United States of America v. Christopher Michael Stebbins

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL STEBBINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30066
D.C. Nos.
4:20-cr-00049-BMM-1
4:20-cr-00049-BMM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** District Judge.
Appellant Christopher Stebbins was charged with and convicted of
Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute
Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Stebbins
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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appeals his convictions and the district court’s 150-month sentence. We affirm both
of Stebbins’ convictions and his 150-month sentence.
1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain Stebbins’ conspiracy conviction.
Although Stebbins’ co-conspirator denied that they had explicitly agreed to sell meth
together, a conspiracy may be inferred from the defendants’ conduct or other
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.
2015). At trial, the jury heard testimony that Stebbins received increasingly large
amounts of meth and that his seller broke down the meth into two-ounce baggies.
The shipments started with a quarter-pound package of meth and culminated in a
two-pound package of meth that led to Stebbins’ arrest. The jury also heard
testimony that Stebbins’ seller connected him with other meth suppliers, relayed
Stebbins’ specific packaging instructions to the new suppliers, and assumed
financial responsibility for a lost package of meth that was supposed to be sent to
and paid for by Stebbins.
Stebbins argues that there was only a buyer-seller relationship with his co-
conspirator, but a rational juror could have found that there was a tacit agreement to
sell meth. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
2. The testimony of Stebbins’ fiancée, Troylynn Brown, was sufficient
evidence to sustain his possession with intent to distribute conviction.
Although portions of Brown’s testimony contradicted her previous statements

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to law enforcement agents, her testimony that she intended to use some of the meth
that Stebbins bought was uncontradicted. The jury was properly instructed on its
ability to determine Brown’s credibility and Stebbins has not demonstrated that her
testimony was so incredible that we must overrule the jury’s determination. See
United States v. Yossunthorn, 167 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Leung, 35 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, a juror could reasonably
conclude that Stebbins intended to distribute the meth to Brown, and the evidence
was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
3. The district court did not err in imposing a 150-month sentence. The
district court explicitly stated that it considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors when imposing the sentence that was 38 months below Stebbins’ guideline
range. The district court also properly summarized and addressed that Stebbins’ co-
conspirator’s sentence did not warrant Stebbins receiving less than 150 months.
Stebbins’ sentence was therefore not procedurally erroneous and is substantively
reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 49-51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.

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