United States of America v. RANDALL D. MCREYNOLDS, AKA Randy Del McReynolds

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANDALL D. MCREYNOLDS, AKA
Randy Del McReynolds,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30205
D.C. Nos.
2:10-cr-00026-WFN-1
2:10-cr-00026-WFN
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANDALL D. MCREYNOLDS, AKA
Randy Del McReynolds,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30206
D.C. Nos.
2:11-cr-00027-WFN-1
2:11-cr-00027-WFN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 21-30207
D.C. Nos.
2:21-cr-00028-WFN-1
2:21-cr-00028-WFN
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
DEC 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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RANDALL D. MCREYNOLDS, AKA
Randy D. McReynolds, AKA Randy Del
McReynolds,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Wm. Fremming Nielsen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 5, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Randall D. McReynolds appeals his conviction and sentence for possession
of a firearm and ammunition by an individual convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), as well as related revocation judgments and sentences for
violations of his supervised release terms. The district court denied McReynolds’s
motion to suppress the fruits of a probation search conducted while he was on
supervised release. On appeal, McReynolds contends that the search violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo and
any underlying factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kvashuk, 29
F.4th 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 608
(9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.1
1. McReynolds contends that the district court applied the wrong
substantive standard under the Fourth Amendment in denying his motion to
suppress. The district court did not err in applying the reasonable suspicion
standard to McReynolds’s claim.
McReynolds’s supervised release terms included a search condition that
plainly required him to “submit [his] person, residence, office, or vehicle to a
search, conducted by a U.S. probation officer, at a sensible time and manner, based
1 As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case, we
do not recount them in detail.

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upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of violation of a condition of
supervision.” Longstanding Supreme Court precedent establishes that, where an
individual on supervised release is subject to such a probation search condition,
reasonable suspicion suffices to justify a warrantless search of the individual’s
home under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
121 (2001).
2. McReynolds next argues that the reasonable suspicion standard should
not govern because the judgments did not “clearly or unambiguously” inform him
of the location subject to the search condition. See Lara, 815 F.3d at 610. This
argument fails.
The relevant judgments “clearly expressed the search condition,” which
required McReynolds to “submit [his] . . .residence . . . to a search . . . based upon
reasonable suspicion of contraband.” See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. McReynolds
signed the judgments and acknowledged that his probation officer reviewed the
relevant conditions with him.2
3. Applying the reasonable suspicion standard here, the probation search
of McReynolds’s home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The
2 To the extent McReynolds argues that the search exceeded the scope authorized
by the condition, that argument lacks merit: The search term here “expressly
authorized searches of [McReynolds’s] ‘place of residence,’ which was precisely
what the officers searched” and, ultimately, where they found contraband. See
Lara, 815 F.3d at 610 (discussing Knights, 534 U.S. at 114–15).

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probation officers had reasonable suspicion to search the home based on three
factors: (1) a tip from Summer Bush, McReynolds’s former romantic partner, that
McReynolds possessed firearms in his home and was actively using
methamphetamine; (2) McReynolds’s missed urinalysis (UA) test; and
(3) McReynolds’s criminal history involving firearms and drugs.
First, as to the tip, the weight accorded to an informant’s tip varies with
certain “indicia of reliability.” See United States v. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d 876,
879–80 (9th Cir. 2020) (listing such indicia). Here, Bush’s tip bore several indicia
of reliability: (1) Bush provided her name and phone number rather than remaining
anonymous, see id. at 879; (2) Bush conveyed “the basis of h[er] knowledge”—
namely, her recent affair with McReynolds during which she observed firearms in
his home and McReynolds using methamphetamine, see id.; and (3) the probation
officer was able to corroborate some of the information Bush provided, see Foster
v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 2018) (officer’s corroboration of
tipster’s statement was indicative of reliability).
Second, after receiving Bush’s fairly reliable tip, Officer Cross ordered
McReynolds to report for a UA test, and he failed to timely comply. According to
testimony from the suppression hearing, probation generally treats a missed test as
a positive test because a delay in reporting compromises the integrity of the testing
process. Therefore, the missed test, at the very least, supports a reasonable

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suspicion that McReynolds possessed contraband and had violated his release
conditions.3
Third, and finally, the nature of McReynolds’s criminal background
involving guns and drugs further bolsters reasonable suspicion for the search here.
See United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2006).
Because the search of his residence was justified by reasonable suspicion,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McReynolds’s suppression
motion. And because McReynolds’s challenge to his conviction, revocations of
supervised release, and sentences depends on successful suppression, the district
court’s judgments in these consolidated appeals are, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
3 What is more, the missed UA test—and its inference of positivity—further
corroborated Bush’s report that McReynolds was actively using methamphetamine.

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