Mari-Lynne Earls v. MARY J. GREENWOOD, Presiding Justice et al.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARI-LYNNE EARLS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARY J. GREENWOOD, Presiding
Justice, in her official capacity as
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Sixth
District Appellate Court,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-16893

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01317-VC

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 5, 2020
**

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Mari-Lynne Earls appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims related to the
application of California’s Vexatious Litigant Statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 391-

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

AUG 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-16893
391.8. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154
(9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Earls’s action challenging the
application of California Civil Procedure Code §§ 391.7 and 391.8 to her state
court filings because it constitutes a forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court
judgments imposed for her failure to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under
§§ 391.7 or 391.8, and raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those
judgments. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609,
616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the
relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s
decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to Earls’s contention, her request
for prospective injunctive relief does not make the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
inapplicable to her claims. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65.
We reject as without merit Earls’s reliance on Earls v. Cantil-Sakauye, 745
Fed. App’x 696 (9th Cir. 2018).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.