United States of America v. Cherie Roer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHERIE ROER,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10175
D.C. No. 1:18-cr-00084-LEK-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Cherie Roer appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges two
conditions of supervised release imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for
drug offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for plain
error, see United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012), and we
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-10175
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Roer first challenges the special condition requiring her to participate in a
mental health assessment. Although Roer has made commendable rehabilitative
efforts, it is apparent that the district court adopted probation’s recommendation to
impose the challenged condition in light of Roer’s history of mental health issues.
See id. at 1090 (district court need not state its reasons for imposing a supervised
released condition when the reasoning is apparent from the record). Moreover, the
condition is proper because it is reasonably related to her rehabilitation and does
not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2003).
Roer also challenges standard condition eight, which prohibits Roer from
interacting with known felons without prior approval, because it implicates her
right to associate with her husband. As the government concedes, the district court
plainly erred by failing to explain its reasons for imposing this condition. See Wolf
Child, 699 F.3d at 1090-92 (describing enhanced procedural requirements the court
must follow when imposing a condition that restricts a defendant’s particularly
significant liberty interest in familial association). Accordingly, we vacate the
condition and remand for the court to exempt Roer’s husband or make the requisite
findings as why it should apply to him. See id. at 1103.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.

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