John Capriole , Martin El Koussa v. Uber Technologies , Inc.; Dara Khosrowshahi

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J OHN CAPRIOLE , M ARTIN EL
KOUSSA , and VLADIMIR LEONIDAS ,
Individually and On Behalf of Others
Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES , I NC.; DARA
KHOSROWSHAHI ,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16030
D.C. No.
3:20-cv-02211-
EMC
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 16, 2020
San Francisco, California
Filed August 2, 2021
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Jacqueline H. Nguyen,
Circuit Judges, and Richard K. Eaton,* Judge.
Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
* Richard K. Eaton, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 34 --

2 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
SUMMARY**
Federal Arbitration Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s order compelling
arbitration in a putative class action requesting a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Uber from classifying drivers in
Massachusetts as independent contractors and an order
directing Uber to classify its drivers as employees and
comply with Massachusetts wage laws.
Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents who have worked as
Uber drivers since at least May 2016, filed a putative class
action in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
on behalf of all “individuals who have worked as Uber
drivers in Massachusetts who have not released all of their
claims against Uber.” When they signed up to become Uber
drivers, Plaintiffs agreed to Uber’s 2015 Technology
Services Agreement, which advised Plaintiffs of a
mandatory arbitration agreement (“Arbitration Provision”),
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
Uber moved to compel arbitration, stay proceedings
pending arbitration, and transfer the case to the District
Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to a
forum selection clause in Uber’s driver agreements. The
Massachusetts district court granted Uber’s motion to
transfer the action to the California district court, including
the pending Emergency Motion and Motion to Compel
Arbitration. The California district court denied Plaintiffs’
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

-- 2 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 3
request for a preliminary injunction and granted Uber’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Plaintiffs asserted that they are exempt from mandatory
arbitration under Section 1 of the FAA because they are a
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
The panel disagreed. Rather, the panel joined the growing
majority of courts holding that Uber drivers as a class of
workers do not fall within the interstate commerce
exemption from the FAA.
Section 1 of the Act exempts from its coverage contracts
of employment of three categories of workers: seamen,
railroad employees, and a residual category comprising any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce. The panel noted that the Supreme Court has
instructed that this last residual category must be afforded a
narrow construction to further the FAA’s purpose to
overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.
The panel first held that in light of the text of the FAA
and Supreme Court precedent, the relevant class of workers
here, Uber drivers, needed to be assessed at the nationwide
level, rather than confined to any limited geographic region.
Limiting the relevant class of workers to a specific
geographic area would undermine the very purpose of the
FAA, by which Congress sought to create a national policy
favoring arbitration.
The panel concluded that Uber drivers, as a nationwide
class of workers, are not engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce and are therefore not exempt from arbitration
under the FAA. Here, the district court’s unchallenged
factual findings compelled the conclusion that Uber’s
service was primarily local and intrastate in nature. Only

-- 3 of 34 --

4 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
2.5% of all trips fulfilled using the Uber Rides marketplace
in the United States between 2015 and 2019 started and
ended in different states. Moreover, only 10.1% of all trips
taken in the United States in 2019 began or ended at an
airport, not all of which involved interstate travel. Plaintiffs
did not (and likely could not) point to any evidence that Uber
drivers were sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce to
fall under the Section 1 exemption.
The panel next concluded that the district court properly
addressed the motion to compel arbitration prior to
adjudicating Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion.
Because Plaintiffs’ claims and requested injunctive relief
were arbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement and
Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief would have upended
the status quo rather than maintained it, the panel determined
that the district court properly addressed the motion to
compel arbitration first.
The panel further held that the district court properly
concluded that the proposed injunction against Uber’s
current driver classification as independent contractors was
not one for public injunctive relief. Plaintiffs argued that a
claim for public injunctive relief could not be waived
contractually under Massachusetts law. The panel held that
even assuming class-wide public injunctive relief, as
conceptualized in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85
(Cal. 2017), were available under Massachusetts law and
that such relief could not be contractually waived, the
requested injunctive relief here could not be remotely
characterized as public injunctive relief as this court or any
other court has recognized it.
Because the panel agreed with the district court that
Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief did not constitute

-- 4 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 5
public injunctive relief, the panel also agreed that Plaintiffs
could not evade the Class Action Waiver in Uber’s
Arbitration Provision, even assuming Massachusetts law
provided for such non-waivable relief. Likewise, because
Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief regarding their
classification was properly a matter for the arbitrator, the
district court did not err by declining to reach the merits of
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction under Winter
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008).
COUNSEL
Shannon Liss-Riordan (argued), Lichten & Liss-Riordan
PC, Boston, Massachusetts, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Theane Evangelis (argued), Blaine H. Evanson, Heather
Richardson, and Samuel Eckman, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.
Rohit K. Singla and Dane P. Shikman, Munger Tolles &
Olson LLP, San Francisco, California; Jeffrey Y. Wu,
Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California;
Elaine J. Goldenberg, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP,
Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Lyft, Inc.
Kevin Ruf, Glancy Prongay & Murray, Los Angeles,
California; Reynaldo Fuentes, Partnership for Working
Families, Oakland, California; for Amici Curiae Boston
Independent Drivers Guild, Gig Workers Rising, Mobile
Workers Alliance, Rideshare Drivers United, and We Drive
Progress.

