Theresa Brooke, a married woman dealing with her sole and separate claim v. 247 HOTELS BEVERAGE, LLC, DBA Cambria Hotel Calabasas, a California limited…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THERESA BROOKE, a married woman
dealing with her sole and separate claim,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
247 HOTELS BEVERAGE, LLC, DBA
Cambria Hotel Calabasas, a California
limited liability company,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-55682
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02941-MCS-E
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 18, 2023**
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Theresa Brooke appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing for
lack of standing her disability discrimination action alleging claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California’s Unruh Act. We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 7 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. D’Lil v. Best W. Encina
Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brooke’s ADA claim for lack of
standing because Brooke failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that she
planned to return to defendant’s hotel. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.,
631 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2011) (to establish Article III standing, an ADA
plaintiff must show either an “inten[t] to return to a noncompliant accommodation”
or that the noncompliant accommodation deterred the plaintiff from visiting and
the plaintiff “plans to visit [the] noncompliant accommodation in the future”); see
also Civ. Rts. Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.
2017) (“[C]oncrete travel plans would be sufficient to show that a disabled plaintiff
intends to visit a facility . . . .”). Although the district court did not notify Brooke
of its intent to dismiss her ADA claim or provide her leave to amend her
complaint, on appeal Brooke does not specify what additional facts she would have
pleaded to establish standing.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental
jurisdiction over Brooke’s Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); Vo v.
Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171-73 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining when a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh
Act claims under § 1367(c)(4)). Contrary to Brooke’s contention, the clerk’s entry

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of default did not require the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over her Unruh Act claim. See id. at 1168 (noting the district court declined
supplemental jurisdiction after the clerk entered default).
AFFIRMED.

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