Davonne Williams v. WALTER RATTRAY, Owner/Founder Church on the Street

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVONNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WALTER RATTRAY, Owner/Founder
Church on the Street; TOMMY BARNETT,
Owner/Founder The Phoenix Dream Center;
CHURCH ON THE STREET, Religious
Organization/ COTS - named in caption of
First Amended Complaint as Church on the
Streets; DREAM CITY CHURCH; CITY
HELP INCORPORATED OF PHOENIX,
Charitable Organization,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-15945
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01760-DWL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Davonne Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Finjan Holdings,
Inc., 58 F.4th 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action because Williams
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729
F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining dismissal “under Rule 12(b)(6) is
proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to
allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard for review and
explaining that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).
We reject as unsupported by the record Williams’s contention that the
district court did not explain how Williams’s first amended complaint failed to
state a claim or why further amendment would be futile.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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