-- 5 of 34 --

6 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
Few technological advances have transformed the global
economy as the internet. This technological revolution has
left an indelible mark on the modern workplace. We live
and work in the wake of this dramatic, digital upheaval, and
its transformative power continues to shape the very nature
of work itself, likely in ways which we cannot yet perceive.
In less than three decades, companies like Amazon,
DoorDash, Google (Alphabet), and Uber, among others,
have transformed from nothing more than an entrepreneurial
vision into fixtures of the modern economy, becoming
household names along the way.
As these new industries have grown, their workforce has
ballooned into the millions in America alone, generating
countless opportunities and vast fortunes but also raising
new questions of law. With transactions taking place at the
speed of light, the once slow-rolling tides of supply and
demand now change within minutes or even seconds,
leading many of these companies to prize flexibility in their
workforce and incentivize part-time work. This reality has
also led to a Dickensian tale of two workforces. On one side
of the divide are those involved in the design and high-level
operation of a company’s platform, who are almost always
deemed “employees,” entitling them to certain protections
and benefits but at the cost of greater employer control over
their activities. On the other side is a much larger bloc
consisting of those who frequently directly transport goods
or passengers, the so-called “gig-economy workers,” most if
not all of whom are classified as “independent contractors,”
a status conferring flexibility but little security.

-- 6 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 7
As a result, the digital economy has begun to collide with
laws designed for the analog age, raising important questions
in the process about the relationship between these gig-
economy companies and their workers. That said, the
tradeoff between flexibility and security is not always so
easily resolved. Disputes are inevitable given the
differences between employees and independent
contractors, and many gig-economy workers have
unsurprisingly attempted to legally challenge their current
classification.
We must now decide who will decide those disputes for
Uber drivers whose contracts with Uber contain mandatory
arbitration provisions. Answering this question requires us
to first determine whether Uber drivers fall within the so-
called “interstate commerce” exemption to mandatory
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. We conclude that they do not. Because
we also conclude that the injunctive relief they requested,
reclassification of their status from “independent
contractors” to “employees,” is not public injunctive relief
that may have allowed them to avoid arbitration, we affirm
the district court’s order compelling arbitration.
I.
Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) develops app-based
platforms to connect “drivers,” individuals who provide
transportation services, with “riders,” those in need of
transportation services. John Capriole, Martin El Koussa,
and Vladimir Leonidas (“Plaintiffs”) are Massachusetts
residents who have worked as Uber drivers since at least
May 2016.
Uber classifies all of its Massachusetts drivers, including
Plaintiffs, as independent contractors, not employees, under

-- 7 of 34 --

8 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
state law. As independent contractors, the drivers are
required to pay business expenses (such as the cost of
maintaining their vehicles, gas, insurance, phone and data
expenses, as well as other costs), they have no guaranteed
minimum wage or overtime premiums, and they do not
accrue paid sick leave, as would be required by
Massachusetts law.
When they signed up to become Uber drivers, Plaintiffs
agreed to Uber’s 2015 Technology Services Agreement (the
“Agreement”). The Agreement’s first page advised
Plaintiffs of the mandatory arbitration agreement
(“Arbitration Provision”), and the Agreement explicitly
specifies that the Arbitration Provision is governed by the
FAA.1 The Arbitration Provision provides, in relevant part,
that all disputes between Uber and its drivers are to be
resolved through binding and final arbitration pursuant to the
terms of the agreement. The Arbitration Provision also
contains a “Class Action Waiver,” providing that Uber and
the signatory “agree to resolve any dispute that is in
arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class,
collective action, or representative basis” and that the
“Arbitrator shall have no authority to consider or resolve any
claim or issue any relief on a class, collective, or
representative basis.” However, any disputes about the
“enforceability, revocability or validity” of the Class Action
1 The parties do not dispute that the FAA governs the Agreement.
But we note that the Arbitration Provision’s statement that it “evidences
a transaction involving interstate commerce” merely establishes that the
contracts between Uber and its drivers sufficiently affect commerce to
fall under the FAA’s purview. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding that the FAA only requires
that a transaction “in fact” involve interstate commerce). It is not a
concession that the work a driver will perform “involv[es] interstate
commerce.”

-- 8 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 9
Waiver are to be resolved only by courts, and not by an
arbitrator. The Agreement also expressly permits any driver
who does not wish to be subject to mandatory arbitration to
opt out (by mail or email) within 30 days of agreeing to the
Arbitration Provision, and provides instructions on how to
do so.
Plaintiffs each agreed to the Arbitration Provision in the
2015 Agreement, and none of them opted out. In January
2020, Uber implemented a new Platform Access Agreement,
which contained a materially identical arbitration provision.
All Plaintiffs again agreed to the new provision, but this time
Capriole chose to opt out within 30 days.2
In September 2019, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts on
behalf of all “individuals who have worked as Uber drivers
in Massachusetts who have not released all of their claims
against Uber.” Plaintiffs simultaneously requested a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Uber from “classifying its
drivers in Massachusetts as ‘independent contractors’” and
an order directing “Uber to classify its drivers as employees
and comply with Massachusetts wage laws.” Plaintiffs
claimed Massachusetts Uber drivers are properly considered
employees under the state’s test for determining whether a
2 The district court correctly found that Capriole remains bound by
the 2015 Agreement and its arbitration provisions because of express
language in the 2020 agreement providing that any opt-out would not
affect pre-existing agreements to arbitration, including the 2015
Agreement.

-- 9 of 34 --

10 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
worker is an employee or independent contractor. See Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B.3
Plaintiffs claimed that as a result of this
misclassification, Uber violated state wage and hour law
when it “required drivers to pay business expenses,” see
Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 148, 149, 150, “failed to guarantee and
pay its drivers minimum wage for all hours worked,” see id.
ch. 151, § 1, and “failed to pay overtime premiums for hours
worked in excess of eight hours per day or forty hours per
week,” see id. ch. 151, § 1A.
When the COVID-19 pandemic struck, Plaintiffs added
new claims for paid sick leave under the Massachusetts
3 Commonly referred to as the “ABC” test, owed to the frequent
reference to its three prongs as “A, B, C,” the Massachusetts statute reads
as follows:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter and chapter 151, an
individual performing any service, except as
authorized under this chapter, shall be considered to be
an employee under those chapters unless:—
(1) the individual is free from control and
direction in connection with the performance of
the service, both under his contract for the
performance of service and in fact; and
(2) the service is performed outside the usual
course of the business of the employer; and,
(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation,
profession or business of the same nature as that
involved in the service performed.
M ASS . G EN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B.

