HEYLI YOHANA JUAREZ LOPEZ and JAVIER YAFRI JUAREZ LOPEZ v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HEYLI YOHANA JUAREZ LOPEZ and
JAVIER YAFRI JUAREZ LOPEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-47
Agency Nos.
A208-866-848
A208-866-849
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 27, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Heyli Yohana Juarez Lopez and her son, a derivative applicant for relief,
petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing
FILED
MAR 29 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Juarez’s appeal of the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
The BIA’s determination that Juarez did not establish past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground is
supported by substantial evidence. The IJ found that Juarez suffered serious
physical, sexual, and mental abuse at the hands of her domestic partner. The BIA
accepted in its analysis that Juarez “suffered harm rising to the level of
persecution,” but affirmed the IJ’s factual finding that this harm was due to a
personal motive. It therefore held that Juarez’s past harm and feared future harm
were not on account of a protected ground. Juarez has not identified evidence that
compels a contrary conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Juarez’s proffered particular
social group, defined as “Guatemalan women unable to leave a forced domestic
relationship with a male partner who treats her and her children as his rightful
property,” was not legally cognizable. To be cognizable, Guatemalan “society
must have a commonly accepted definition of th[is] group.” Nguyen v. Barr, 983
F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). No evidence in the record
demonstrates how (or whether) Guatemalan society defines “domestic
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relationship,” “forced domestic relationship,” or a male partner’s treatment of
others “as his rightful property,” such that there is “a clear benchmark for
determining who falls within the group.” Id. (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence therefore supports the BIA’s determination that Juarez had not carried her
burden as to asylum and withholding of removal. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. The
BIA assumed that the past harm Juarez suffered “rises to the level of torture.”
However, the record evidence does not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan
government would be “willfully blind to [Juarez’s torture] or unwilling to oppose
it.” Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823, 837 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
PETITION DENIED.
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