Testo completo
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ABDUL BIN
TALAL AL SAUD, AKA Shaykh
Muhammad Abdul Aziz Khalid Bin Talal
Alsaud,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JASON MEDLEY; DUPNICK, named as
Sheriff Dupnick; JONATHAN P. SIRESS;
DAVID CORONADO; FAY IBARA, named
as Deputy Warden Fay Ibara Arizona;
CARSON MCWILLIAMS, Southern
Director; MIGUEL RETANA, State Prison
Guard AZ; PYLE, State Prison Guard
Arizona; KREAMER,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-17052
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01120-SPL-JFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2022**
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Before: WALLACE, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Shaykh Muhammad Abdul Bin Talal Al Saud appeals
pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Al Saud’s
excessive force and deliberate indifference claims because Al Saud failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to
him. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638, 641-44 (2016) (explaining that an
inmate must exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before bringing
an action, and describing limited circumstances in which administrative remedies
are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion
of administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and
doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation,
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (once
the defendant has carried the burden to prove there was an available administrative
remedy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence showing that
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him).
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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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