United States v. 2020-03-10 | 19-55625 | FELIPE GUTIERREZ-CHIC V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIPE GUTIERREZ-CHIC,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM BARR, ET AL.,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 19-55625

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00814-JAH
(RBB)

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 6, 2020
**

Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,
***
District
Judge.

Felipe Gutierrez-Chic appeals the district court’s order denying his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition,

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***
The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED

MAR 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
Gutierrez-Chic challenges the lawfulness of an arrest warrant issued by the district
court in the Western District of Texas.
In January 2019, Gutierrez-Chic was arrested in the Southern District of
California pursuant to the Texas warrant. Following his arrest, Gutierrez-Chic was
transferred to the Western District of Texas, where the district court revoked his
probation and sentenced him to an 11-month term of imprisonment. Gutierrez-
Chic completed his term of imprisonment in December 2019 and was transferred
to the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement for
deportation.
Gutierrez-Chic concedes there are no avenues remaining for him to obtain
the relief sought in his petition. He is not subject to further court supervision, and
he fails to articulate any collateral consequences stemming from the revocation of
his probation. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998) (declining “to
presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement result[] from [a] petitioner’s parole revocation”); United States v.
King, 891 F.3d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2018) (extending Spencer mootness standard to
revocations of supervised release). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISMISSED.