Edilberto Camarse Cuyson v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDILBERTO CAMARSE CUYSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-15043

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01913-AC

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Allison Claire, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 24, 2020
**

Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Edilberto Camarse Cuyson appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

FEB 26 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-15043
Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in determining that a
questionnaire completed by Cuyson’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Cecile Soliven, was
not a Medical Source Statement or a medical opinion. The questionnaire did not
express Dr. Soliven’s judgment as to the severity of Cuyson’s impairments or what
he could do despite his impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (2012)
(defining “medical opinions” as statements that “reflect judgments about the nature
and severity of your impairment(s), including . . . what you can still do despite
impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions”).
The record does not support Cuyson’s backup assertion that the ALJ’s
summary of the questionnaire is inaccurate. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (where the ALJ provides a rational interpretation of the
evidence, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings).
The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount
Cuyson’s symptom testimony. Cuyson’s testimony was undercut by his failure to
follow treatment recommendations. His testimony was also inconsistent with the
ALJ’s observations, inconsistent with the medical evidence, and inconsistent with
Cuyson’s activities. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (ALJ reasonably concluded that
claimant’s reported activities were inconsistent with the limitations alleged);
Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)

3 18-15043
(ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony as inconsistent with the medical
evidence); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may
consider a lack of corroborating medical evidence as one factor in the credibility
determination); Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458, n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (no error
where ALJ made specific findings based on his observation of the claimant). Any
error in the ALJ’s additional reasons for discounting Cuyson’s symptom testimony
was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (error is harmless where it is
“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”).
Any error in the ALJ’s evaluation of a third-party function report was
harmless. See id.
Cuyson’s request for oral argument, included in his opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.