JESSICA SHAW, an individual v. Geico General Insurance Company

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSICA SHAW, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-55724

D.C. No.
2:18-cv-07601-DSF-FFM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2020
Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ and BADE, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,
**
District Judge.

While riding a bicycle in 2015, Jessica Shaw was hit by a car. Shaw and
GEICO dispute whether Shaw is an “insured” for purposes of underinsured-
motorist benefits afforded under an automobile-insurance policy. The district court

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
FILED

JUL 27 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-55724
held Shaw is not an insured and granted summary judgment for GEICO. Shaw
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; review the district
court’s decision without deference, see Trishan Air, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 635 F.3d
422, 426 (9th Cir. 2011); and reverse.
Under California law, if language in an insurance policy is “substantially
identical” to the California Insurance Code, the rules of contract interpretation do
not apply. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Los
Angeles Cty., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 721 (Ct. App. 2011). GEICO argues, and the
district court held, that the relevant policy language here is substantially identical
to the Code. We disagree. The policy defines “insured” as “the individual named
in the declarations.” In contrast, the Code defines “insured” as “the named
insured,” and it in turn defines “named insured” as “the individual or organization
named in the declarations.” Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(b). These two definitions
may appear nearly identical in isolation. In context, however, the difference is
material—both sides agree Shaw is not “the named insured,” but they dispute
whether she is “the individual named in the declarations.” The policy and Code
therefore are not substantially identical.
Applying California rules of contract interpretation, see Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., 460 P.3d 1201, 1210 (Cal. 2020), we
find the definition of “insured” ambiguous with respect to Shaw. Her name

3 19-55724
appears on the declarations page as an “Additional Driver.” Thus, she is “named
in the declarations,” and she could reasonably be considered an insured. The
policy’s failure to explicitly define the rights of Additional Drivers compounds this
ambiguity. A reasonable person in Shaw’s position could expect to qualify as an
insured; we must interpret the policy to protect that expectation. See Minkler v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 616, 624 (Cal. 2010).
For these reasons, Shaw is an insured under the GEICO policy for purposes
of underinsured-motorist coverage. The district court ruling to the contrary is
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.