Michael Ellis v. Corizon Incorporated

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL ELLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CORIZON INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
KAREN BARCKLAY; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 18-17015
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00536-SPL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Michael Ellis appeals pro se from the district court’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference
in the treatment of his skin condition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir.
2004) (summary judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)
(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ellis’s claims against defendants
Barclay-Dodson, Devon, Myers, and Johnson because Ellis failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (deliberate
indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a
difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to
deliberate indifference); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.
2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present
factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ellis’s deliberate
indifference claim against defendant Corizon Inc. because Ellis failed to establish a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any policy or custom of Corizon Inc.
caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles,
833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to
establish liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978)); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a

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private entity is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the entity acted under color
of state law and the constitutional violation was caused by the entity’s official
policy or custom).
AFFIRMED.

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