long-shot legal theories or viewing the legal
system as biased in favor of law enforcement, or even

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corrupt, is coextensive with the finding that Ford and Panetti
require. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 729 (“[D]elusions come
in many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere with the
understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires.”). We
therefore cannot conclude that the state court’s decision was
an unreasonable application of Panetti. That is particularly
so when we have already rejected a substantially similar
argument: that Dixon’s insistence on the DNA suppression
theory demonstrated his incompetence at trial. Dixon raised
this argument in his federal habeas proceedings, and it failed.
See Dixon, 932 F.3d at 803 (“As to Dixon’s continued
interest in the DNA suppression issue . . . Dixon’s interest in
the issue was not so bizarre or obscure as to suggest that
Dixon lacked competence.”); see also Dixon, 2016 WL
1045355, at *9 (“‘Criminal defendants often insist on
asserting defenses with little basis in the law, particularly
where, as here, there is substantial evidence of their guilt,’
but ‘adherence to bizarre legal theories’ does not imply
incompetence.” (quoting United States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d
653, 660 (7th Cir. 2014))).
For these reasons, Dixon has not demonstrated that
“there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
B
We also reject Dixon’s argument that the state court’s
decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
First, Dixon argues that Dr. Vega’s testimony and
assessment of Dixon were erroneous in several respects. He
maintains that because Dr. Vega opined that Dixon does not
suffer from paranoid schizophrenia when the state court
concluded that he does, Dr. Vega was therefore incapable of

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DIXON V . SHINN 13
assessing whether Dixon could understand the State’s
reasons for his execution. In Dixon’s view, only
Dr. Amezcua-Patiño’s testimony was valid, and because it
was allegedly uncontested, the state court unreasonably
failed to adopt Dr. Amezcua-Patiño’s conclusions.
The state court concluded that Dixon had not shown he
was incompetent to be executed. And Dixon has not
demonstrated that the state court’s use of Dr. Vega’s
observations reflects an unreasonable determination of the
facts. Both Dr. Vega and Dr. Amezcua-Patiño agreed that
paranoid schizophrenia, or delusional thoughts alone, would
not be dispositive of Dixon’s competency claim. It was not
unreasonable for the state court to agree with Dr. Amezcua-
Patiño that Dixon suffered from schizophrenia and
delusions, but to also find that Dixon was rationally capable
of understanding the State’s reason for his execution. Dixon
has not demonstrated how the state court made incompatible
findings on this score. Cf. Otte v. Houk, 654 F.3d 594, 606
(6th Cir. 2011) (holding that a state court’s determination
was not objectively unreasonable because “the state court’s
decision to credit one expert over another is entitled to great
deference,” and the petitioner had “offered little more than
competing testimony” to show that the State’s expert’s
opinions were unsound).
Dixon points to other alleged shortcomings in Dr. Vega’s
opinion and analysis, but these do not render the state court’s
factual findings unreasonable. For example, Dixon takes
issue with the length of Dr. Vega’s interview of him, the fact
that it was conducted by video, that Dr. Vega did not retain
an audio recording of the interview after he had prepared and
submitted his report, that Dr. Vega did not directly ask him
about his understanding of why he was to be executed, and
that Dr. Vega discounted the value of Dixon’s

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14 DIXON V . SHINN
neuropsychological test results. But none of these points,
singularly or in combination, made it unreasonable for the
state court to credit Dr. Vega’s observations and conclude
that Dixon is competent to be executed based on the entirety
of the evidence. That is particularly so under AEDPA’s
“highly deferential” standard of review, which “demands
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico, 559 U.S. at 773 (first quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333
n.7; then quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24
(2002) (per curiam)).
Second, Dixon objects to the state court’s discussion of
his high-average intelligence and his coherent and organized
writings. Dixon argues that intelligence does not reduce the
effects of serious psychotic illnesses or relieve paranoid
schizophrenics from hallucinations, including in cases like
his. As evidence of his delusional beliefs, Dixon principally
points to two handwritten letters he addressed to the Arizona
Judicial Commission in April 2022, demanding the
disbarment of the members of the Arizona Supreme Court.
The state court’s reliance on Dixon’s writings and his
intelligence level was not objectively unreasonable. Dixon
points to no authority demonstrating that these were
improper considerations in assessing Dixon’s competency to
be executed. And the state court expressly recognized that
Dixon’s intelligence and coherent writings also did not
“preclude” a finding of incompetence.
Third, Dixon challenges the state court’s reliance on his
statement to Dr. Vega that he would likely feel “relief” if he
regained his memory of the murder. Specifically, Dr. Vega
stated: “[W]hen Clarence was asked, hypothetically, how he
would feel if he were to suddenly have a memory of having
killed her,” “he replied that if he were to recall having
murdered that girl, he would have a sense of relief on his

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DIXON V . SHINN 15
way to his execution.” Dixon argues that this statement is
irrelevant to whether he rationally understands the State’s
reasons for his execution. Dixon also questions the
reliability of Dr. Vega’s recitation of the statement.
Dixon does not directly argue that he did not make the
challenged statement to Dr. Vega in their interview, and the
state court could thus reasonably conclude that Dixon had
made the statement as reproduced in Dr. Vega’s report and
referenced in his later testimony. The state court could also
reasonably rely on the statement as evidence that Dixon is
capable of rationally understanding the reason for his
execution. Cf. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 731 (“[U]nder Ford
and Panetti, the Eighth Amendment may permit executing
[petitioner] even if he cannot remember committing his
crime.”).
As stated above, the ultimate question is “whether
[Dixon] can rationally understand the reasons for his death
sentence.” Id. at 728. The state court’s conclusion that
Dixon does have this understanding was not based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed, and Dixon’s motion for a stay of execution,
Dkt. No. 9, is denied.
AFFIRMED; Motion for Stay of Execution DENIED.

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