Jennifer Orozco Bisozo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER OROZCO BISOZO, et al.,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1059
Agency Nos.
A208-929-883
A208-929-884
A208-929-885
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 4, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: BYBEE, BENNETT, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Orozco Bisozo (Orozco) and her minor children, natives and
citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s
(BIA’s) order affirming denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Exercising
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 30 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 6 --

2
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition.
Petitioners entered the United States in April 2016, shortly after Orozco was
threatened at a grocery store she owned and operated in her hometown. Orozco
testified that armed gang members entered her store and demanded 20,000 pesos.
After she responded that she did have any way to get that money, the gang
members told her they would return in two weeks and kill Orozco and her family if
she did not have the money. Orozco testified that she left the country before the
two weeks was up and did not pay the money. She also testified that her family
experienced no other threats or harm in Mexico, and that her parents still live in the
town and have not experienced threats or violence.
The government began removal proceedings in June 2018. Petitioners
conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
protection. An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Orozco testified credibly,
but denied all relief. In part, the IJ concluded that the harm experienced by
Petitioners did not rise to the level of past persecution or torture, and that
Petitioners did not establish a likelihood of future harm based on a protected
ground. The BIA affirmed.
We review the agency’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and its
conclusions of law de novo. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th
Cir. 2022). “To prevail under the substantial evidence standard, the petitioner

-- 2 of 6 --

3
‘must show that the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that
[the agency’s] findings and decisions are erroneous.’” Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d
1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s asylum determination.
“To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a likelihood
of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’”
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)).1 The agency determined that those who threatened her were
motivated by economic gain, and thus that there was no nexus to a protected
ground.2
On appeal, Petitioners point to nothing in the record establishing a nexus
between their harm and membership in a protected group. Instead, they argue that
the agency violated its “duty to fully develop the record” because the IJ did not
specifically question Orozco about a nexus between the harm she experienced and
1 Petitioners asserted membership in two claimed protected particular social
groups: (1) Mexican small business owners opposing gang dominance and
violence and extortion; and (2) the Orozco Bisozo family fleeing gang violence.
2 The IJ made this finding explicitly. The BIA found no “clear error” in the IJ’s
finding.

-- 3 of 6 --

4
membership in a protected group.3 But because Orozco was represented by
counsel, it is not clear that the IJ was obligated to independently question her about
each element of relief. See Jacinto v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2000).
The record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s
determination that Petitioners were targeted for economic reasons. See Barrios v.
Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (economic motive for harm is not
persecution on account of a protected ground). In both Orozco’s testimony and
written declaration, she explained that she was extorted only for money and
identified no other reason why the gang members may have targeted her or her
family. Moreover, the fact that her parents continue to live in the same town
without threats or violence undercuts the suggestion that Petitioners were targeted
because of their family membership.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s withholding of removal
determination for the same reason. “To succeed [on a withholding claim], an
applicant must show a ‘clear probability’ of persecution because of a protected
ground.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). Withholding of removal requires a lesser connection between
3 Petitioners also contend that the agency failed to give sufficient weight to a 2017
State Department report establishing that gang violence is prevalent in Mexico and
that government officials are sometimes complicit in gang activity. But Petitioners
do not argue that this evidence is relevant to the agency’s dispositive nexus
determination.

-- 4 of 6 --

5
persecution and a protected ground than asylum. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 358-60 (9th Cir. 2017) (asylum claims require a protected ground to be
“one central reason” for persecution, whereas withholding claims require that a
protected ground be “a reason” for persecution). But both forms of relief require at
least some nexus, and Petitioners have not presented any evidence of such a nexus
here. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).4
3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s CAT determination.
“To qualify for relief under CAT,” an applicant “must establish it is more likely
than not that he or she would be tortured if returned to the proposed country of
removal.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020). We have
held that past death threats are insufficient to compel a finding of likely future
torture. See Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1139-40, 1148. Petitioners also point to
generalized reports about the prevalence of gang violence in Mexico to substantiate
their fear of torture, but we have held that such reports are also insufficient to
compel a finding of likely future torture. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d
1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[G]eneralized evidence of violence and crime in
Mexico is not particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet [the CAT]
standard.”).
4 Because we uphold the agency’s nexus determination as to both asylum and
withholding, we need not reach the agency’s determination that the harm
Petitioners suffered did not rise to the level of persecution.

-- 5 of 6 --

6
PETITION DENIED.

-- 6 of 6 --