Karen Ninoska Ulloa-Antunez v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAREN NINOSKA ULLOA-ANTUNEZ;
ESTEFAN ALEJANDRA ULLOA-
ANTUNEZ, AKA Estefani Ulloa-Antunez,
AKA Estefany Ulloa-Antunez, AKA
Estefany Alejandra Ulloa-Antunez,
Petitioners,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70995
Agency Nos. A202-078-665
A202-078-666
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 16, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAY 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Karen Ninoska Ulloa-Antunez and her daughter, Estefan Alejandra Ulloa-
Antunez, natives and citizens of Honduras, petition for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of an order of an
Immigration Judge (IJ), which denied their claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioners are not
entitled to asylum because they failed to establish that any harm they suffered in
Honduras was or would be on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s
desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random
violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). Further,
although the IJ found Ulloa-Antunez to be credible, that credibility finding does
not entitle petitioners to relief because her testimony fails to demonstrate that they
satisfy the requirements for asylum.
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s decision that petitioners are not
entitled to withholding of removal because they have not shown that their lives or
freedom would be threatened in Honduras because of a protected ground. See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). For that reason, the BIA’s error in
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applying the “one central reason” standard to the question of nexus in petitioners’
withholding of removal claims, see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359
(9th Cir. 2017), was harmless.
Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s determination that they are
ineligible for CAT relief and therefore waive any argument regarding CAT. See
Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover,
because petitioners do not identify anything in the record showing that the IJ failed
to evaluate any evidence or testimony, demonstrated cultural bias, or misapplied
the law, petitioners’ claim that the IJ violated their due process rights is meritless.
The BIA decision was sufficiently reasoned and detailed for our review, and
remand for further explanation is not warranted. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d
799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, the notice to appear filed by the Department of Homeland Security
was adequate to vest jurisdiction in the removal proceeding in the immigration
judge. Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2019).
PETITION DENIED.
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