-- 10 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 11
Earned Sick Time Law.4 Specifically, Massachusetts
requires larger employers to provide “a minimum of one
hour of earned sick time for every thirty hours worked by an
employee.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148C(d)(1).
Massachusetts employees may accrue and use up to five
days (40 hours) of paid sick leave per calendar year. Id.
§ 148C(d)(4). Pursuant to Massachusetts’ COVID-19 Order
No. 13, Uber and other rideshare drivers are considered
“essential workforce” in Massachusetts, so they were not
subject to any shutdown orders and could continue working
throughout the pandemic. Because they are essential
workers, Plaintiffs argued that Uber’s alleged
misclassification of them as independent contractors
“creat[es] an immediate danger, not only to Uber drivers, but
to the general public as well.” Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged
Uber’s failure to provide paid sick leave forced drivers to
drive, even if they had experienced COVID-19 symptoms
and risked infecting their passengers, because the drivers
“need[ed] to continue working in order to support
themselves.”5
Separately, Uber moved to compel arbitration, stay
proceedings pending arbitration, and transfer the case to the
4 Although Plaintiffs’ briefs largely focus on paid sick leave,
Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief remains broad and would have the
court reclassify all drivers as employees for all purposes, not just paid
sick leave, unlike many other rideshare driver suits that have sought
emergency injunctive relief for reclassification only for the purpose of
paid sick leave. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-11974-
IT, 2020 WL 2616302, at *5 (D. Mass. May 22, 2020).
5 Massachusetts recently lifted most of its remaining COVID-19
restrictions given declining case counts, allowing all businesses to
reopen at full capacity. See Reopening Massachusetts: All Remaining
COVID Restrictions Lifted, CBSBoston (May 29, 2021),
tinyurl.com/4pah9e7b (last accessed June 30, 2021).

-- 11 of 34 --

12 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
District Court for the Northern District of California
pursuant to a forum selection clause in Uber’s driver
agreements. On March 20, 2020, the Massachusetts district
court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction,
see Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-11941-IT,
2020 WL 1323076, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2020), but, just
three days later, Plaintiffs filed a new Emergency Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction (the “Emergency Motion”).
Shortly thereafter, the Massachusetts district court granted
Uber’s motion to transfer the action to the California district
court, including the pending Emergency Motion and Motion
to Compel Arbitration.6 By this point, Plaintiffs had
amended their complaint to add new claims regarding paid
sick leave, additional named plaintiffs, and the allegation
that “Capriole has driven passengers across state lines while
driving for Uber.” The California district court denied
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted
Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. Plaintiffs timely
appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because
Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment. A “district court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration is
reviewed de novo,” Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Bos.,
6 Despite the transfer, Plaintiffs appealed the Massachusetts district
court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to the First
Circuit. However, in light of the transfer and the California court’s
subsequent order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case, the
First Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal as moot. See Capriole v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 991 F.3d 339, 344 (1st Cir. 2021) (“The final judgment in
California means that the arbitrator, not us or another court, is to decide
any claim for relief in this case unless and only if the Ninth Circuit
reverses.”).

-- 12 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 13
360 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004), but “[t]he factual
findings underlying the district court’s decision are reviewed
for clear error,” Bradley v. Harris Rsch., Inc., 275 F.3d 884,
888 (9th Cir. 2001). We also review the district court’s
denial of a preliminary injunction “for [an] abuse of
discretion,” which “will be found if the district court based
its decision ‘on an erroneous legal standard or clearly
erroneous finding of fact.’” All. for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lands
Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc)).
III.
A.
We begin with the primary question on appeal, whether
Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to mandatory arbitration.
Plaintiffs assert that they are exempt from mandatory
arbitration under Section 1 of the FAA because they are a
“class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. We disagree. Rather, we join the
growing majority of courts holding that Uber drivers as a
class of workers do not fall within the “interstate commerce”
exemption from the FAA. See Osvatics v. Lyft, Inc., No. 20-
cv-1426 (KBJ), 2021 WL 1601114, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 22,
2021) (collecting cases).7
7 We address only whether Uber drivers, as a class of workers, are
“engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and are therefore exempt
from the FAA. We are not presented with the question of whether drivers
for app-based food delivery services or other local courier services fall
under the interstate commerce exemption, but our precedent, along with
that of at least one other circuit, suggests that such workers similarly do
not fall under the exemption. See Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

-- 13 of 34 --

14 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
While Massachusetts law forms the substantive basis for
Plaintiffs’ claims, their disputes regarding Uber’s
Arbitration Provision are governed by the FAA, which
“places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
contracts, requiring courts to enforce them according to their
terms.” In re Grice, 974 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2020). But
Section 1 of the Act “exempts from its coverage ‘contracts
of employment’ of three categories of workers: ‘seamen,’
‘railroad employees,’ and a residual category comprising
‘any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.’” Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1). We have described
this last category as the “residual clause.” Id. at 955. The
Supreme Court has instructed that the residual clause must
“be afforded a narrow construction” to further the FAA’s
purpose “to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 118 (2001) (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272–73).
In affording such a narrow construction, the Court cautioned
that “[t]he plain meaning of the words ‘engaged in
commerce’” in Section 1 “is narrower than the more open-
ended formulations ‘affecting commerce’ and ‘involving
commerce.’” Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)).
When deciding whether the exemption applies, “the
critical factor [is] not the nature of the item transported in
interstate commerce (person or good) or whether the
plaintiffs themselves crossed state lines, but rather ‘[t]he
nature of the business for which a class of workers
perform[ed] their activities.’” Grice, 974 F.3d at 956
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Waithaka
971 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1374 (2021);
Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir.
2020).

