Guadalupe Benitez Valencia; Daniela Juarez Benitez; Ja.j.b v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUADALUPE BENITEZ
VALENCIA; DANIELA JUAREZ
BENITEZ; JA.J.B,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1966
Agency Nos.
A201-743-856
A201-743-857
A201-743-858
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 11, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: BOGGS***, RAWLINSON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Guadalupe Benitez Valencia, Daniela Juarez Benitez, and J.A.J.B
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
JAN 16 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(Petitioners) petition this court for review of an order from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
“Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of] Burbano[, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872
(BIA 1994)] and also provides its own review of the evidence and law, we review
both the IJ’s [Immigration Judge’s] and the BIA’s decision.” Ruiz-Colmenares v.
Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025,
1028 (9th Cir. 2011)). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial
evidence, meaning that the agency’s findings are “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Salguero
Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Nasrallah v.
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020)); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must demonstrate a ‘well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.’” Salguero Sosa, 55 F.4th at 1218
(quoting Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021)). “A petitioner can
satisfy this burden by showing past persecution, which gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption of future persecution.” Id.
The Petitioners argue that they suffered from past persecution due to

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emotional harm they experienced when their family members disappeared or were
kidnapped or killed. “‘[A]lthough harm to a petitioner’s close relatives, friends, or
associates may contribute to a successful showing of past persecution,’ it must be
‘part of a pattern of persecution closely tied to [the petitioner] himself.’” Sharma, 9
F.4th at 1062 (quoting Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009))
(some modifications in original). Here, the Petitioners point to no violence or
threats of violence that they faced themselves. They make no other argument that
they have a well-founded fear of future persecution except to point to past violence
against their family members. Accordingly, the petition is denied with respect to
the Petitioners’ asylum claims.
2. To be eligible for withholding of removal, the Petitioners must
demonstrate a “clear probability” that their “life or freedom would be threatened”
upon return. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 658 (9th Cir. 2022) (first quoting INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987), then quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A)). This standard is “more stringent than asylum’s well-founded-
fear standard . . . .” Id. Because the record does not compel a finding that the
Petitioners have a well-founded fear of future persecution, they accordingly have
not satisfied the higher standard applicable to withholding of removal claims.
3. “To qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show it is ‘more likely
than not he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of

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removal.’” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). Because the
Petitioners’ treatment does not “rise to the level of persecution,” however, “it
necessarily falls short of the definition of torture.” Id. And the “[g]eneralized
evidence of violence” to which the Petitioners point does not establish that they in
particular would more likely than not be tortured if returned to Mexico. B.R. v.
Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022).
DENIED.

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