United States of America v. Christian James Palmer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIAN JAMES PALMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-30061
D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00212-RCT-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judge, Presiding**
Submitted January 18, 2023***
Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Christian James Palmer appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised
release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** Richard C. Tallman, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-30061
Palmer first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
explain adequately its rationale for imposing the 24-month sentence, which was
above both the Guidelines range and the parties’ sentencing recommendations. We
review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103,
1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects the
district court imposed the statutory maximum sentence in light of Palmer’s
criminal history, and his repeated violations of the terms of his supervised release
despite the leniency afforded him at his original sentencing and over the course of
his supervised release term. Moreover, Palmer has not shown a reasonable
probability that he would have received a lower sentence had the district court said
more. See United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008).
Palmer also argues that the district court improperly imposed the sentence to
promote his rehabilitation. The district court, however, expressly disclaimed any
reliance on rehabilitation. Further, the record shows that the court did not impose a
term of imprisonment to promote Palmer’s rehabilitation or select a 24-month
sentence because of the treatment options a sentence of that length would afford.
Rather, after Palmer acknowledged in his allocution his substance abuse and
mental health issues and explained that he needed more “structure,” the court
properly explored the possible rehabilitative options. See Tapia v. United States,
564 U.S. 319, 334 (2011).

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3 22-30061
Palmer next argues that, because the district court did not identify the
sentencing factors upon which it was relying, the record is unclear as to whether
the court relied on any prohibited 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See
United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a
district court may not consider at a revocation sentencing any § 3553(a) factor
omitted from § 3583(e)). However, we presume that judges know the law, see
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and nothing in
the record indicates that the court relied on impermissible factors.
Finally, Palmer argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. In
light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3583(e) sentencing factors, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the above-Guidelines
sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.

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