-- 14 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 15
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2020)); see
also Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800 (“[T]he question is ‘not
whether the individual worker actually engaged in interstate
commerce, but whether the class of workers to which the
complaining worker belonged engaged in interstate
commerce.’” (quoting Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988)). We have applied this
clause to “the contracts of employees who actually transport
people or goods in interstate commerce.” Craft v. Campbell
Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Circuit
City, 532 U.S. at 121. In sum, the analysis focuses on the
inherent nature of the work performed and whether the
nature of the work primarily implicates inter- or intrastate
commerce.
1. The Scope of the “Class of Workers” at Issue
However, before we can determine whether Uber drivers
are engaged in interstate commerce as a class, we must first
define the scope of the relevant “class of workers.” Plaintiffs
only purport to represent a putative statewide
(Massachusetts) class of Uber drivers. On the occasions in
which we have previously analyzed whether a category of
workers falls within the exemption, we have been confronted
only with a putative nationwide class of workers. See, e.g.,
Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 908. Accordingly, we have had the
opportunity to consider classes of workers only at the
nationwide level. In light of the text of the FAA and
Supreme Court precedent, we see no reason for our analysis
to change, where, as here, we face only a putative statewide
class. We therefore conclude that we must assess the
relevant “class of workers” here, Uber drivers, at the
nationwide level, rather than confine it to any limited
geographic region.

-- 15 of 34 --

16 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court instructed that the
residual category of “any other class of workers” under
Section 1 of the FAA is “controlled and defined by reference
to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited
just before it,” i.e., “seamen” and “railroad employees.”
532 U.S. at 115. As those terms contain “no geographic
limitations,” “the most natural inference is that Congress
intended those terms to encompass all seamen and railroad
employees nationwide.” Osvatics, 2021 WL 1601114,
at *10. Giving the same construction to the “other class of
workers” referenced in Section 1, this category of workers
must similarly be assessed at a nationwide level, rather than
any narrow, geographic region.
Indeed, if we were to limit the relevant class of workers
to a specific geographic area, we would undermine the very
purpose of the FAA, by which Congress sought to create a
“national policy favoring arbitration.” Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)
(emphasis added). We therefore agree with the district court
in Osvatics that it “seems unlikely that Congress would have
wanted the applicability of the section 1 exemption—and
thus the enforceability of a given arbitration agreement—to
vary by geographical region.” 2021 WL 1601114, at *11.
Such a logical underpinning is likely why all courts
addressing this question, even those that have ultimately
concluded that Uber drivers do fall within the interstate
commerce exemption, have rejected attempts to cabin their
analyses to a specific geographic area. See Osvatics, 2021
WL 1601114, at *10 (collecting cases).
Any alternative approach would potentially produce
absurd results whereby the FAA would apply differently to
neighboring states, or even neighboring cities in the same
state. It would also introduce uncertainty into labor and

-- 16 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 17
employment contracts across the country by sowing doubt as
to the enforceability of any arbitration agreement depending
on where a particular lawsuit was filed or the scope of any
putative class. Such an approach would “undermine[] both
the certainty and predictability which arbitration agreements
are meant to foster.” Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance
Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 631 (1985) (counseling courts to avoid inviting
“unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties
to secure tactical litigation advantages” that would “damage
the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil
the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements” (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974))).
2. Whether Uber Drivers Are Engaged in Foreign or
Interstate Commerce
We conclude that Uber drivers, as a nationwide “class of
workers,” are not “engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce” and are therefore not exempt from arbitration
under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs’ argument to the
contrary is premised on the fact that Uber drivers sometimes
cross state lines or pick up and drop off passengers at airports
who are heading to (or returning from) interstate travel.
Although it arose in the “highly deferential” context of a
mandamus petition, our decision in Grice is instructive and
its reasoning persuasive. 974 F.3d at 954. In Grice, we held
a district court’s conclusion that “rideshare drivers who pick
up and drop off passengers at airports do not fall within this
residual category” was not “clearly erroneous as a matter of
law.” Id. (quoting Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650,
654–55 (9th Cir. 1977)).

-- 17 of 34 --

18 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
In so concluding, we based much of our reasoning on
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., an antitrust case in which
the Supreme Court held that the transportation of interstate
rail passengers and their luggage between rail stations in
Chicago to facilitate their travel is part of “the stream of
interstate commerce.” 332 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1947),
overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep.
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). Important to the Supreme
Court’s conclusion was that the passengers contracted
directly with the railroad for this “between-station
transportation in Chicago” that was exclusively provided by
a single company, itself contracting directly with the
railroad. Id. at 228–29. Thus, because the alleged restraint
of trade sought to “eliminate competition . . . for supplying
transportation for this transfer in the midst of interstate
journeys,” the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had
plausibly alleged an unlawful restraint of interstate
commerce under the Sherman Act. Id. at 229.
By contrast, addressing a related antitrust challenge
against local taxicab operators in Chicago, the Supreme
Court also held that “when local taxicabs merely convey
interstate train passengers between their homes and the
railroad station in the normal course of their independent
local service, that service is not an integral part of interstate
transportation.” Id. at 233. The Supreme Court also noted
that none of the cab companies “serve[d] only railroad
passengers, all of them being required to serve ‘every
person’ within the limits of Chicago.” Id. at 231. The
companies had “no contractual or other arrangement with the
interstate railroads.” Id. “Nor [were] their fares paid or
collected as part of the railroad fares,” and “in short, their
relationship to interstate transit [was] only casual and
incidental.” Id. Because the plaintiffs in Yellow Cab failed
to show how “local taxicab service” was “an integral part of

