United States of America v. Craig Mason

22-10013Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit12 dic 2022

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CRAIG MASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10013
D.C. No.
2:16-cr-00002-KJM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 12 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Appellant Craig Mason challenges his conviction for unlawfully
manufacturing and dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(1)(A). He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment and by denying a subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. For the first time on appeal, he also argues that the indictment was
insufficient to allege a violation of § 922(a)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we dismiss the appeal because Mason knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal these issues.
Mason pled guilty to unlawfully manufacturing and dealing in firearms
without a license in 2019. The plea agreement specifically provided that Mason
waived his right to appeal “all constitutional and/or legal challenges to the
defendant’s conviction and guilty plea, including arguments that the statutes to
which defendant is pleading guilty are unconstitutional. . . . The defendant
specifically gives up the right to appeal any issue raised in his . . . Motion to
Dismiss.”
After entering his plea, but before sentencing, Mason claimed he had just
become aware of the district court decision in United States v. Jimenez, 191 F.
Supp. 3d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2016), holding that § 922 is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to certain conduct, id. at 1045, and a 2016 letter from then-Attorney
General Loretta Lynch to Congress (“Lynch Letter”) explaining the government’s

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decision not to appeal the Jimenez decision.1 Mason moved to withdraw his guilty
plea, arguing that the defendant’s successful vagueness challenge in Jimenez
applied to his case as well.2 The district court denied the motion, holding that the
Jimenez decision and Lynch Letter are non-binding legal developments, which do
not constitute “fair and just reason[s]” for withdrawing a plea. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2009).
This court reviews enforceability of appellate waivers de novo. United
States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2022). “A defendant’s waiver of his
appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses his right
to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily
made.” United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). “[W]e will not
exercise . . . jurisdiction to review the merits of [a defendant’s] appeal if we
conclude that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal unless the
result would work a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496
F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gwinnett, 483
1 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) requires the Attorney General to submit a
report to Congress explaining any decision “not to appeal . . . any judicial . . .
determination adversely affecting the constitutionality” of federal statutes or
regulations.
2 Mason also cited developments in other district court cases, but they are
irrelevant here because they occurred after Mason pled guilty.

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F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, there is no dispute that Mason’s appellate waiver covers the grounds
of his appeal because his claims are all legal challenges to his plea or conviction.
Instead, Mason argues for the first time on appeal that his appellate waiver was
unknowing and involuntary because the government “withheld” the Jimenez
decision and Lynch Letter during plea negotiations. But the Jimenez decision was
published in June 2016 and the Lynch Letter is dated September 8, 2016,3 more
than two years before Mason signed his plea agreement in March 2019.
Mason provides no authority holding that the government has a duty to
disclose publicly available information during plea bargaining. But even if such a
duty exists, it was not violated here because the Jimenez decision and Lynch Letter
are immaterial. Those materials provide that § 922 is ambiguous with respect to
defendants that possess AR-15 lower receivers.4 Jimenez, 191 F.Supp.3d at 1040–
45. Here, Mason was charged in part with manufacturing and selling completed
and fully functional AR-15 style firearms. Thus, the vagueness analysis in Jimenez
3 Mason concedes that the Lynch Letter was publicly available on the
Department of Justice website as early as April 2017. Although he contends that it
was hard to find, he cites no authority suggesting that the difficulty of finding a
resource online is relevant to our analysis.
4 AR-15 style firearms require both a “lower” and “upper” receiver to
operate. Jimenez, 191 F.Supp.3d at 1039. Jimenez and the Lynch Letter discuss
ambiguity as to whether a lower receiver alone constitutes a “firearm” under § 922.
Id. at 1040–45.

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and the Lynch Letter is inapposite.
Because the “language of [Mason’s] waiver encompasses his right to appeal
on the grounds raised, and [his] waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made,” we
enforce the waiver and decline to exercise jurisdiction over the merits of Mason’s
appeal. Joyce, 357 F.3d at 922; Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d at 957.
DISMISSED.5
5 The motion to take judicial notice, Dkt. 15, is GRANTED.

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