Neona Modoc v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NEONA MODOC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-35383
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05468-BAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 16, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,**
District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 6 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Neona Modoc (“Modoc”) appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Social Security
disability. “The Social Security Administration’s disability determination should
be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported
by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm the district court.
Modoc argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating
several medical opinions. However, the ALJ carefully reviewed the conflicting
medical evidence and gave specific, legitimate reasons to discount portions of the
opinions of Dr. Saltzberg, Dr. May, and Dr. Leinenbach, and germane reasons to
discount portions of nurse practitioner Browning’s opinion. See Lester v. Chater,
81 F.3d 821, 830B31 (9th Cir. 1996); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2012). The ALJ agreed that Modoc suffered from several severe impairments
and rejected both opinions that contained more restrictive limitations than were
supported by the evidence and those that were insufficiently restrictive given her
legitimate physical and emotional limitations. “Where evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be
upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s rejection of portions of Modoc’s
testimony. The ALJ proffered clear and convincing reasons for discounting the
severity of her symptoms, including that the alleged severity was contradicted by the
medical record, and that Modoc often failed to report this severity to her physicians,
instead reporting an ability to participate in everyday activities that were inconsistent
with the severity of symptoms she described at the hearing. See Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853,
857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Finally, Modoc argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the lay testimony.
The ALJ offered germane reasons for discounting the report filed by Modoc’s
mother. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117 (“the ALJ’s well-supported reasons for rejecting
claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness testimony”). The ALJ
failed to specifically address observations of Modoc’s limitations made by social
worker Johnson, but any such error was harmless, as these observations did not
contradict the ALJ’s finding that Modoc was limited to the least physically
demanding sedentary work with some additional postural and social limitations. Id.
at 1115 (harmless error principles apply in social security cases).
AFFIRMED.

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