United States of America v. Amber Heilman-Blanton

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AMBER HEILMAN-BLANTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-30064
D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00188-JLR-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Amber Heilman-Blanton appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 14-month sentence imposed upon her second revocation of
supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Heilman-Blanton contends that the district court erred by failing to explain
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the sentence adequately. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-
Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none.
The record reflects that the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for
imposing a sentence one month above the Guidelines range, including Heilman-
Blanton’s history of noncompliance and her unsuitability for supervised release.
See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Moreover, contrary to Heilman-Blanton’s contention, the district court did not rely
on impermissible sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v.
Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
Heilman-Blanton also contends that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable in light of the alleged procedural errors and her struggles with
substance abuse. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

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