Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru, an individual v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School, a California non-profit corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AGNES DEIRDRE MORRISSEY-BERRU,
an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL,
a California non-profit corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-56624
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-09353-SVW-AFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GILSTRAP,**
District Judge.
Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru brought a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against her former employer, Our
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable James Rodney Gilstrap, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 30 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Lady of Guadalupe School (the “School”). The only issue reached by this Court is
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
School on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister” for purposes of the
ministerial exception. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
reverse.1
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Olsen v. Idaho State
Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the
Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception for the first time, 565 U.S.
171, 188 (2012), and considered the following four factors in analyzing whether
the exception applied: (1) whether the employer held the employee out as a
minister by bestowing a formal religious title; (2) whether the employee’s title
reflected ministerial substance and training; (3) whether the employee held herself
out as a minister; and (4) whether the employee’s job duties included “important
religious functions,” id. at 191–92. Hosanna expressly declined to adopt “a rigid
formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,” and instead
considered “all the circumstances of [the employee’s] employment.” Id. at 190.
1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of
this case.

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Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that
the district court erred in concluding that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister” for
purposes of the ministerial exception. Unlike the employee in Hosanna-Tabor,
Morrissey-Berru’s formal title of “Teacher” was secular. Aside from taking a
single course on the history of the Catholic church, Morrissey-Berru did not have
any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Morrissey-Berru also
did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister.
Morrissey-Berru did have significant religious responsibilities as a teacher at
the School. She committed to incorporate Catholic values and teachings into her
curriculum, as evidenced by several of the employment agreements she signed, led
her students in daily prayer, was in charge of liturgy planning for a monthly Mass,
and directed and produced a performance by her students during the School’s
Easter celebration every year. However, an employee’s duties alone are not
dispositive under Hosanna-Tabor’s framework. See Biel v. St. James Sch., 911
F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2018). Therefore, on balance, we conclude that the
ministerial exception does not bar Morrissey-Berru’s ADEA claim.2 See id. at
608–11 (holding that the ministerial exception did not apply under similar
circumstances).
2 As the district court indicated, Morrissey-Berru’s ADEA claim, based on
her demotion, appears to be time barred. However, we leave it to the district court
to resolve this issue in the first instance on remand.

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REVERSED.

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