Rosario Tomas-Tomas; Pablo Alfredo Pablo-Tomas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSARIO TOMAS-TOMAS; PABLO
ALFREDO PABLO-TOMAS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-677
Agency Nos.
A202-070-114
A202-070-115
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 12, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Rosario Tomas-Tomas, and her son Pablo Alfredo Pablo-Tomas, seek
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the
decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her application for asylum,
FILED
MAY 16 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition for review.
Tomas-Tomas did not challenge the BIA’s determination that she failed to
establish that the Guatemalan government was or would be “unable or unwilling”
to protect her from persecution. Therefore, Tomas-Tomas has forfeited any such
argument, see Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013),
and her asylum and withholding of removal claims fail as a result, see
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (asylum);
Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2004) (withholding of
removal).
Alternatively, Tomas-Tomas’s asylum and withholding of removal claims
fail because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s holding that the harm Tomas-
Tomas suffered did not rise to the level of persecution. We reject Tomas-Tomas’s
argument that the death threats she and her son received rose to the level of
persecution because they were not “so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Here the BIA could have reasonably
concluded that Juan Pablo’s threats were not credible given the “surrounding
circumstances,” id., including the “unfulfilled” nature of the threats, Hoxha v.
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Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, the physical violence
Tomas-Tomas endured was not significant enough to compel a conclusion that the
violence rose to the level of persecution. See Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012,
1016–17 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s
denial of asylum and withholding of removal.
The BIA’s determination that it was not more likely than not that Tomas-
Tomas would be tortured upon return to Guatemala by or with the acquiescence or
willful blindness of a public official was also supported by substantial evidence.
The record shows that the treatment Tomas-Tomas received did not rise to the
level of torture, because it did not rise to the level of persecution, which is less
severe. See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018). Nor has
Tomas-Tomas shown the likelihood of government acquiescence or willful
blindness, given the steps the Guatemalan government has taken to combat
violence against women, regardless whether it has fully achieved its goals. See
Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the
BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of Tomas-Tomas’s request for relief
under the CAT.
PETITION DENIED.
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