United States v. 2020-08-13 | 19-15926 | IQBAL RANDHAWA V. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IQBAL S. RANDHAWA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA
Bank of New York, Successor to JPMorgan
Chase Bank, NA, as trustee, on behalf of the
holders of the Structured Asset Mortgage
Investment II Inc., Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-12,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-15926

D.C. No.
2:18-cv-02244-JAM-AC

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 4, 2020
**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit
Judges.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

AUG 13 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
Iqbal S. Randhawa appeals the district court’s denial of leave to amend his
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) complaint against the Bank of New York Mellon.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the denial for abuse of
discretion, we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Randhawa’s suit as time-barred, noting
that the loan in question “was consummated in 2004,” that Randhawa “recorded
the Notice of Rescission in 2005, and the TILA cause of action arose when the
bank failed to take any action to wind up the loan within 20 days of receiving
plaintiff’s notice of rescission.” The statute of limitations on a TILA recission
enforcement claim is borrowed from analogous state contract law, Hoang v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2018), in this case four years, Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 337, which expired long before Randhawa filed this action.
Randhawa does not challenge this determination, but argues the district court
should have permitted him to amend his TILA complaint to include a quiet title
claim. The statute of limitations for quiet title depends upon the “underlying
theory of relief,” Muktarian v. Barmby, 407 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. 1965), and as the
district court noted, the same logic that forecloses his TILA claims applies here.
The quiet title claim in Randhawa’s proposed amended complaint is premised on
the alleged fraud that led him to transfer his deed in 2004. In California, the statute
of limitations for fraud is three years, Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc.,

3
522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d)), and
Randhawa’s claim is thus time-barred. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant him leave to amend. See Graham-Sult v. Clainos,
756 F.3d 724, 748 (9th Cir. 2014).
AFFIRMED.