Ray Lee Vaughn v. C. Wegman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAY LEE VAUGHN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C. WEGMAN,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

BOWMAN,

Defendant.

No. 19-15547

D.C. No. 1:15-cv-01902-LJO-JLT

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 6, 2020
**

Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Ray Lee Vaughn appeals pro se from the district

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

MAY 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-15547
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the
First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), arising out of
the denial of his request for inclusion on the prison’s Jewish religious services list
and kosher meal plan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Vaughn’s First
and Fourteenth Amendment claims because Vaughn failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Wegman personally participated in the
decisions that Vaughn challenges, or exercised authority over the individuals who
made those decisions. See Mendiola-Martinez, 836 F.3d at 1247 (explaining that
summary judgment is proper if a plaintiff “fails to make a sufficient showing to
support an element of” his claims); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.
2002) (explaining that in order to demonstrate liability under § 1983, “there must
be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation”).
The district court properly dismissed Vaughan’s RLUIPA claim as moot
because Vaughn was transferred to a different prison where he now receives
kosher meals and there is no reasonable expectation that Wegman will violate his
rights in the future. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015)

3 19-15547
(explaining that “RLUIPA does not authorize suits for damages against state
officials in their individual capacities”); see id. (explaining that claims for
injunctive relief are moot once the “inmate is removed from the environment in
which he is subjected to the challenged policy or practice” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Vaughn’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Docket Entry No. 24) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.