Jhoti Ashok Crawford v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JHOTI ASHOK CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-15603
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02919-KJN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kendall J. Newman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Jhoti Crawford appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)’s decision denying him supplemental security
income (“SSI”) benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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de novo the district court’s order upholding the ALJ’s denial of benefits. Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). We “may reverse the ALJ’s
decision to deny benefits only if it is based upon legal error or is not supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. We affirm.
The ALJ properly applied the five-step sequential evaluation to determine
whether Crawford was eligible for SSI benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The
ALJ’s conclusion at step one that Crawford had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since he applied for SSI benefits on September 30, 2013, is supported by
substantial evidence and is not contested by either party. At step two, the ALJ
properly considered the separate and combined effects of Crawford’s claimed
impairments, and his conclusion that Crawford’s claimed impairments of his right
eye injury, lower back pain, asthma, and muscular dystrophy are not severe is
supported by substantial evidence.
At step three, the ALJ properly applied the special psychiatric review
technique applicable in 2015, and his conclusion that Crawford’s mental
impairments do not meet the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, Crawford argues that the
ALJ committed legal error at step four in finding that he is not disabled and can
perform his past work as a forklift driver, because the ALJ erred in giving greater
weight to his non-treating physicians’ opinions than to his treating psychiatrists’

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opinions. We need not address this issue, because the ALJ made alternative findings
at step five that Crawford is not disabled because he can perform other jobs such as
a food-counter worker, a laundry worker, or a retail bagger. Crawford did not
challenge the ALJ’s alternative step-five findings in district court, nor does he on
appeal.1
AFFIRMED.
1 Additionally, Crawford’s argument that the ALJ erred in discounting the
credibility of his testimony at his ALJ hearing is waived, because Crawford did not
raise the issue in district court. See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.
2006); Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2000).

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