-- 18 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 19
interstate transportation,” the Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the
Sherman Act. Id. at 233.
We think rideshare drivers are less like the exclusive
provider of “between-station transportation” described in
Yellow Cab and more like a “local taxicab service.” Id.
at 228, 233. Therefore, Uber drivers, as a class, “are not
engaged in interstate commerce” because their work
“predominantly entails intrastate trips,” even though some
Uber drivers undoubtedly cross state lines in the course of
their work and rideshare companies do contract with airports
“to allow Uber drivers . . . to pick up arriving passengers.”
Grice, 974 F.3d at 956–58 (quoting Rogers v. Lyft, Inc.,
452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2020)); see also
Aleksanian v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 1:19-cv-10308 (ALC),
2021 WL 860127, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (“[J]ust
because Uber is set up to handle the occasional interstate trip
does not mean that ‘interstate [commerce] is a central part of
the job description of the class of workers to which
[Plaintiffs] belong.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting
Wallace, 970 F.3d at 803)).
The Third Circuit’s decision in Singh v. Uber
Technologies Inc., cited by Plaintiffs, is not inapposite. 939
F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019). In Singh, the Third Circuit held that
Uber or other rideshare drivers could fall under the FAA’s
interstate commerce exemption but did not hold that
rideshare drivers categorically fall within the exemption. Id.
at 227. Rather, in Singh, the Third Circuit vacated the
district court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded
the case for discovery on “whether Singh belongs to a class
of transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce,”
based on Singh’s affidavit that “he frequently transported
passengers on the highway across state lines, between New

-- 19 of 34 --

20 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
York and New Jersey.” Id. at 226–27. The Third Circuit
directed the district court to examine “the contents of the
parties’ agreement(s), information regarding the industry in
which the class of workers is engaged, information regarding
the work performed by those workers, and various texts—
i.e., other laws, dictionaries, and documents—that discuss
the parties and the work.” Id. at 227–28. Thus, Singh stands
only for the proposition that any interstate commerce
exemption inquiry must focus on the district court’s factual
findings regarding the extent of interstate work. Id.
Here, the district court’s unchallenged factual findings
compel the conclusion that Uber’s service is primarily local
and intrastate in nature. Only 2.5% of “all trips fulfilled
using the Uber Rides marketplace in the United States
between 2015 and 2019 . . . started and ended in different
states.” Moreover, “only 10.1% of all trips taken in the
United States in 2019 began or ended at an airport,” not all
of which involved interstate travel. For example, some trips
to and from the airport are taken by airport employees and
passengers traveling solely on intrastate flights. Overall,
interstate trips, even when combined with trips to the airport,
represent a very small percentage of Uber rides, and only
occasionally implicate interstate commerce. Furthermore,
the record demonstrates that even Uber trips “that started and
ended in different states” are inherently local in nature as
“the average distance was approximately 13.5 miles and the
average duration was approximately 30.0 minutes.” Even
these statistics are likely influenced by the fact that many
interstate trips are performed by drivers (or for riders) who
live close to state borders, especially on the East Coast. For
this reason, we agree with the district court in Rogers v. Lyft
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904 (N.D. Cal. 2020), that “[i]nterstate
trips that occur by happenstance of geography do not alter

-- 20 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 21
the intrastate transportation function performed by the class
of workers.” Id. at 916.
Given this background, Uber drivers, even when
crossing state lines or transporting passengers to airports, are
“merely convey[ing] interstate . . . passengers between their
homes and [their destination] in the normal course of their
independent local service.” Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 233;
see also Rogers, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (“[Uber] is in the
general business of giving people rides, not the particular
business of offering interstate transportation to
passengers.”). Thus, interstate movement cannot be said to
be a “central part of the class members’ job description.”
Wallace, 970 F.3d at 801. As almost any user of Uber’s
product would attest, Uber trips are often short and local, and
they only infrequently involve either crossing state lines or a
trip to a transportation hub, as the evidence demonstrates.
And “someone whose occupation is not defined by its
engagement in interstate commerce does not qualify for the
exemption just because she occasionally performs that kind
of work.” Id. at 800 (citing Hill v. Rent-A-Ctr., 398 F.3d
1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005)). As we have said, “‘the
residual exemption is . . . about what the worker does,’ not
just ‘where the goods [or people] have been.’” Grice,
974 F.3d at 958 (omission and alteration in original)
(quoting Wallace, 970 F.3d at 802). By contrast, for the
other enumerated categories of workers in Section 1, seamen
and railroad workers, the interstate movement of goods and
passengers over long distances and across national or state
lines is an indelible and “central part of the job description.”
Wallace, 970 F.3d at 803.
Indeed, Plaintiffs do not (and likely cannot) point to any
evidence that Uber drivers are sufficiently “engaged in
interstate commerce” to fall under the Section 1 exemption.

-- 21 of 34 --

22 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
Grice, 974 F.3d at 958. Plaintiffs point to (for the first time
on appeal) several advertisements as to partnership
agreements from 2016 and 2017 between Uber and certain
airlines. The first is a March 2017 press release from an
Indian airline, Jet Airways, purportedly demonstrating that
Jet Airways passengers are able to use the airline’s app to
request an Uber when booking their flight. The second is an
offer from American Airlines for a free $20 Uber ride credit
for select passengers. But nothing about the submitted
materials indicates the type of commercial relationship
described in Yellow Cab that would implicate interstate
commerce. Plaintiffs did not rely on this evidence below,
and so we do not have any record (or even allegation) that
Uber’s fares were “paid or collected as part of the [airline’s]
fares.” Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 231. As we noted in Grice,
“[a]lthough Uber entered into agreements with the . . .
airports to allow Uber drivers like [Plaintiffs] to pick up
arriving passengers, [Plaintiffs] do[] not contend that [their]
passengers contracted with the airlines to hire [them].”
Grice, 974 F.3d at 958.
However, even with this material, there is no evidence
that Uber exclusively contracted with airlines such that its
drivers would “serve[] only [airport] passengers” or
otherwise participate in a single, unbroken stream of
interstate commerce. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 231; see also
Rogers, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (contrasting the unaffiliated
nature of rideshare trips to “people who drive for an airport
shuttle service” who “might constitute a class of
transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce” by
means of “the interstate character of that nominally intrastate
activity”). Indeed, without any affiliation with the airlines
or other contractual arrangement, Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated the “practical, economic continuity” required
to establish that they are engaged in interstate commerce.

