Guo Guang Zhuang v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUO GUANG ZHUANG,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 13-73422
Agency No. A087-694-731
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 5, 2024**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Guo Guang Zhuang, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from the
immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 5 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s adverse credibility
determinations for substantial evidence. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1039 (9th Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.
The BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. When assessing a claimant’s credibility under the REAL ID Act, the
agency must consider the “totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,”
including any inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the petitioner’s statements. Alam v.
Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The BIA identified numerous inconsistencies and
implausibilities that bore on Zhuang’s veracity and that were supported by
substantial evidence, including Zhuang’s inconsistent accounts of his arrest and his
subsequent travel to the United States. The IJ addressed Zhuang’s explanations for
his inconsistent or implausible statements on these issues and offered specific and
cogent reasons for not accepting them. Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 758 (9th
Cir. 2021).
We accord a “healthy measure of deference” to an agency’s adverse
credibility determination, which may be upheld unless the evidence compels—and
not merely supports—a different conclusion. Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296,
1300 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041). Unsupported findings

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must “all but gut” the agency’s determination under the totality of the circumstances.
Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2021).
Here, because the agency offered “specific, cogent explanation[s]” for not
accepting Zhuang’s reason for at least several inconsistencies that went to the
veracity of his claims, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is not all but
gutted. Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Although the evidence may have supported an alternative finding for some of
Zhuang’s claims, under the totality of the circumstances, the IJ’s explanations for
finding Zhuang not credible were adequately reasoned and supported by evidence in
the record, and thus the agency did not substantially err. Id.
The agency also did not err in finding that Zhuang failed to submit
corroborative evidence substantiating his claim that he would be imprisoned for life
for leaving China. Zhuang’s submitted evidence failed to corroborate the
plausibility and seriousness of his claimed persecution, as it was not specific enough
to show his experiences were shared by other similarly situated individuals. Cf.
Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
petitioner’s claim was credible because petitioner testified of specific instances and
provided documentary evidence in which others were persecuted for similar
situations as his). The agency did not err in finding that Zhuang had not met his
evidentiary burden of proof.

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Because a noncitizen who fails to establish a well-founded fear of persecution
for asylum purposes is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal, Zhuang’s
withholding of removal claim should also be denied. See Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332
F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because the agency did not err in finding Zhuang not to be a credible witness,
Zhuang’s applications based on persecution necessarily fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft,
348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). We may not reach Zhuang’s CAT claim, as it
is unexhausted because Zhuang did not meaningfully challenge it on appeal. “A
petitioner’s failure to raise an issue before the BIA generally constitutes a failure to
exhaust, thus depriving this court of jurisdiction to consider the issue.” Sola v.
Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d
674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a petitioner cannot raise an issue on appeal
that was not raised before the agency).
PETITION DENIED.

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