Susan Baker, an individual; v. Dean Meiling, an individual;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN BAKER, an individual; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DEAN MEILING, an individual; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JANET CHUBB, an individual; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 22-15503
D.C. No.
3:20-cv-00518-MMD-CLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: FORREST and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER,*** District
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Senior United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Judge.
Appellants—a proposed class of elderly investors in a metal-coatings
company—appeal from the district court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees to
Appellees and sanctioning their attorney, Marc Lazo. The lone issue raised is the
propriety of Lazo’s sanction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing “the district court’s imposition of sanctions and award of attorneys’
fees for abuse of discretion,” De Dios v. Int’l Realty & RC Invs., 641 F.3d 1071,
1076 (9th Cir. 2011), and its “underlying finding of bad faith” for clear error,
Newtok Vill. v. Patrick, 21 F.4th 608, 615 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.
The district court awarded $375,635.55 in attorneys’ fees to Appellees, and
it sanctioned Lazo by holding him jointly and severally liable for that amount.
Lazo argues that the district court deprived him of procedural due process—and
therefore abused its discretion—by sanctioning him without first providing notice
and an opportunity to be heard. To be sure, “an attorney subject to discipline is
entitled to procedural due process, including notice and an opportunity to be
heard.” Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118
(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1999)). As we have held, however, “[t]he opportunity to brief the issue fully
satisfies due process requirements.” Id. And Lazo had such an opportunity:
Appellees moved the district court to hold him personally responsible for their

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attorneys’ fees, and Lazo opposed that motion. Accordingly, the district court’s
sanction did not violate Lazo’s right to procedural due process.
Lazo also challenges the district court’s finding of bad faith, which was a
necessary predicate to its sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Kohler v. Flava
Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2015). But the district court provided
at least seven justifications for its bad-faith finding, and Lazo challenges only two
of them. Even if we agreed with Lazo as to the two bad-faith justifications that he
challenges, the five he fails to address would suffice to support affirmance of the
court’s bad-faith determination. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We can, of course,
affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”); cf. United States v. Stauffer, 922
F.2d 508, 516 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When a district court lists several reasons for
taking a certain action, and one of the reasons is flawed, the district court’s
decision should still be upheld if other reasons support the ruling.”). We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not commit clear error in determining the issue of
bad faith, nor abuse its discretion in the imposition of sanctions and the award of
attorneys’ fees against Lazo.
AFFIRMED.1
1 Appellees pending motion for judicial notice is DENIED as moot.

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