-- 22 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 23
Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 195; see also Osvatics, 2021 WL
1601114, at *15 (“[T]here must be an established link
between such intrastate rideshare trips and the channels of
commerce that are designed to facilitate passengers’
interstate journeys.”).
For these same reasons, we find the analysis of the
minority of district courts that have found to the contrary
unpersuasive. They assign too much weight to the fact that
rideshare drivers occasionally perform interstate trips or
trips to transportation hubs. Moreover, they do not consider
whether the trips form part of a single, unbroken stream of
interstate commerce that renders interstate travel a “central
part” of a rideshare driver’s job description. See, e.g., Islam
v. Lyft, Inc., No. 20-cv-3004 (RA), 2021 WL 871417, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2021) (suggesting that “a class of
transportation workers” that only “perform more than a de
minimis amount of interstate transportation” may be “found
to be ‘engaged in . . . interstate commerce’” (omission in
original)); Haider v. Lyft, Inc., No. 20-cv-2997 (AJN), 2021
WL 1226442, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (focusing
largely on the aggregate “sheer number of interstate trips
rideshare drivers make” across the country while
inexplicably limiting the analysis to “full-time” drivers);
Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc.¸ 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D. Mass.
2020) (focusing only on the “continuity of movement” of
rideshare trips to and from the airport as part of a broader,
interstate trip to conclude that Lyft drivers are engaged in
interstate commerce).8
8 The district court in Cunningham relied on a misinterpretation of
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943). In fact, all
Walling suggests is that an “interstate journey is not ended by reason of
a temporary holding of the goods [shipped across state lines] at [a]

-- 23 of 34 --

24 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
Our conclusion also comports with our recent decision
in Rittmann. There, we joined the First Circuit and held that
Amazon Flex (“AmFlex”) workers did fall under the
interstate commerce exemption due to the interstate nature
of Amazon’s business. Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 917–18. We
reasoned that “AmFlex workers complete the delivery of
goods that Amazon ships across state lines and for which
Amazon hires AmFlex workers to complete the delivery” as
the last leg of a single, unbroken stream of interstate
commerce coordinated by Amazon from origin to
destination. Id. at 917. In Waithaka, in which the First
Circuit articulated the approach we adopted in Rittman,
Amazon “never contested that products . . . AmFlex workers
deliver cross state lines to reach their final destinations.”
966 F.3d at 26 n.11. By contrast, Uber stalwartly objects to
any notion that interstate transportation is intrinsic to its
service, and Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence
undermining Uber’s position. Moreover, even when
warehouse” before subsequent shipment to customers within the same
state as the warehouse. 317 U.S. at 569. Thus, Walling merely held that
an enterprise cannot transform interstate transactions into intrastate
trade, thereby avoiding laws applicable to interstate commerce, merely
by means of a brief pause at a same-state warehouse before shipping
them on. It does not stand for the establishment of a “practical continuity
of movement” test for interstate commerce. But see Cunningham, 450 F.
Supp. 3d at 46 (characterizing Walling as “holding that goods remain in
interstate commerce where there is a practical continuity of movement”).
Interpreting Walling in this way accords with Yellow Cab because the
wholesale business in Walling appeared to control every leg of the
interstate shipment from origin to destination, and therefore the
temporary warehousing of a shipment merely represents a link in a
single, unbroken chain of interstate commerce, similar to Amazon in
Rittmann. See Walling, 317 U.S. at 569–71; Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 917–
18. Not only did the district court in Cunningham misread Walling, but
it did not discuss or even mention Yellow Cab, the reasoning of which is
indispensable to the outcome of this case.

-- 24 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 25
transporting passengers to and from transportation hubs as
part of a larger foreign or interstate trip, Uber drivers are
unaffiliated, independent participants in the passenger’s
overall trip, rather than an integral part of a single, unbroken
stream of interstate commerce like AmFlex workers. See
Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 917.
B.
Plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s refusal to
adjudicate their preliminary injunction motion before it
granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration. Because
Plaintiffs’ claims and requested injunctive relief are
arbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement and
Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief would have upended
the status quo rather than maintained it, we think that the
district court properly addressed the motion to compel
arbitration first.
As we held in Toyo Tire Holdings of Americas, Inc. v.
Continental Tire North America, Inc., “a district court may
issue interim injunctive relief on arbitrable claims if interim
relief is necessary to preserve the status quo and the
meaningfulness of the arbitration process—provided, of
course, that the requirements for granting injunctive relief
are otherwise satisfied.” 609 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2010).
Because the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs, i.e.,
immediate reclassification as employees, is arbitrable by the
terms of Uber’s Arbitration Provision and those terms limit
the ability of a court to provide interim relief, Toyo controls.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011) (holding that courts “must place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and
enforce them according to their terms” (citation omitted)).

-- 25 of 34 --

26 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
In Toyo, we reversed a district court’s holding that it did
not have “the authority to grant injunctive relief to maintain
the status quo pending arbitration” based on its erroneous
reading of Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th
Cir. 1999). Toyo, 609 F.3d at 979. In both Toyo and Simula,
the parties had agreed to mandatory arbitration subject to the
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC Rules”), Article 23(2) of which allows
parties to petition a court for “interim or conservatory
measures” before the dispute is heard by the arbitrator(s).
Toyo, 609 F.3d at 979 (emphasis omitted); see also Simula,
175 F.3d at 725. Addressing whether Article 23(2) allows a
federal court to provide any injunctive relief, we concluded
in Toyo that “a court may grant interim relief,” but only “to
maintain the status quo while the parties are awaiting the
creation of an arbitration panel and a decision by that panel
with respect to injunctive relief.” 609 F.3d at 980–81.
However, this rule led to different outcomes in Toyo and
Simula based on their respective facts.
Simula involved a suit by a safety technology developer
against an auto parts supplier, alleging that the latter, among
other things, stole the developer’s ideas, violated its
trademark, and unlawfully restrained trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. See 175 F.3d at 719. Under these
circumstances, we affirmed a district court’s denial of
injunctive relief pending commencement of arbitration
proceedings because “the arbitration panel did have power
to afford the interim relief [the plaintiff] sought” and because
“nothing suggested any imminent need for injunctive relief
to maintain the status quo until an arbitration panel could
address [the plaintiff’s] request for interim relief.” Toyo,
609 F.3d at 980 (discussing Simula, 175 F.3d at 719, 725).

