Stacey Mora v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STACEY MORA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-35947
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00326-REB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Ronald Bush, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 24, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Although Stacey Mora suffers from deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary
emboli with ongoing anticoagulant therapy; obesity; tremors secondary to
medication; mild asthma; and depression, the record supports the Commissioner of
FILED
NOV 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. It was not error to determine that Ms. Mora’s
impairments are not severe enough to meet or medically equal the criteria of a
listed impairment in the relevant regulations. Nor was it error to determine that Ms.
Mora has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy.
The sole issue presented in this appeal that Ms. Mora both raised before the
district court and preserved on appeal is that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) failed to give proper weight to the medical opinion of Ms. Mora’s treating
psychiatrist, Dr. DeSilva, who attested that Ms. Mora met a listed mental
impairment.1 Although Dr. DeSilva’s records documented Ms. Mora’s subjective
feelings, complaints, and medications, his records contained no objective medical
evidence (e.g., laboratory or psychological testing) since the alleged onset date of
Ms. Mora’s disability to support her claim of a mental disability. See 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(5)(A).
1 For the first time on appeal, Ms. Mora also challenges (1) the ALJ’s
conclusions concerning her RFC; (2) whether the ALJ gave proper weight to
statements from Ms. Mora’s former social worker and mother; and (3) the ALJ’s
analysis of Ms. Mora’s failure to seek in-person mental health counseling until
September 2015. Although Ms. Mora argues that she cannot waive pure questions
of law, she fails to explain how any arguments related to these challenges (as stated
in her opening brief on appeal) present pure questions of law.
2

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The ALJ had substantial evidence in the medical record to discount the
conclusions of Dr. DeSilva, whose notes since the alleged onset date showed no
psychological exams, and other medical evidence in the record generally described
benign findings and normal results. See Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980
(9th Cir. 1997). Although Ms. Mora argues on appeal that Dr. DeSilva in fact
conducted laboratory and psychological testing after her alleged onset date, she
cites to nothing in the record to support that contention. Instead, the record
reflected Ms. Mora’s ability to exercise at a fitness center, go hiking and boating,
and interact socially so that most people did not know that she was depressed. See
Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990). There was no objective
medical evidence to support Dr. DeSilva’s attestation that Ms. Mora met the
criteria for a listed impairment, and thus Ms. Mora’s argument that the ALJ erred
in discounting Dr. DeSilva’s opinion fails.
AFFIRMED.
3

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