NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL CHARLES SWEETS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-55997
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01816-BLM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barbara L. Major, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 5, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Michael Sweets appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of an
administrative law judge (ALJ) denying disability insurance benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act. We review the district court’s decision de novo and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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“reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), superseded by
regulation on other grounds. “[W]hen the evidence is susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are
supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Id. at 1111. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Sweets argues that the ALJ: (1) misapplied the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines (the grids); (2) did not provide “a reasonable explanation using
evidence that Sweets can carry, lift, and move objects in a job that requires
frequent[ly] lifting 25 pounds and 50 pounds occasionally”; and (3) “provided his
own limitations” without “adequate explanation of the record, without specific
support from a medical source, and with no testimony from a medical expert.”
However, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of Sweets’s
residual functional capacity (RFC), application of the grids, and reliance on the
testimony of a vocational expert (VE). The limitations of the RFC, which allows
for medium work, are supported by substantial evidence, including the exertional
and non-exertional limitations identified by accepted medical sources, here, Drs.
Kanner, Post, Taylor-Holmes, and Sabourin. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141,
1149 (9th Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Given his capacity for medium
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work, Sweets fails to establish that the grids would direct a finding of
disability. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 2, §§ 202.00-203.31. Because
the grids did not direct a finding of disability and because Sweets exhibited a mix
of exertional and non-exertional limitations, the ALJ correctly turned to the
expertise of the VE. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir.
2006). The ALJ gave the VE all the limitations supported by substantial evidence
and reasonably relied on the testimony of the VE to conclude that Sweets could
adjust to other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).
Sweets also argues that the ALJ failed to address his impaired vision and
hearing loss. However, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Kanner, who found
that Sweets’s “vision is well corrected with glasses.” As for Sweets’s hearing, the
ALJ addressed Dr. Kanner’s and Dr. Alello’s findings, and concluded that “he
should avoid exposure to loud noise.”
Sweets contends that “[t]he ALJ’s decision does not address Sweets’[s]
pain.” But the ALJ considered Dr. Berry’s notes regarding Sweets’s pain and
concluded that Dr. Berry’s opinion “is without significant objective support from
objective medical records, is very inconsistent with other evaluations in the file
done by orthopedist specialists, and is overly restrictive in light of the remainder of
the file and even the claimant’s own testimony.” The ALJ also acknowledged Dr.
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Kanner’s “lower back pain” diagnosis, but noted the same doctor’s finding that
Sweets “would be able to lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five
pounds occasionally with equivalent limitations on pushing and pulling. He could
sit or stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday.”
Finally, Sweets asserts that the ALJ erred by “independently dismiss[ing] the
effect of Sweets’[s] [m]edication.” However, Sweets fails to offer any objective
evidence of side effects. He points only to his own testimony. Therefore, the ALJ
was not required to discuss the alleged side effects in the first place. See Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no error where “the ALJ
took into account those limitations for which there was record support that did not
depend on Bayliss’s subjective complaints.”).
AFFIRMED.
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