-- 26 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 27
By contrast, Toyo involved a rapid breakdown of a tire
manufacturing and distribution partnership where the
defendants controlled the manufacture of the plaintiff’s main
product and outright denied the plaintiff’s right “to purchase
nearly 290,000 tires, or 60% of its North American supply
of TBR tires, after Toyo had purchased tires from [the
manufacturer] for over twenty years.” Id. at 980. Given the
reality that “the selection of arbitrators and the constitution
of the arbitral panel necessarily takes time,” the plaintiff in
Toyo could have “los[t] its customers before interim relief
[from the arbitral panel was] possible,” a result that would
“defeat any ultimate award.” Id. at 981. Thus, we held that
the district court could “issue interim injunctive relief on
arbitrable claims if interim relief is necessary to preserve the
status quo and the meaningfulness of the arbitration
process,” and, in doing so, aligned our court with the
uniform conclusions of our sister circuits. Id. at 981–82
(collecting cases).
Here, the district court correctly refused to resolve
Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief before deciding the
motion to compel arbitration. Language in Uber’s
Arbitration Provision parallels Article 23 of the ICC Rules,
authorizing courts to grant interim relief but strictly limiting
it to measures that preserve the status quo. The Arbitration
Provision provides that “[a] party may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction for temporary or preliminary
injunctive relief in connection with an arbitrable
controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to
which that party may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual
without such provisional relief.” (emphasis added). Thus,
as in Toyo, Uber’s Arbitration Provision covers requests for
emergency relief, and the district court therefore had power
to grant interim, injunctive relief only if “necessary to

-- 27 of 34 --

28 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
preserve the status quo” until the case could be heard by an
arbitrator, emergency or otherwise. 609 F.3d at 981.
This case is more like Simula than Toyo. Here, “the
delay associated with securing an arbitration panel’s ruling
on interim relief” would not “defeat any ultimate award,”
particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiffs seek all benefits
of classification as employees, not just paid sick leave.
Toyo, 609 F.3d at 981. As the district court astutely noted,
an injunction mandating that Uber re-classify all of its
Massachusetts drivers as employees, after years of operating
with drivers classified as independent contractors and with
the magnitudinous attendant changes to their pay and
benefits, would “upend, rather than preserve, the status quo.”
Moreover, it would certainly fail to “preserve the
meaningfulness of the arbitral process.” Toyo, 609 F.3d at
980.
C.
Plaintiffs attempt to elide the FAA’s requirements (and
any order compelling arbitration) by styling their request for
injunctive relief as one for “public injunctive relief,” which
they assert cannot be waived under Massachusetts law, and
thus would preclude arbitration here. However, the district
court properly concluded that the proposed injunction
against Uber’s current driver classification as independent
contractors Plaintiffs sought was not one for “public
injunctive relief.”
Under the FAA, a “written provision in . . . a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA enshrines “a liberal federal policy

-- 28 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 29
favoring arbitration agreements.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983));
accord Blair v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 825 (9th Cir.
2019). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
arbitration agreements may contain waivers of the class
action mechanism and require the parties to pursue their
claims individually. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1619 (“In
the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal
courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms—including terms providing for individualized
proceedings.”). Uber’s 2015 Agreement contains such a
class action waiver, providing that “[t]he Arbitrator shall
have no authority to consider or resolve any claim or issue
any relief on a class, collective, or representative basis.”
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that their request for
preliminary relief classifying them as employees is one for
“public injunctive relief,” which they argue cannot be
waived contractually under Massachusetts law. Plaintiffs’
primary support for this argument is a California Supreme
Court decision, McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85 (Cal.
2017), which held that waiver of public injunctive relief “in
any contract—even a contract that has no arbitration
provision” is “unenforceable under California law.” Id.
at 94. Analyzing three California consumer protection
statutes, the court explained that public injunctive relief is
“injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of
prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the
general public.” Id. at 87 (first citing Cruz v. PacifiCare
Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1164–65 (Cal. 2003); and
then citing Broughton v. Cigna Health. of Cal., 988 P.2d 67,
74 (Cal. 1999)). “Its ‘evident purpose’ . . . is ‘to remedy a
public wrong,’ ‘not to resolve a private dispute,’ and any
benefit to the plaintiff requesting such relief ‘likely . . .

-- 29 of 34 --

30 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
would be incidental to the general public benefit of enjoining
such a practice.’” Id. at 94 (second omission in original)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Broughton, 988 P.2d at
76 & n.5). As such, McGill reasoned, the availability of
class-wide public injunctive relief cannot be waived by a
“predispute arbitration agreement.” Id. at 94. The McGill
court was also careful to note that the three statutes
recognized as containing a public injunction provision—the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), the Unfair
Competition Law, and the False Advertising Law—all
involve protections against misleading and deceptive
practices, where an injunction will provide a meaningful
benefit primarily (and potentially only) to the public
“because the plaintiff has ‘already been injured, allegedly,
by such practices and [is] aware of them.’” Id. at 90
(alteration in original) (quoting Broughton, 988 P.2d at 76
n.5).
Plaintiffs invoke McGill to argue that the injunctive
relief they seek, reclassification as employees on a class-
wide basis, similarly cannot be waived under Uber’s
Arbitration Provision. But their argument is unavailing. To
start, as the Massachusetts district court noted, it is debatable
whether the relevant Massachusetts law, the Wage Act, even
provides for public injunctive relief. See Capriole, 2020 WL
1323076, at *3 (“The [Wage Act] explicitly contemplates
class-wide relief but includes no provisions that allow for
injunction for the public benefit.”). That said, the
Massachusetts Attorney General submitted an amicus brief
in the Massachusetts district court in support of Plaintiffs’
position, arguing that the law under review in McGill—
specifically the CLRA—has parallel language to the Earned
Sick Time Law and thus does provide for public injunctive

