United States of America v. ANDREW THOMAS CARPINO, AKA Andrew Looney

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDREW THOMAS CARPINO, AKA
Andrew Looney,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-30132
D.C. No.
1:20-cr-02028-SMJ-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 6, 2024**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GOULD, BYBEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Andrew Carpino appeals the district court’s order revoking his
probation and sentencing him to 30 months’ imprisonment following repeated
probation violations. Defendant contends that the district court abused its
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 8 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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discretion by revoking his probation and further abused its discretion by imposing
a substantively unreasonable sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
The district court has broad discretion to revoke probation. United States v.
Daly, 839 F.2d 598, 599 (9th Cir. 1988). We review revocation decisions for
abuse of discretion and fundamental unfairness. United States v. Simmons, 812
F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1987). Generally, there is an abuse of discretion only when
a district court “makes an error of law, [when it] rests its decision on clearly
erroneous findings of fact, or when [the panel is] left with ‘a definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.’” United
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s
probation. The district court’s initial sentence of three years’ probation was
lenient, given that the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 30- to 37-month term
of imprisonment. But in the district court’s view, Defendant made compelling
assurances that he could comply with the probation terms and recover from his
drug addiction. Defendant demonstrably failed to live up to his assurances within
the first six months of his probation, and he admitted to six probation violations
during that time. Given Defendant’s history of noncompliance, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation.

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2. Nor did the district court impose a substantively unreasonable
sentence. We review “the substantive reasonableness of a criminal sentence under
what the Supreme Court has described as ‘the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard
of review.’” United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)). The “touchstone of
reasonableness” is whether the district court meaningfully and rationally
considered the circumstances of the case and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Id. at 1089 (citation omitted). At both Defendant’s initial sentencing
hearing and his resentencing hearing, the district court explicitly weighed each of
the relevant factors in the statute and carefully considered the circumstances of the
case.
a. Defendant does not meaningfully challenge the reasonableness of the
sentence. He does not claim that 30 months is an excessive punishment for his
offenses. Indeed, the sentence is on the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines’
range of 30 to 37 months. Defendant also does not contend that the district court
failed to give meaningful consideration to his circumstances or that it committed
any procedural errors.
b. Defendant contends that he should have been re-sentenced to
probation in a long-term inpatient treatment facility. The issue, however, is not
whether other reasonable sentences were available to the district court, but whether

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the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable. On that, Defendant has no
colorable argument. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Defendant to 30 months’ imprisonment.
AFFIRMED

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