United States v. 2020-02-14 | 17-71001 | KAMRAN KASHANIAN V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KAMRAN KASHANIAN,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 17-71001

Agency No. A089-516-153

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted January 9, 2020
San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,
**
District
Judge.

Petitioner Kamran Kashanian, a native and citizen of Iran, became a
conditional permanent resident through his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Kashanian
and his wife subsequently separated, and he sought a waiver of the requirement
that they jointly file a petition to remove the conditional basis of his permanent

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
FILED

FEB 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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resident status. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 216(c)(4)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) initially granted the
waiver, but later reopened removal proceedings, exercised her discretion to deny
the waiver, and ordered Kashanian removed from the United States. Kashanian’s
appeal was dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). We deny
Kashanian’s petition for review.
Kashanian’s sole argument on appeal is that, once the IJ decided he was
statutorily eligible for the waiver because of his “good faith” marriage, the IJ did
not have discretion to deny the waiver. See INA § 216(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4)(B). This argument is foreclosed by our decision in Singh v. Holder,
591 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2010). In Singh, we explained that “granting a waiver
involves two steps: First, the Attorney General or his designee (here, the BIA)
must determine whether the petitioner has demonstrated that he meets one of three
alternative criteria. See § 216(c)(4)(A)-(C). Second, if the petitioner has so
demonstrated eligibility, the BIA ‘may’ grant the waiver. § 216(c)(4).” Id. at
1194. We stated that “[t]he second-order decision whether to grant a waiver is
unambiguously ‘left to the discretion of the Attorney General.’” Id. (quoting
Damon v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Under Singh, the IJ could deny the waiver Kashanian sought as a matter of
discretion. Kashanian’s only argument on appeal therefore fails.

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PETITION DENIED.