-- 30 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 31
relief that cannot be waived.9 And, as Plaintiffs correctly
note, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that
as “the department charged with enforcing the wage and
hour laws,” the Attorney General’s interpretation of those
laws “is entitled to substantial deference, at least where it is
not inconsistent with the plain language of the statutory
provisions.” Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 851 N.E.2d 417,
421 (Mass. 2006).10
However, we need not resolve how the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court would rule on this question because,
even assuming class-wide public injunctive relief, as
conceptualized in McGill, were available under
Massachusetts law and that such relief may not be
contractually waived, Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief
cannot be remotely characterized as “public injunctive
relief” as we have recognized it, or as has any other court for
9 Specifically, the Massachusetts Attorney General noted that the
CLRA authorizes an injured consumer to sue for “[a]n order enjoining
[a company’s unlawful] methods, acts, or practices,” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1780(a)(2), and provides that “[a]ny waiver by a consumer” of the
CLRA’s provisions “is contrary to public policy and shall be
unenforceable and void,” id. § 1751. By comparison, the Massachusetts
Earned Sick Time Law allows an individual to “institute and prosecute
in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others
similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages
incurred . . . and other benefits.” M ASS . G EN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150. The
Massachusetts Misclassification Statute provides that the Massachusetts
Attorney General’s civil and criminal enforcement authority does not
“limit the availability of other remedies at law or in equity.” Id. ch. 149,
§ 148B(e).
10 Adding to the uncertainty of any conclusion about Massachusetts
state law on this question (were we to draw one), the level of deference
owed to the Attorney General’s interpretation is not clear and depends
on the circumstances of a particular case. See ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC
v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 56 N.E.3d 740, 751 (Mass. 2016).

-- 31 of 34 --

32 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
that matter. As we noted in Blair, in which we held
California’s recognition of public injunctive relief was not
preempted by the FAA, “[o]ne key difference between a
private and public injunction is the primary beneficiary of
the relief.” 928 F.3d at 824. On the one hand, “[p]rivate
injunctions ‘resolve a private dispute’ between the parties
and ‘rectify individual wrongs,’ though they may benefit the
general public incidentally.” Id. (quoting McGill, 393 P.3d
at 89). “By contrast, public injunctions benefit ‘the public
directly . . . ,’ but do not otherwise benefit the plaintiff . . . .”
Id. (quoting McGill, 393 P.3d at 90).
Against this standard, the district court correctly
concluded that Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief is not
one for “public injunctive relief.” Here, the relief sought by
Plaintiffs—to “enjoin Uber from misclassifying its drivers
as independent contractors, thus entitling them to the
protections of Massachusetts wage laws, including paid sick
leave”—is overwhelmingly directed at Plaintiffs and other
rideshare drivers, and they would be the “primary
beneficiar[ies]” of access to overtime and minimum wage
laws. Blair, 928 F.3d at 824. The public health implications
of paid sick leave, which would not even begin to accrue for
months, only “benefit the general public incidentally.” Id.11
11 Though it does not affect our analysis, Plaintiffs’ claimed public
health benefits of reclassification are further belied by the declining
incidence and risk of COVID-19—a feat that is in no small part owed to
the herculean efforts of healthcare professionals and America’s
widespread vaccination campaign. Indeed, in Massachusetts,
approximately 63% of the population isnow fully vaccinated, a similar
(and commendable) rate to neighboring states that would presumably
form the destination (or origin) of any interstate trips for Massachusetts
Uber drivers. See How Vaccinations Are Going in Your County and
State, NY Times, tinyurl.com/hxj742e (last accessed and updated June
30, 2021).

-- 32 of 34 --

CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES 33
Such relief plainly does not constitute “public injunctive
relief,” and McGill would therefore not even control if we
were applying California law. Id. Indeed, California state
courts applying McGill have reached the same conclusion
with regard to employment laws, including one decision
directly addressing rideshare drivers. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Lyft, Inc., No. CGC-20-583685, 2020 WL 2532527, at *4
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020) (“The request for injunctive
relief directing Lyft to reclassify its drivers is likewise
directed to Plaintiffs and other Lyft drivers as individuals,
not to the general public . . . . [It] therefore seeks private, not
public, injunctive relief.”); Clifford v. Quest Software Inc.,
251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 278 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that
“public interest and any incidental benefit to the public from
ensuring Quest’s compliance with wage and hour laws d[id]
not transform Clifford’s private UCL injunctive relief claim
into a public one under the definitions of public and private
injunctive relief articulated by our Supreme Court in
Broughton, Cruz, and McGill”), review denied, No. S258542
(Cal. Nov. 13, 2019).
Because we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs’
requested injunctive relief does not constitute “public
injunctive relief,” we also agree that Plaintiffs cannot evade
the Class Action Waiver in Uber’s Arbitration Provision,
even assuming Massachusetts law provided for such non-
waivable relief. Likewise, because Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief regarding their classification was properly a
matter for the arbitrator, the district court did not err by
declining to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction under Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

-- 33 of 34 --

34 CAPRIOLE V . UBER TECHNOLOGIES
IV.
In sum, the district court properly granted Uber’s motion
to compel arbitration. In doing so, it properly addressed
Uber’s motion to compel arbitration prior to addressing
Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a preliminary injunction,
and properly concluded that Uber drivers do not fall within
the interstate commerce exemption to the FAA, and that
Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief—reclassification as
employees—does not constitute “public injunctive relief.”
The parties shall each bear their costs of appeal.
AFFIRMED.

-- 34 of 34 --